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"The most important unanswered question in evolutionary biology, and more 
generally in the social sciences, is how cooperative behaviour evolved and can be 
maintained in human or other animal groups and societies.”  
 
 
- Lord Robert May, former Chief Scientific Adviser 
to HM Government, in his final presidential 
address to the Royal Society, 30 November 2005. 
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Abstract 
 
In recent decades we have learned that cooperation is an important and pervasive 
feature of microbial life. This revelation raises exciting possibilities. On the one 
hand, we can now augment our understanding of how social phenomena evolve by 
using microbial model systems to test our theories. On the other hand, we can use 
concepts from social evolution to gain insight into the biology of the microbes we 
hope to control or kill.  
 
In this thesis I explore both possibilities. First, I consider the theoretical problem of 
how and when microbial cooperation might be subject to frequency- and density-
dependence. Formerly, vague theory and a scant, sometimes contradictory empirical 
literature made it unclear when such patterns could be expected. Here, I develop 
theory tailored to a microbial context, and in each case, I test key predictions from 
the theory in laboratory experiments, using as my model trait the production of 
siderophores by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.  
 
Secondly, I consider the ecological consequences of cooperator-cheat dynamics in 
the context of an infection. Specifically, I use experimental infections of diverse host 
models to investigate the role of two cooperative traits, siderophore production and 
quorum sensing, in the pathogenesis of P. aeruginosa. When a successful infection 
requires cooperation among pathogens, theory predicts that conflict among co-
infecting strains can undermine cooperation and hence decrease virulence; whereas, 
in the absence of cooperation, conflict could lead to heightened exploitation and 
hence increased virulence. This exciting idea has received little empirical attention to 
date but here I address this using multiple pathogen strains, multiple social traits, and 
multiple model hosts.  
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1. Sociomicrobiology: an introduction 
 
The work in this thesis represents a fusion of social evolution theory and 
microbiology. This area of research, dubbed ‘sociomicrobiology’, is a fledgling field, 
but one that is growing rapidly as scientists from either background increasingly 
recognise the potential, and indeed the need, for synergy between these two 
historically disparate disciplines (Velicer 2003; West et al. 2006; Dethlefsen et al. 
2007; West et al. 2007a). In the following sections of this chapter,  I briefly review 
the significance of this union, discussing, in turn what microbiology has to offer 
social evolution (section 1.1), and then what social evolution has to offer 
microbiology (section 1.2). I provide only a brief synopsis here because each later 
chapter contains its own independent introduction with relevant background. In the 
final section of this chapter (1.3) I provide a plan for the rest of this thesis, outlining 
how my own research addresses the challenges in this field.    
 
1.1. How can microbiology help social evolution?  
 
Social evolution concerns the study of ‘social’ behaviours†, which are those that 
affect not only a focal individual but others too. Such behaviours can be classified on 
the basis of their direct fitness consequences for both the actor and the recipient(s) 
(Table 1.1; Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1985; West et al 2007c).  
 
Table 1.1.  Social behaviours classified according to their direct fitness consequences. 
Effect on recipient 
 + - 
+ 
 
Mutual benefit Selfishness 
Effect on actor 
- Altruism Spite 
 
                COOPERATION 
                                                 
† ‘Behaviour’, as it is used here, can be regarded as synonymous with ‘trait’ or ‘adaptation’. It refers 
to any action undertaken by- , or any morphological structure associated with, a given biological 
entity. Thus, the transmission of a selfish genetic element, the secretion of proteins from a cell, a 
plant’s tolerance for rhizobial colonization of its root nodules, or the territorial contest between two 
baboons can all be thought of as ‘behaviours’.  
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Behaviours beneficial to the actor can be ‘selfish’ if the recipient suffers costs, or 
‘mutually beneficial’ if the recipient also benefits from the interaction‡. Behaviours 
costly to the actor could be ‘altruistic’ if beneficial to the recipient, or ‘spiteful’ if 
costly to both parties (see Gardner and West 2004 for further discussion on the 
evolution of spite). Altruism and mutual benefit together comprise ‘cooperative’ 
behaviours – those which provide benefit to others (and which have evolved at least 
partly because of this benefit). In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish between 
these two, because an action that incurs a cost to the actor in the short term 
(appearing to be an altruistic act) could result in some deferred direct benefit at a 
later time point (and thus be mutually beneficial). Also, mutual benefits are typically 
asymmetrical, so – at least when interacting parties are part of the same competitive 
pool (i.e. local, intraspecific interactions) – such behaviours will usually ultimately 
tend towards either selfishness (if the actor derives greater benefit) or altruism (if the 
recipient derives greater benefits from the interaction).  
 
Cooperation is widespread in nature and has underpinned all the major transitions 
between levels of biological complexity (Maynard Smith and Szathmàry 1995). 
Despite its ubiquity however, it presents a serious evolutionary conundrum: against a 
backdrop of Darwinian “survival of the fittest”, how can cooperation evolve if it 
increases the fitness of a recipient relatively more than it does the fitness of the 
actor? Surely cheats – individuals which do not cooperate but are able to exploit the 
cooperation of others – would gain a competitive advantage and thus be able to 
invade and out-compete a population of cooperators? This problem is well 
recognized in the fields of economics and sociology too (e.g. the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’; Hardin 1968). 
 
Given the ubiquity of cooperation in the natural world, solutions to the problem of 
cooperation must obviously exist. Accordingly, much effort has gone into finding 
biologically plausible explanations for the evolution of cooperation, particularly in 
the wake of William D. Hamilton’s seminal insights of the 1960s, when he 
recognized that an actor’s behaviour could influence its fitness indirectly too via its 
                                                 
‡ Note that the term ‘mutualism’ is historically reserved for instances of interspecific cooperation 
(West et al. 2007c). 
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impact on other individuals, and that the direction and magnitude of this influence 
depended on the genetic correlation between the actor and the recipient (kin 
selection; Hamilton 1964).  
 
A profusion of models and mechanisms has since been proposed, involving either 
direct or indirect fitness benefits, or some combination of the two (Figure 1.1). In 
recent years, significant progress has been made towards bringing this vast body of 
work together into a common, comprehensive conceptual framework (Sachs et al. 
2004; Foster and Wenseleers 2006; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Bergmüller et al. 
2007; West et al. 2007b; Bshary and Bergmüller 2008; Gardner and Foster 2008). 
There has also been progress towards resolving the considerable semantic confusion 
that has dogged this field (West et al. 2007c) and in developing and promoting a 
versatile, powerful approach with which to mathematically formalize and link these 
various concepts (inclusive fitness theory; Hamilton 1964; Taylor and Frank 1996; 
Frank 1998; Grafen 2006; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Grafen 2007; Lehmann et al. 
2007; Taylor et al. 2007) 
 
Figure 1.1. A classification scheme for the various mechanisms whereby cooperation can 
evolve. Although direct benefits are principally important for mutually beneficial cooperation 
and indirect benefits for altruism, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and may 
often operate synergistically to facilitate the evolution of cooperation. This figure is redrawn 
from West et al. (2007b), which discusses these mechanisms in greater detail.  
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Theoretical advances in the field of social evolution have outpaced empirical work. 
The majority of this theory was devised to explain known behaviours in animals such 
as insects, birds and mammals, and although the general concepts should be 
applicable across all biological systems, there has been little empirical testing of 
these ideas outside of these select taxa (West et al 2007a). Moreover, some aspects of 
theory have been overlooked by empiricists because to test them experimentally 
would require manipulations that are impractical or impossible in traditional systems. 
For example, to experimentally test the idea that local competition could 
counterbalance kin selection for cooperation (West et al. 2001; Griffin and West 
2002) requires that relatedness be varied independently of the scale of competition  - 
something not easily achieved in traditional study systems (but see Griffin et al. 
2004).  
 
This is where microbiology comes in. Microbial systems are uniquely amenable to 
experimentation. Microbes can be cultured under laboratory conditions, quickly, in 
large population sizes and with high levels of replication. The fitnesses of different 
genotypes can be easily monitored across multiple generations and the course of their 
evolution can be influenced by artificially imposed selection regimes, tracked in real 
time, and even halted whenever desired by simply popping them in the freezer! 
Moreover, in the case of the better studied microbial model organisms, much is 
already known about the genetic details underlying a given trait, such that genetic 
mutants for a trait of interest can be relatively easily generated using targeted 
mutagenesis, or failing that, non-targeted mutagenesis using radiation or chemical 
treatments (Foster et al. 2007). 
 
Microbial systems, therefore, offer social evolution excellent opportunities to 
confirm the generality of existing theory and test previously untested (or poorly 
tested) predictions. Their unique biology can also provide novel challenges for which 
new theory is appropriate, such as quorum sensing (Brown and Johnstone 2001) or 
frequency-dependent cooperation (chapter 2). Finally, because many microbes are 
medically or economically important, they present a rare opportunity for scientists 
working on social evolution to apply their skills and experience to situations where 
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greater biological insight could lead to a more productive or sustainable industrial 
process, or significant benefits to our health and wellbeing and that of the organisms 
we care about (Nesse and Stearns 2008). 
 
1.2. How can social evolution help microbiology?  
 
The classic view of microbes as simple organisms that live out essentially solitary 
existences has been dramatically overturned in the past few decades with the 
discovery that, in fact, microbes are intensely social organisms. Indeed, microbes 
exhibit a striking array of social behaviours (Shapiro 1998; Crespi 2001; West et al. 
2007a; Davidson and Surette 2008).  Numerous microbial systems have now been 
described in which individuals variously communicate and cooperate to disperse, 
acquire food and counter abiotic or biotic threats. Such phenomena have 
understandably attracted enormous interest from microbiologists, who have set to 
work deploying, usually to great effect, an impressive array of modern technology, to 
uncover the molecular and biochemical details underlying each system.  
 
There has however, been considerable confusion in the microbiological literature 
when it comes to interpreting the ultimate, evolutionary forces that facilitate and 
govern these phenomena. The fact that cooperation among individual microbes can 
lead to benefits at the population level does not itself provide an evolutionary stable 
solution to the problem of cooperation (West et al. 2007a), yet the microbiological 
literature is replete with claims that cooperative behaviours have evolved ‘for the 
good of the group’ (e.g. Shapiro 1998). I provide a few examples below: 
 
• Biofilms – intricate surface-attached communities – represent a common 
mode of growth for many microbes (Kolter and Greenberg 2006). Growth in 
biofilms confers obvious benefits at a group level. These matrix-enclosed 
‘slime cities’ (Watnick and Kolter 2000) provide a stable, protective 
environment and act as a nidus for the dissemination of dispersal units (Hall-
Stoodley and Stoodley 2005). Observing that biofilm cultures are often 
characterized by greater genetic and phenotypic diversity than planktonic 
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cultures (Stewart and Franklin 2008), and that genetically diverse biofilms 
have a greater likelihood of persisting under changeable environmental 
conditions, Boles et al. (2004) postulate that this “… self-generated diversity 
in biofilms provides a form of biological insurance that can safeguard the 
community in the face of adverse conditions.” Chia et al. (2008) share this 
view: “The different types of cells rely on each other, so that their mutual 
interactions lead to the overall success of the group.” Watnick and Kolter 
(2000) extend this thinking to multispecies biofilms: “We liken the 
multispecies bacterial biofilm to a city where bacteria settle selectively, limit 
settlements of new bacteria, store energy in exopolysaccharide, and transfer 
genetic material horizontally, all for the good of the many.”  
• In microbial populations facing starvation or stress it is often observed that a 
subpopulation of specialized “persister” cells develops (Lewis 2007). These 
are metabolically quiescent but hardy phenotypes with greatly improved 
prospects for survival under stressful conditions. Palkova (2004) interprets 
this phenomenon as follows: “… multicellular existence allows individual 
cells to differentiate and acquire specific properties, such as forming 
resistant spores, which benefit the whole population.”  
• Apoptosis (cell suicide) routinely occurs within metazoan tissues but also in 
microbes (Bayles 2007; Büttner et al. 2007), where its function has attracted 
much speculation:“… in yeast colonies, part of the population sacrifices itself 
for the benefit of the rest of the population” (Palkova and Vachova 2006)  
• Cell-to-cell signaling (quorum sensing), thought to operate in most microbial 
taxa (Bassler and Losick 2006), is another phenomenon of major biological 
significance, and it too is widely assumed to have evolved because of the 
benefits it confers at a population-level. Lyon (2007) suggests that this 
situation has been further exacerbated by the use of loaded 
anthropomorphisms when referring to this phenomenon, such as ‘‘language’’ 
(Bassler 2002; Sperandio et al. 2003), ‘‘talking’’ (Kaiser and Losick 1993; 
Winzer et al. 2002), ‘‘listening’’ (Fuqua and Greenberg 1998), 
‘‘eavesdropping’’ (Von Bodman et al. 2003; Wagner et al. 2006), and even 
‘‘linguistic communication’’ (Ben Jacob et al. 2004).  
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The past 45 years of social evolution research have shown us that this concept of 
traits evolving “for the good of the group” is misguided (West et al. 2008; Gardner 
and Grafen, in press). On the contrary, one of the most important principles to have 
emerged from these decades of social evolution research is that selection acts to 
maximize the inclusive fitness of individuals. Certainly, the relative success of a 
group in competition with other groups can feed back into the inclusive fitness of 
individuals that comprise that group (multi-level selection), and in this sense, group-
selected benefits can influence the course of evolution; however, only under certain 
restrictive conditions – such as when groups are wholly clonal, or competition is 
completely suppressed – will the interests of individuals and groups may be 
sufficiently aligned for selection to appear to act at the level of the group. In general, 
this is considered a weak and largely unimportant force in evolution (Maynard Smith 
1976; West et al. 2006).  
 
A major problem with the “for the good of the group” paradigm is that it tends to 
overlook the inevitable potential for conflict of interest within groups. Wherever 
there is cooperation, so too we would expect conflict. Conflict is especially likely 
within populations with high genetic variability, but if the conditions are right (i.e. 
the scale of competition is sufficiently local), conflict can occur even within highly 
related groups (Gonzalez-Pastor et al. 2003; Griffin et al. 2004). Explanations for 
cooperation must take into account the ever-present potential for invasion and take-
over by selfish cheats – individuals that avoid contributing to population-level 
cooperation while still deriving benefits from the cooperation of others (Velicer 
2003; Travisano and Velicer 2004; West et al. 2006).  
 
Invoking this sort of group selection to account for microbial social phenomena is 
both fallacious and unnecessary. In contrast, focusing on the costs and benefits 
accruing to individuals (and other individuals with whom they interact), can offer 
more insightful, more powerful and ultimately more biologically plausible 
hypotheses. For instance, the presence of genetic variants within biofilms may not 
reflect the endpoints of an adaptive programme of division of labour but simply 
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evidence of selection at work within the biofilm (Cooper et al. 2005; but see also 
Brockhurst et al. 2006). The seemingly altruistic production of exploitable resources 
such as extracellular polysaccharide (biofilm ‘slime’) could in fact be driven by 
conflicts within the biofilm, as cells compete to occupy the surface zones of the 
biofilm (Xavier and Foster 2007). The ‘persister cell’ phenomenon, meanwhile, 
could have evolved as a bet-hedging strategy benefitting the inclusive fitness of an 
individual cell because quiescence raises its own individual chances of surviving 
catastrophes (Gardner et al. 2007). Even apoptosis can be explained from the 
perspective of the inclusive fitness of an individual cell (Ackermann et al. 2008; 
Gardner and Kümmerli 2008). Quorum sensing too, did not necessarily evolve as a 
universally beneficial system of communication, but rather could have arisen as an 
adaptation whereby individual cells could gauge the diffusive properties environment 
(Redfield 2002) or coerce other cells into cooperating (Keller and Surette 2006). 
 
Bringing rigorous and up-to-date social evolution theory into microbiology is 
important (Foster 2005; Nesse and Stearns 2008). Microbes, with their large 
populations and rapid generation times, can respond quickly to selection and if we 
want to properly understand the course this evolution will take, we will need to 
understand not only the proximate mechanistic details of microbiological 
phenomena, but also the ultimate evolutionary forces that govern the emergence and 
persistence of these traits of interest (Tinbergen 1963). The distinction between 
individual-based explanations for cooperation and those that rely solely on 
population-level benefits is crucial: because of the selfish interest of individuals, 
bacterial populations will not always evolve in ways that optimise population 
survival.  
 
1.3. Aims of this thesis 
 
In the preceding sections I have argued for a closer union between social evolution 
and microbiology. In this thesis I work towards achieving this aim, by (a) 
demonstrating how social evolution theory can be advanced by testing it in the 
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context of microbial systems (chapters 2 and 3) and (b) applying social evolution 
theory to further our understanding of microbial virulence (chapters 4 and 5).  
Specifically:  
• Chapter 2 considers the theoretical problem of how and when microbial 
cooperation might be subject to frequency-dependence. The chapter 
comprises a combination of theory and laboratory experiments which test this 
theory, using as a model system the cooperative production of siderophores 
(iron scavenging molecules) by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.  
• Chapter 3 follows a similar format to chapter 2 but explores a different 
theoretical question – that of when and why cooperation is expected to be 
density dependent. Again, I test theoretical predictions using in vitro 
experiments with the P. aeruginosa siderophore model system. 
• Chapter 4 asks whether the virulence of multi-strain infections can be 
influenced by social conflicts among co-infecting pathogens. I tackle this 
question empirically, concentrating on the public goods type cooperative trait 
of siderophore production and using experimental infection models of 
different host models with the well-known generalist pathogen P. aeruginosa.  
• Chapter 5 extends the work of the previous chapter to a different model trait, 
quorum sensing, which is widely held to be a key factor in the virulence of 
many microbial pathogens. I test whether social conflict over this trait, 
previously demonstrated to occur in vitro, also applies in vivo in an infection 
context, and whether it influences the resulting virulence of an infection. In 
this chapter I also evaluate, through my own experiments and a survey of the 
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2. Frequency dependence and cooperation: theory 




Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory provides a leading explanation for the problem of 
cooperation. A general result from inclusive fitness theory is that, except under 
restrictive conditions, cooperation should not be subject to frequency-dependent 
selection. However, several recent studies in microbial systems have demonstrated 
that the relative fitness of cheats, which do not cooperate, is greater when cheats are 
rarer. Here we demonstrate theoretically that such frequency-dependent selection can 
occur in microbes when there is: (a) sufficient population structuring, or (b) an 
association between the level of cooperation and total population growth. We test 
prediction (b) and its underlying assumption, using the pathogenic bacterium 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, by competing strains that produce iron scavenging 
siderophore molecules (cooperators) with non-producers (cheats) at various ratios, 
under conditions that minimise population structuring. We found that both the 
relative fitness of cheats, and the productivity of the mixed culture were significantly 
negatively related to initial cheat frequency. Furthermore, when the period of 
population growth was experimentally shortened, the strength of frequency 
dependence was reduced. More generally, we argue that frequency-dependent 
selection on cooperative traits may be more common in microbes than in metazoans 
because strong selection, structuring and cooperation-dependent growth will be more 




Explaining cooperation is one of the greatest challenges for evolutionary biology 
(Maynard Smith and Szathmàry 1995; Hamilton 1996). The problem is: why should 
an individual perform a cooperative behaviour that appears costly to perform, but 
benefits other individuals (Hamilton 1964)? Following a wealth of theoretical work 
                                                 
§ Published as Ross-Gillespie, A., Gardner, A., West, S.A. and A. S. Griffin. 2007. Frequency 
dependence and cooperation: theory and a test with bacteria. American Naturalist 170:331-342. See 
appendix A2. 
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in this area in recent decades, we now have an excellent general understanding of the 
different ways in which cooperation can be favoured (reviewed by Frank 2003; 
Sachs et al. 2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006; West et al. 2006, 2007). However, 
much of this vast body of theory has been developed to elucidate general principles, 
and is less useful for stimulating empirical tests of theory (Leimar and Hammerstein 
2006). Consequently, a major task for social evolution research is to take this general 
theory and develop it such that it can be tested empirically, with specific groups of 
organisms.  
 
Microbes offer a number of advantages for testing social evolution theory (reviewed 
by Crespi 2001; West et al. 2006). In particular, they perform a number of 
cooperative behaviours, where it is possible to alter the costs and benefits of 
cooperation experimentally, and then follow the fitness consequences (West et al. 
2006). Recently, there has been interest in how the relative fitness of cooperators, 
and cheats who do not cooperate (or cooperate less), depends upon the relative 
proportion of cooperators in the population (Velicer et al. 2000; Dugatkin et al. 2003; 
Dugatkin et al. 2005; Harrison et al. 2006; MacLean and Gudelj 2006). However, 
these experimental examinations of frequency dependence contrast with most theory 
in this area, where frequency dependence is not predicted. Indeed, a major result 
from Hamilton’s (1964) original inclusive fitness formulation, showing how 
cooperation can be favoured between relatives, was that it did not vary with gene 
frequency at all. Instead, because increased cooperation also represents an increased 
opportunity for exploitation, the fitness advantage of cooperation remains constant 
despite changes in the frequency of cooperators. Hamilton was so pleased by this 
result that he later described it as a “gift from God” (Hamilton 1988). Subsequent 
work has shown that frequency dependence can enter into kin selection theory in 
cases featuring strong selection (genes with large fitness effects) or non-additivity 
(e.g. Charlesworth 1978; Michod 1982; Toro et al. 1982; Queller 1984; Frank 1998; 
Day and Taylor 1998; Rousset 2004).  
 
Our first aim in this paper is to develop theory that predicts specifically when and 
why frequency dependent selection on cooperation should be observed in microbes. 
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The phenomenon is illustrated by considering the extracellular secretion of 
substances which can be utilised by neighbouring cells. The production of such 
‘public goods’ requires explanation because they are costly to the individual to 
produce, but provide a benefit to the local group (West et al. 2006). In this situation, 
we might, at first glance, expect that selection on cells that contribute less than their 
fair share to the public good resource pool (cheats) should be frequency dependent. 
That is, cheats should do better when they are rare, because there will be more public 
goods / cooperators for them to exploit. However, cooperators also gain a benefit 
from being in a more cooperative population. In the simplest scenario, these two 
effects exactly cancel and so selection on cheats and cooperators does not depend on 
their frequency (see model section). We will examine the extent to which frequency 
dependence does arise when the following biological complexities are taken into 
consideration: population structure, effects of cooperation on population growth, and 
large (as opposed to small) fitness consequences associated with variation in the 
level of cooperation (strong selection). 
 
Our model predicts that, given strong selection, cheats will be subject to negative 
frequency-dependent selection (i.e. their relative fitness will be lower when 
common) when (a) the population is structured, and / or (b) a higher frequency of 
cooperators leads to greater population growth. We tested prediction (b), and the 
underlying assumption on the relationship between growth and cooperator frequency, 
by investigating the production of a public good, iron-scavenging siderophore 
molecules, in the bacterial pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa (West and Buckling 
2003; Griffin et al. 2004). Iron is a major limiting factor for bacterial growth, 
because most iron in the environment is in the insoluble Fe(III) form and is actively 
withheld by hosts (Guerinot 1994; Ratledge and Dover 2000). Siderophores scavenge 
insoluble and host-bound iron, making it available for bacterial metabolism. To 
determine whether frequency dependence is a general characteristic of P. aeruginosa 
siderophore production, and not just a pleiotropic effect associated with a specific 
cooperator-cheat pair, we examined three independently-derived cooperator-cheat 
strain pairs. These involved mutants produced by UV mutagenesis, single gene 
deletion, and spontaneous natural mutation respectively. 
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2.3. Models and Analyses 
 
We will explore some ways in which frequency-dependent selection can arise in kin 
selection models for the production of public goods dilemmas in microbes. In 
particular, we examine the role of (1) population structure (including mixing rates 
and the scale over which social interaction occurs), and (2) the dependence of 
population carrying capacity and growth on the level of public goods contributions. 
In both cases, we allow for strong selection, which is crucial for frequency 
dependence in the context of social behaviours, and is an important characteristic of 
many microbial cooperative traits (see discussion). To begin, we demonstrate that 
frequency dependence does not emerge under the simplest possible scenario with 
weak selection.  
 
Weak selection and frequency independence 
 
In a broad class of models, weak selection leads to frequency independence (Rousset 
2004, p80; 2006). To see why, consider a large population facing a public goods 
dilemma, such as, for example, siderophore production. An individual’s fitness is a 
function of: (1) its level of public goods contribution, s ; and (2) the average public 
goods production across the whole population, s . Without making further 
assumptions, we can express fitness as w s,s ( ); this can be done for structured and 
unstructured populations. Further, we assume that cooperative individuals contribute 
an amount sC , and that a proportion p of the individuals in the population are 
defectors (cheats) who contribute a smaller amount, sD = sC −δ ; hence, s = sC − pδ . 
Thus, the fitness of a cooperator is 
 
wC = w sC ,sC − pδ( ),                                                                                                   (1) 
 
and the fitness of a cheat is 
 
wD = w sC −δ,sC − pδ( ).                                                                                              (2) 
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The relative fitness of cheats is given by the ratio of cheat and cooperator fitness and, 







∂s δ = 0
δ / ˆ w + O δ 2( ),                                                                              (3) 
 
where ˆ w = w sC ,sC( ) is the fitness of cooperators in the absence of cheats. This 
reveals that, to leading order in δ, the relative fitness of cheats is not a function of 
their frequency p in the population (the partial derivative appearing in equation (3) is 
not a function of p, because it is evaluated in the neutral population where δ = 0, so 
that cooperators and defectors are indistinguishable and the frequency of the latter is 
irrelevant). Hence, if selection is weak (δ sufficiently small for higher order terms in 
δ to be negligible), it is also frequency independent. For stronger selection, the 
trailing term of order δ2 becomes more important, and if this is a function of the 
frequency of cheats then there is the possibility of frequency-dependent selection. 
Note that although our analyses focus on whether the fitness of cheats is frequency 
dependence, the fact that we are examining relative fitness means that they also 
demonstrate the nature of selection on cooperators – if the relative fitness of cheats 
decreases as they become more common, then the relative fitness of cooperators 




One way in which strong selection can give rise to frequency-dependent selection is 
if populations are structured so that cooperators and cheats do not share the same 
social environment. This could occur in populations with localised social interaction 
due to limited mixing of public goods or cells. A consequence of this is that more 
cooperative individuals would have greater access to public goods, either because 
they enjoy preferential access to the public goods that they have produced, or 
because they use the public goods produced by their clonal relatives (who are also 
cooperators). We examine this in general terms, describing fitness as a product of 
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two components that capture: (1) the cost of producing public goods; and (2) the 
benefit of receiving public goods. In particular, we write: 
 
w s, ˆ s ( )= g s( )h ˆ s ( ),                                                                                                       (4) 
 
where: w is fitness; g is a growth component that decreases with one’s individual 
allocation to public goods production, s; and h is a growth component that increases 
with one’s access to public goods, ˆ s  (for related microbial models see Brown 1999; 
Smith 2001; West et al. 2002; Dugatkin et al. 2003; West and Buckling 2003). In 
mathematical terms, we have: g > 0, ∂g /∂s = ′ g < 0, h > 0 and ∂h /∂ˆ s = ′ h > 0 . We 
make the further assumption of linear or diminishing returns to fecundity as access to 
public goods in the social environment is increased, giving ∂2h /∂ˆ s 2 ≤ 0 . Due to 
population structure, the level of public goods available in the social environment is 
correlated with the individual’s own allocation to public goods, according to the 
expression ˆ s = rs + (1− r)s ; i.e. the level of public goods available lies between one’s 
own investment (s) and the population average investment ( s ), according to the 
relatedness between social partners (r). The variable r encapsulates the effects of 
both bacterial dispersal and the diffusion of public goods through the population. It 
therefore allows us to move between the extremes of a completely mixed population 
or global diffusion of public goods (r=0), and a completely structured population, 
where all neighbours are the same genotype or public goods disperse over such small 
distances that they are only utilised by the individual that produced them (r=1; cheats 
only interact with cheats, and cooperators only interact with cooperators).  
 
We compare the fecundity of a strain that allocates nothing to public goods (s = 0, 
defection) to that of a strain that allocates a standard unit (s = 1, cooperation). 
Respectively, these are: 
 
wD = g 0( )h (1− r)(1− p)( )= gDhD , and                                                                       (5) 
 
wC = g 1( )h r + (1− r)(1− p)( )= gC hC ,                                                                          (6) 
 
   31 
where p is the population frequency of cheats, and hence s =1− p  is the population 
average allocation to public goods, being the proportion of cooperators.  
The relative fitness of cheats can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )
















.                                                              (7) 
 
We now determine whether and how the relative fitness of cheats (v) varies with 












.                                                                                     (8) 
 
This reveals the following: (1) In the absence of population structure (r = 0) there is 
no frequency dependence (dv/dp = 0), because cooperators and cheats share the same 
social environment and hence hC = hD  and ′ h C = ′ h D ; (2) In fully-structured 
populations (r = 1) there is no frequency dependence (dv/dp = 0), because an 
individual’s social environment is dependent only on its own cooperation strategy 
and not on the global frequency of cooperators; (3) In a population with intermediate 
structuring (0 < r < 1) there is negative frequency dependence (dv/dp < 0), because 
cooperators enjoy more public goods in their social environment than do cheats and 
hence hC > hD  and ′ h C ≤ ′ h D . 
 
The impact of population structure (r) on cheat relative fitness (v) is examined using 











                                                                                  (9) 
 
is a negative quantity, and hence increasing population structure (higher r) reduces 
the relative fitness (v) of cheats. This is because cheats will have a higher fitness in 
more mixed populations, where they are better able to exploit the cooperators. This 
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could be tested empirically by examining the strength of frequency dependence 
across populations that are structured to different degrees – e.g. using shaken versus 
unshaken liquid culture media, or semisolid agar culture media of varying viscosities. 




Figure 2.1. Structured-population model, with fitness given by the product of 
g[s] =1− s /2 and h[ˆ s ] = ˆ s  where s is an individual’s own contribution to public goods, 
and ˆ s  is the amount of public goods in the individual’s social environment. (A) The 
relative fitness of cheats (v) decreases with their frequency (p) and with the degree of 
population structure (r). (B) The total productivity of the population decreases with the 
frequency of cheats (p) and with degree of population structure (r). 
 
Population growth as a function of cooperation frequency 
 
Another way in which strong selection can give rise to frequency dependence is 
when the growth of a population depends on its genetic composition. If the growth of 
a bacterial population is negligible when cheating is prevalent, we expect little 
change in population size and genetic composition, due to cheats having a limited 
opportunity to exploit cooperators. Conversely, if more cooperative bacterial 
colonies achieve a higher carrying capacity and hence more growth, differences in 
growth rates of cooperators and cheats could lead to more pronounced changes in 
gene frequencies. Describing fitness in terms of absolute increase over the growth 
period, the relative fitness of faster growers increases with the number of rounds of 
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division. Put simply, more growth means a greater chance for cheats to exploit 
cooperators. 
 
For simplicity, consider a well-mixed population of bacteria growing exponentially 
over a time period that depends on the initial proportion of cooperators. Defining a 
basic time unit such that the instantaneous rate of growth is 1 for cooperators, then 
the growth rate of cheats can be represented as 1+b. After t time units, the numbers 
of cooperators and cheats are given by: 
 
nC ,t = nC ,0e
t ,                                                                                                              (10) 
 
nD,t = nD,0e
(1+b )t ,                                                                                                        (11) 
 
respectively, where nC ,0  and nD,0 are, respectively, the numbers of cooperators and 
cheats at time t = 0. If growth ceases at time t = T[ p0], which decreases with the 
initial proportion of cheats (p0; i.e. dT /dp0 < 0), then the frequency of cheats 










.                                                                              (12) 
 
Hence, the relative fitness of cheats versus cooperators is:  
 
v = ebT .                                                                                                                      (13) 
 
It is easy to show that relative fitness of cheats is frequency dependent, and indeed 












                                                                                          (14) 
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is negative because dT/dp0 < 0. Note that frequency independence is recovered in the 
limit of weak selection (small b). Here, we can write T = ˆ T + O(b) where ˆ T  is a 
constant with respect to the frequency of cheats, p. Hence, from a Taylor expansion 
of (13), relative fitness is given by v =1+ ˆ T b + O(b2) , i.e. to a first order 
approximation it is independent of the frequency of cheats.  
 
This model of exponential growth, with an abrupt halt at a time depending on the 
population level of cooperation, is unrealistic and pursued only for the sake of 
analytic tractability. We now consider a more realistic model describing logistic 
growth and competition for resources, in which a population of cooperators can 
maintain a higher cell density than can a population of cheats. In particular, we 
continue to assume an intrinsic growth rate of 1 and 1+b for cooperators and cheats 









= 1+ b( )nD,t 1− E t( ),                                                                                          (16) 
 
where: the numbers of cooperators and cheats ( nC ,t  and nD,t) are expressed as 
proportions of the total population size that can be maintained at equilibrium 
(carrying capacity) if all cells cooperate; and E t = nC ,t + (1+ a)nD,t  is the ‘effective’ 
population size, in terms of the strain on resources that slows population growth, 
where each cheating individual incurs a strain that is equivalent to that of 1+a 
cooperators. This reflects the benefit of cooperation for the population: for a > 0, 
defectors inflate the effective size of the population, so that when they are common 
the actual number of cells that can be sustained at stationary phase is reduced. This 
model contains nonlinearities which prevent an analytical treatment, though 
numerical solutions are possible (Figure 2.2), and these recover the same qualitative 
results derived above for the simpler exponential growth model. 




Figure 2.2. Logistic growth model, with more cooperative populations experiencing 
higher carrying capacity, for a range of initial population sizes ( z0 = nC ,0 + nD,t  as a 
proportion of carrying capacity for a fully-cooperative population) and initial proportion 
of cheats ( p0 = nD,0 /z0). We assume that cheats grow at twice the rate of cooperators, 
and that they exert twice as great a competitive strain on resources (a = b = 1). (A) The 
relative fitness of cheats (v) decreases as initial population size (z0) and initial proportion 
of cheats (p0) increases, because both result in reduced population growth, and hence less 
pronounced fitness differences. (B) The total productivity of the population (G) 
decreases as initial population size (z0) and initial proportion of cheats (p0) increases, 





We experimentally tested our prediction that cheat fitness will be negatively 
correlated with the frequency of cheats when population growth increases with 
cooperator frequency. We minimised the possible effects of structured populations 
leading to frequency dependence by carrying out growth in a shaken liquid media.  
 
Description of strains 
 
Three cooperator-cheat pairs (“A” to “C”; see appendix A1), comprising strains of 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa that differed with respect to production of the primary 
siderophore, pyoverdine (pvd), were used in this experiment. For convenience, we 
will further denote individual strains as either “+” (cooperator, did produce pvd) or “-
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” (cheat, defective for pvd), giving A+, A-, B+, B-, C+, and C-. Specifically, the 
strains used were as follows: A+: PA01 (strain ATCC15692), a pvd-producing 
wildtype; A-: PAO6609 (Hohnadel et al. 1986), a pvd-negative mutant derived by 
UV-mutagenesis from methionine auxotroph PAO6409 (Rella et al. 1985), which in 
turn was generated by transposon mutagenesis from PA01; B+: PA01 (strain 
ATCC15692), pvd-producing wildtype, as for A+ above; B-: an unmarked deletion 
mutant derived from PA01, defective for the pyoverdine synthetase gene pvdD 
(Ghysels et al. 2004); C+: a wildtype, pvd-producing clone cultured from UCBPP-
PA14, a clinical isolate known to also be pathogenic in plants and animals (Rahme et 
al. 1995). C-: a pvd-negative mutant coevolved with C+ in the laboratory under iron-
limiting conditions, which should favour the spread of spontaneously arising mutants 
that somehow avoid the cost of producing siderophores and instead take up those 
produced by neighbouring bacteria. Both C+ and C- were isolated from the same 
overnight culture, which at that point had been passaged through 19 (daily) serial 
transfers, where each transfer entailed the inoculation of 60 µl of overnight culture 
(incubated at 37ºC and shaken at 200 r.p.m.) into 30ml glass universal vials 
containing 6 ml fresh medium (CAA; 5g casamino acids, 1.18g K2HPO4.3H2O, 
0.25g MgSO4.7H20 per litre). Like A- and B- which are known to be pvd-synthesis 
defective, mature C- colonies also have a pale white appearance, distinguishing them 
from both C+ and their parent strain, which appear conspicuously green owing to the 




For each strain pair, + and - cultures were initiated from freezer stock and incubated 
overnight in an orbital shaker (37ºC, 200 r.p.m.). For this first stage, strains were 
grown in 6 ml standard Kings B solution in 30 ml glass universal vials. After 24 
hours, the cultures were retrieved and vortexed for 45 seconds. For pair A only, pilot 
data predicted substantial cell density differences between the A+ and A- solutions 
after 24 hours growth in KB, so to equalise cell densities in the + and - cultures, a 
volume of A+ solution (3.64 ml) was drawn off and replaced with buffer solution 
(M9).  
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We then prepared, by appropriate dilution, “treatment” cultures in which – (cheats) 
were mixed with + (cooperators) at cell density ratios of approximately 1:1000, 
1:100, 1:10, 1:1, and 100:1 respectively. These solutions were supplemented with 
buffer (M9) such that each would contain cells at approximately the same density 
(~106 cells/60 µl). For each of these five treatments, we inoculated 6 replicate 
“competition” vials with 60 µl of the prepared mixed cultures: 30 ml universal glass 
vials containing 6 ml CAA medium as described previously, supplemented with 100 
mg.ml-1 human apo-transferrin (an iron chelator) and 20 mM NaHCO3, necessary for 
effective chelator activity (Meyer et al. 1996). The 30 competition vials were then 
placed, in random order, in an orbital shaker for overnight incubation (37ºC, 200 
r.p.m.).  
 
To assess the initial ratios of cooperators to cheats in the inocula, multiple samples 
were taken, grown on KB-agar plates, and colony-forming units (CFUs) were 
counted and categorized as either + or - on the basis of colour and morphology.  
 
Similarly, each of the 30 competition cultures, after 24 hours of incubation at 37ºC, 
was diluted, spread on to KB-agar plates, incubated again overnight for counting. In 
this way, we obtained data on the absolute density and relative proportions of + and – 
CFUs both before and after the competition period. Labelling, spreading and 
counting of plates, at each stage, were fully randomized to minimize order effects. 
 
For pairs A and B, a single round of competition was conducted. In the case of pair 
C, two rounds were conducted, in each of which a different treatment failed to yield 
useful data. The results were of both rounds were thus pooled for combined analysis. 
 
We also carried out a separate experiment to test whether reducing the period of 
population growth reduced the extent of frequency dependence. Using strain pair A, 
we simultaneously inoculated two parallel sets of three treatments, with 
cheat:cooperator ratios of approximately 1:1000, 1:10 and 100:1 respectively. Our 
protocol was identical to that described above, except that, whereas one set was 
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cultured for a full 24 hours before sampling, the second set was sampled after just 6 




We performed two types of analyses on data from each of the three strain pairs. 
Firstly, we calculated relative cheat fitness (v), by comparing the frequency of cheats 
at the beginning and end of the experiment. Specifically, v is given by 
( ) ( )2112 11 xxxxv −−= , where x1 is the initial proportion of cheats in the population, 
x2 is their final proportion. The value of v therefore signifies whether cheats increase 
in frequency ( )1>v , decrease in frequency ( )1<v , or remain at the same frequency 
( )1=v . We assessed the nature and strength of the relationship between v and x1, 
using standard General Linear Models (GLMs) with x1 as the explanatory variable. In 
each case, v and x1 were first log-transformed or – in the case of pairs 1 and 2 – 
converted to the form ( )1log +v  to normalise the distribution of the residuals, in 
accordance with the assumptions of parametric analyses. In the case of pair C, 
“round” was included as a blocking factor in the maximal model, but was non-
significant, and so was excluded from the final model. Secondly, we quantified 
productivity (G) as the final cell density attained by the mixed culture at the end of 
the competition period. Again, this was analysed with respect to initial cheat 
frequency, x1, using a standard GLM. Here again, G was first log-transformed to 
normalise the distribution of the residuals. All analyses were performed with 




In all three cheat-cooperator pairs, the relative fitness of cheats was significantly 
negatively correlated with initial cheat frequency (Figure 2.3A). In all cases, the 
relationship was best described by a power function (pair A: v = 4.200x1
-0.442, GLM: 
F1,28 = 92.17, p < 0.001; pair B: v = 1.856x1
-0.123, GLM: F1,26 = 11.27, p = 0.0024; pair 
C: v = 2.270x1
-0.176, GLM: F1,45 = 37.24, p < 0.001). At low frequencies, cheats 
showed higher fitness than cooperators; while at high frequencies, cheat fitness was 
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Figure 2.3. (A) Relative cheat fitness and (B) mixed-culture productivity as a function 
of initial cheat frequency, for three independent pairs of Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
strains. Here, relative fitness is the proportional increase in frequency of cheats relative 
to cooperators, and productivity is the final cell density of the mixed culture after a 24 
hour competition period. Fitted lines reflect (A) power and (B) exponential regression 
curves, estimated by least-squares. 
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For all three strain pairs, productivity of the mixed culture was significantly 
negatively correlated with initial cheat frequency (Figure 2.3B). In all cases, the 
relationship was best described by an exponential function (pair A: G = 3.56×108e-
1.97x1, GLM: F1,28 = 74.83, p < 0.001; pair B:  G = 2.82×10
8e-2.38x1, GLM: F1,26 = 
75.82, p < 0.001, r2 = 0.70; pair C: G = 1.04×109e-2.13x1, GLM: F1,51 = 139.11, p < 
0.001). In cultures initiated with a high frequency of cheats (i.e. the 100:1 treatment), 
productivity was around an order of magnitude lower than in cultures where cheats 
were scarce (i.e. 1:1000 treatment). 
 
The strength of frequency dependence was reduced when populations were allowed 
to grow for shorter periods of time (Figure 2.4). In our further experiment with strain 
pair A, the population growth was significantly lower in the 6hr old cultures that in 
the 24hr old cultures (Figure 2.4B; 24-hour cultures: G = 1.01×108e-2.779x1, 6-hour 
cultures: G = 1.68×106e3.824x1; GLM: final density*time F1,29 = 119.76, p < 0.001). 
The strength of frequency dependence with respect to cheat relative fitness was also 
reduced over the shorter time period (Figure 2.4A; 24-hour cultures: v = 1.303x1
-0.241, 
6-hour cultures: v = 1.117x1




Figure 2.4. (A) Relative cheat fitness and (B) mixed-culture productivity as functions of 
initial cheat frequency, in 6 hour cultures (open circles and dotted regression line) versus 
24 hour cultures (filled circles and solid regression line). Here, relative fitness is the 
proportional increase in frequency of cheats relative to cooperators, and productivity is 
the final cell density of the mixed culture at the end of the competition period. Fitted 
lines reflect (A) power and (B) exponential regression curves, estimated by least-
squares. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals around the means. 
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We carried out a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. 
First, we considered an alternative measure of productivity: the fold increase in total 
cell density over the competition period. These analyses produced results 
qualitatively concordant with those presented here. Second, we considered an 
alternative approach for all fitness vs. proportion analyses: instead of regressing x1 
against v (an expression which itself contains x1), we simply regressed the initial 
odds ratio, ( )11 1 xx −  against the final odds ratio, ( )22 1 xx − . By this approach, fitted 
regression lines with slopes significantly less than 1 indicate negative frequency 
dependence. In the first set of experiments, we found this result for all three strain 
pairs (pair A: slope 0.73±0.02, Ts = 12.30, d.f. = 28, p < 0.001; pair B: slope 
0.93±0.03, Ts = 2.32, d.f. = 26, p = 0.029; pair C: slope 0.84±0.04, Ts = 4.33, d.f. = 
48, p < 0.001). In the experiment considering different competition periods, only the 
24 hour cultures showed negative frequency dependence (24 hr cultures: slope 
0.84±0.02, Ts = 7.68, d.f. = 16, p < 0.001; 6 hour cultures: slope 0.97±0.03, Ts = 
1.29, d.f. = 14, p = 0.218). Third, we repeated all analyses using the ratio of cheats to 
cooperators (xR) as the explanatory variable, rather than the proportion of cheats in 
the mixed population (x1), where ( )11 1 xxxR −= . For all three strain pairs, results 




In this study, we have determined under what conditions the production of public 
goods in microbes will be subject to frequency-dependent selection. Specifically, we 
have shown that if there is strong selection, two sets of conditions can lead to 
frequency-dependent fitness: (a) when cooperators acquire a more than a random 
benefit of public good production – e.g. if cooperators tend to be clustered together 
(population structuring) or if individual cells have preferential access to the public 
goods that they produce (Figure 2.1); or (b) when increased levels of cooperation 
lead to greater growth, a higher carrying capacity, and hence more generations over 
which cheats can exploit cooperators (Figure 2.2). In both cases, the relative fitness 
of cooperators or cheats is greater when they are less common. We then explicitly 
tested the second of these possibilities (by controlling for the first, population 
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structuring), using the production of iron scavenging siderophore molecules in P. 
aeruginosa as a model trait. As predicted, we found a negative relationship between 
the relative fitness of cheats and the proportion of cheats in the population (Figure 
2.3A). Furthermore, we found support for the underlying assumption leading to this 
prediction - a higher proportion of cooperators led to greater growth (Figure 2.3B), 
and a reduction in the period of growth led to a decrease in the extent of frequency 
dependence (Figure 2.4).  
 
Situations favouring frequency-dependent selection 
 
We have identified two ways in which kin selection models of public goods 
dilemmas can generate frequency-dependent selection, given strong selection. 
Firstly, population structure, incorporating both limited mixing of cells and limited 
diffusion of public goods molecules (local social interaction) can result in the 
selective advantage of cheating decreasing as cheats become more common. When 
populations are structured, the level of public goods available to an individual will 
depend upon the production of public goods by: (a) that individual and its clonal 
relatives; (b) the average level of public goods production in the population. 
Increasing population structure increases the importance of the former and decreases 
the importance of the latter. A higher frequency of cheats will lead to a lower 
average level of public goods production (b). The consequences of this will be 
greater for cheats, because they receive fewer public goods through their own 
production and that of their relatives (a). This leads to the relative fitness of cheats 
decreasing with cheat frequency. Secondly, frequency dependence may also arise 
when total population growth increases with the level of cooperation in the 
population. If more cooperative populations achieve a higher carrying capacity, then 
more rounds of growth and division are possible before stationary phase is reached. 
The selective benefit of cheating multiplies with each round of division, so that the 
relative fitness of a cheat measured over the period of population expansion increases 
with the (initial) frequency of cooperators in the population (Figure 2.2A). 
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How does our work relate to previous theory?  We have provided some specific 
cases for the general conclusion that the generation of frequency-dependent selection 
relies on strong selection (Charlesworth 1978; Michod 1982; Toro et al. 1982; 
Queller 1984; Day and Taylor 1998; Nowak and May 1992; Rousset 2004; Jansen 
and Van Baalen 2006). The aim of this previous work was to elucidate general 
points, and so scenarios were modelled which do not facilitate simple application to 
specific systems such as public goods production (e.g. the two-player games; Queller 
1984).  An important exception to this was provided by Dugatkin et al. 2003), who 
explicitly considered frequency-dependent selection in microbes. However, Dugatkin 
et al. (2003) did not explain how frequency dependence should occur in the first 
place – their aim was to address the consequences of frequency-dependent selection, 
and so they simply assumed that it occurred. This is analogous to taking equation 7 
or 16 as a starting point, rather than determining how they should arise. More 
generally, frequency dependence does not usually arise from most of social evolution 
theory, because selection is usually assumed to be weak, to make analyses more 
tractable (Hamilton 1964; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1998; Rousset 2004). 
Frequency dependence can also arise in models for the evolution of cooperation that 
do not rely on kin selection (e.g. reciprocity; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). 
  
Frequency-dependent selection in microbes 
 
Frequency-dependent selection can, under certain conditions, prevent cheat takeover 
and facilitate the co-existence of multiple phenotypes (Aviles 2002). However, in 
two of the three strain pairs examined in this study, cheats were at least as fit as 
cooperators, even when common (Figure 2.3A). With such a payoff structure, we 
may anticipate that, in time, cheats would go to fixation in populations where there is 
little competition between groups. Consistent with this idea, siderophore-defective 
strains are routinely isolated from the lungs of late-stage cystic fibrosis patients, 
where they typically grow as monoclonal populations (Lee et al. 2005; Salunkhe et 
al. 2005; Smith et al. 2006). On the other hand, in an environment where competition 
occurs between subpopulations, and these subpopulations contain different 
proportions of cheats, those groups with more cooperators may outcompete cheat-
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dominated groups (Griffin et al. 2004). Thus, cooperation may also be maintained by 
frequency-dependent selection at the level of the group. 
 
We suggest that negative frequency dependence should be common in microbes, 
because: (a) both population structuring and cooperation dependent growth rates are 
likely to be important in many situations; (b) mutations can occur which lead to large 
differences in the level of cooperation (strong selection; see below). Accordingly, 
negative frequency-dependent selection has now been shown for social cheats in at 
least nine studies on seven microbial species (Velicer et al. 2000; Vulic and Kolter 
2001; Fiegna and Velicer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Turner and Chao 2003; 
Dugatkin et al. 2005; Harrison et al. 2006; MacLean and Gudelj 2006; this study). 
However, while we highlight these studies as support for our prediction, we also 
point out that most did not explicitly test the underlying assumptions of why 
frequency dependence occurs. Ultimately, a range of complementary approaches is 
most useful. At one extreme will be studies designed to reveal those specific 
mechanisms responsible for frequency dependence. For example, our aim in the 
present study was to test one particular mechanism that can lead to frequency 
dependence – cooperation-dependent population growth. In order to do this we (a) 
carried out our experiment in shaken vials, in order to remove the other possible 
mechanism that can lead to frequency-dependent selection – population structure; 
and (b) also tested the underlying assumption that a higher proportion of cooperators 
allows the population to grow to a larger size (Figure 2.3B). At the other extreme are 
studies in more natural conditions that examine the net consequences of both 
mechanisms for generating frequency dependence (e.g. Harrison et al. 2006). An 
important task for the future is to determine the relative importance in nature of the 
two different mechanisms that we have shown can lead to frequency dependence. 
 
We observed a decrease in the extent of frequency dependence when the period of 
time available for growth was shortened (Figure 2.4). This supported the assumption 
of our model that the relative fitness of cheats increases over time as the population 
goes through more rounds of growth and division. It is possible that other factors 
could also cause the relative fitness of cheats to vary over time. For example, as the 
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population grows this could lead to a decrease in iron availability that reduces the 
relative fitness of cheats (Griffin et al. 2004), or a higher population density that 
allows cheats to better exploit cooperators, and hence increases the relative fitness of 
cheats (Greig and Travisano 2004; MacLean and Gudelj 2006). However, effects 
such as these cannot explain the frequency dependence evident in our data - in order 
for frequency dependence to be observed, one of the additional factors that we have 
suggested would still be required, such as populations with greater frequencies of 
cooperators growing to higher final densities. 
 
More generally, our study illustrates that, although the same social evolution theory 
originally developed for metazoans can be applied to microbes, certain aspects of 
microbial biology mean that some differences may occur in the evolution of social 
traits. In particular, with typical social evolution study organisms, such as insects, 
birds and mammals, it is usually assumed that mutation will lead to minor variations 
in behaviour (weak selection), and so frequency dependence will be relatively 
unimportant (Sinervo and Lively 1996; Sinervo et al. 2006; Sinervo and Calsbeek 
2006). In contrast, in the case of microbes, single or small numbers of mutations can 
have extremely large effects on social behaviours (strong selection; Velicer et al. 
1998; 2000; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Velicer and Yu 2003; Foster et al. 2004; 
Griffin et al. 2004; Fiegna et al. 2006). For example, in P. aeruginosa, social 
behaviours such as siderophore production are routinely and completely lost from 
isolates obtained from lung infections (Lee et al. 2005; Salunkhe et al. 2005; Smith et 
al. 2006). Furthermore, the majority of microbial cooperative behaviours are 
controlled by quorum sensing regulatory networks (Keller and Surette 2006; Venturi 
2006). Consequently, the disruption of these networks, even through the loss of a 
single gene, can have huge effects on the level of cooperation.  A consequence of the 
potential for mutations of large effects (strong selection) in microbes, is that this 
allows frequency-dependent selection, through the mechanisms we have described in 
this study. 
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3. Density dependence and cooperation: theory and a 




Whilst cooperative systems can persist in nature despite the potential for exploitation 
by non-cooperators, it is often seen that small changes in population demography can 
tip the balance of selective forces for or against cooperation. Here we consider the 
role of population density in the context of microbial cooperation. First, we account 
for conflicting results from recent studies by demonstrating theoretically that: (a) for 
public goods cooperation, higher densities are relatively unfavourable for 
cooperation; whereas; (b) for self-restraint type cooperation, higher densities can be 
either favourable or unfavourable for cooperation, depending on the details of the 
system. We then test our predictions concerning public goods cooperation using 
strains of the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa that either produce 
iron-scavenging siderophore molecules (cooperators) or do not (cheats). As 
predicted, we found that the relative fitness of cheats was greatest at higher 
population densities. Furthermore, as assumed by theory, we show that this occurs 
because cheats are better able to exploit the cooperative siderophore production of 




Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation is one of the most 
important and long-standing problems in evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmàry 1995; Hamilton 1996). Whilst a profusion of theoretical work in the past 
five decades has led to a good theoretical overview of the different mechanisms by 
which cooperation can arise and persist, much of this theory remains to be tested 
(Sachs et al. 2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006; West et al. 2007b). One area that has 
attracted a lot of theoretical attention is how selection for cooperation can be affected 
                                                 
** A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication: Ross-Gillespie, A., Gardner, A., 
Buckling, A., West, S.A. and A. S. Griffin. Density dependence and cooperation: theory and a test 
with bacteria. 
   48 
by the ecology and demography of populations (see reviews by Frank 1998; Rousset 
2004 and Lehmann and Keller 2006). Genetic composition, density, sub-structuring, 
and the degree of mixing between individuals can all affect the spread and stability 
of behavioural strategies within a population; but it can be difficult to predict, from 
such general theory, precisely how such effects would apply in the context of 
particular cooperative systems (Leimar and Hammerstein 2006; West et al. 2007b). 
Moreover, it has been difficult to test these ideas empirically, because of the inherent 
complexities of experimentally manipulating population structure in traditional 
model systems such as vertebrates or insects.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the role of population density in the evolution of 
cooperation. We develop theory specific to the context of microbial cooperative 
systems and then test our predictions experimentally using a bacterial model system. 
It has recently been realised that microbes exhibit a striking range of cooperative 
behaviours, which offer excellent opportunities for testing social evolution theory 
(Crespi 2001; West et al. 2006). This is because mutants that do not cooperate 
(cheats) can be isolated from natural populations or artificially generated, the costs 
and benefits of cooperation can be easily manipulated experimentally, and the 
resultant fitness consequences monitored over many generations (Velicer 2003; West 
et al. 2006; Foster et al. 2007). Microbes are particularly useful for investigating the 
role of population structure in the evolution of cooperation, and recent experiments 
have provided clear support for the importance of factors such as substructuring, 
mixing and disturbance frequency (Griffin et al. 2004; Brockhurst et al 2007; Diggle 
et al. 2007b), and the relative frequency of cooperators vs. cheats in a population 
(Velicer et al. 2000; MacLean and Gudelj 2006; Diggle et al. 2007b; Ross-Gillespie 
et al. 2007;). With population density, however, the picture is less clear. While one 
recent study in yeast reported cheats having a higher relative fitness at higher 
population density (positive density dependence; Greig and Travisano 2004), another 
yeast study found that cheats had a higher relative fitness at lower cell densities 
(negative density dependence; MacLean and Gudelj 2006; MacLean 2008). 
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Our first objective in this paper is to develop explicit theory, tailored to microbial 
systems, that will make it clear when, why, and what sort of density dependence is 
expected. Specifically, we formalise why different patterns of density dependence 
are to be expected with different types of cooperative behaviour. In the first scenario, 
individuals cooperate by manufacturing products that can be utilised by their 
neighbours (i.e. public goods). This is a relatively common form of cooperation in 
microbes, with bacteria producing numerous factors that are released into the 
environment beyond the cell membrane (West et al. 2007a). In the context of a 
public goods dilemma, cheats prosper only insofar as they have access to the public 
goods produced by other individuals, and hence they are expected to perform 
relatively poorly at low population density and relatively better when the population 
density is higher (i.e. positive density dependence). In contrast, we suggest that 
different predictions can arise when the cooperative dilemma concerns the 
consumption of a finite public resource (the ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario; 
(Hardin 1968), another situation that is commonplace in microbes (West et al. 2007a; 
MacLean 2008). In this context, cooperators are cells that show “self-restraint” and 
use the resource more efficiently, as opposed to quickly but relatively inefficiently. 
At low population density, resources will be less limiting, so there is no benefit to be 
had from more prudent use of resources, whereas at higher density, efficient resource 
use enhances the overall productivity of a social group and hence cooperation 
provides a greater benefit. In this case, cheats are expected to do better at lower 
densities (negative density dependence).  
 
In the second part of the paper, we test our prediction that the production of a public 
good leads to the relative fitness of cheats, who do not produce it, being positively 
density dependent. We used as our model cooperative trait the production of 
siderophores in the bacterial pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa (West and Buckling 
2003; Griffin et al. 2004). Siderophores scavenge iron from the environment, most of 
which is otherwise unavailable to bacteria since it is either actively withheld by hosts 
or is in the insoluble Fe(III) form (Guerinot 1994; Ratledge and Dover 2000). 
Siderophores are secreted extracellularly, diffuse freely and be taken up by any 
neighbouring cell. Previous work has shown that siderophore production is a 
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cooperative behaviour, vulnerable to exploitation by cheats (Griffin et al 2004; West 
et al. 2007c). As well as testing for positive density-dependence, we test the 
underlying assumption of our theoretical model: that cheat fitness is contingent on 
the physical proximity to cooperators and the siderophores that they produce. While 
our theoretical work examines both public goods and self-restraint, we test only the 
public goods model, because that is where the clearer a priori prediction can be 
made, and because this is part of our longer term project on the evolution of 
siderophore production.  
 
3.3. Models and analyses 
 
Relative fitness of cheats 
 
Let the personal fitness w of an individual cell be a function of its cooperation 
strategy X and the average cooperation strategy Y of its social group, i.e. w = W(X,Y). 
We define a ‘cooperator’ as investing more, and a ‘cheat’ as investing less, into 
cooperation. In particular, we assume that cheats invest an amount x into cooperation 
while cooperators invest x+δx, where δx > 0, and we denote the average strategy of 
the cheat’s social group as y and the cooperator’s social group as y+δy. Thus, the 
relative fitness of cheats can be expressed as: 
 
v x, y,δx,δy( )=
W x, y( )













 /W x, y( )+ O δ 2( ),               (1) 
 
where the partial derivatives are evaluated at X = x and Y = y. Noting that δy/δx = 
dY/dX + O(δ), and denoting dY/dX = R, i.e. the ‘whole-group’ relatedness (this is the 
relatedness of an individual to the group, including itself – formally, the expected 
relatedness of two cells randomly drawn from the social group, with replacement; 
Taylor and Frank 1996; Pepper 2000; Rousset 2004), relative fitness can be 
expressed in the form: 
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We consider a density-dependent model of public goods cooperation. First, we 
assume that the production of public goods by an individual or group is equal to the 
value of its cooperation strategy, i.e. X or Y.  Second, because not all of the public 
goods produced in a social group may be used, especially if cell density is low so that 
contact rate between cells and public goods molecules is low, we assume that a 
proportion exp(-kn) of the Y public goods produced by the group are lost; where n is 
the number of cells in the social groups and k is the per molecule per cell rate of 
uptake of public good molecules over the unit time period. Third, we assume that the 
growth benefit of public goods is a power function of the quantity taken up by the 
cell, with exponent a and scaled by an amount b, and added to a baseline growth 
equal to 1-b; the exponent a describes how sustained are the fitness returns of 
increased access to public goods (with lower a indicating greater diminishing 
returns) and b describes the relative growth benefit of public goods. Finally, we 
assume that the production of an amount of public goods X incurs a personal 
multiplicative growth cost cX. Putting all this together yields the fitness function: 
 





 1− cX( ).                                                         (3) 
 






abza−1 1− exp −kn( )( )
a













 δx + O δ
2( ),                         (4) 
 
where z is the population average level of cooperation, and the whole-group 
relatedness is R = 1/n +((n-1)/n)r where r is the ‘others-only’ relatedness to the group 
(this is the relatedness of an individual to the others in the group – formally, the 
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expected relatedness of two cells randomly drawn from the social group, without 
replacement; Pepper 2000). Differentiating the RHS of expression (4) by n reveals 





abza−1 1− exp −kn( )( )
a
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to first order in δx. Assuming dr/dn ≤ 0, i.e. the others-only relatedness of social 
partners does not increase with cell density, then a sufficient condition for the 
relative fitness of cheats to increase with population density (positive density 
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We now demonstrate that this is satisfied for sufficiently large values of b, and that 
there always exists a b ≤ 1 that is large enough to satisfy the condition. First, if the 
RHS of condition (6) is positive, then the condition can be rearranged into the form b 











































                            (7) 
 
lies in the range 0 < b* < 1. Alternatively, if the RHS of condition (6) is negative 
then, if the LHS is also negative, we obtain the condition b < b* where b* > 1, and if 
the LHS is positive we obtain the condition b > b* where b* < 0; in either scenario, 
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the condition is satisfied irrespective of the value of b. In summary, so long as public 
goods are sufficiently beneficial (large enough b), the relative fitness of cheats is 
never a decreasing function of cell density (Figure 3.1A). For example, if the public 
good is necessary for growth (b = 1) then any density dependence in the relative 
fitness of cheats will be positive. 
  
 
Figure 3.1. Model demonstrating how the fitness of cheats relative to cooperators can be 
subject to density dependence. Under public goods cooperation (A), cheat relative 
fitness, v, is positively related to density across most of the parameter space but is highly 
sensitive to b, a parameter describing how beneficial cooperation is to a recipient. For 
this illustration, we set a = 1, c = r = 0.5 and k = 0.9. We assume that cooperators invest 
X = 1 into public goods and cheats invest X = 0 and, mirroring the experiments, that 
cheats make up 10% of the population. Under self-restraint cooperation (B), cheat 
relative fitness can be either positive or negatively density dependent, depending on the 
values of both b (see above) and r, relatedness to other cells in the social group. For this 
illustration, we set a = k = 0.25, assume cooperators show self-restraint X = 0.5 and 
cheats X = 0, and that cheats make up 10% of the population. 
 
 
We may also examine the impact of relatedness upon density dependence. Increasing 
the value of relatedness uniformly across all densities reduces the degree of density 
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which is always negative. This positive density dependence we are predicting within 
populations is not to be confused with the negative density dependence which can 
arise at the metapopulation level in cases where there is a threshold benefit 
associated with public goods production (Brown and Johnstone 2001; Brockhurst et 




Next we consider cooperation in the form of self restraint in resource use (Frank 
1996; 1998). First, analogous to the previous model, we assume that the social group 
of cells does not use all of its available resources but rather that a proportion 1-exp(-
kn(1-Y)) of resources are acquired when the group allocates effort 1-Y into resource 
acquisition (and hence it shows self restraint Y). Second, we assume that each cell 
acquires an amount of resource equal to its relative acquisition effort, i.e. (1-X)/(n(1-
Y)). Finally, we assume that the conversion efficiency of a unit of resource into 
growth is an increasing function of self-restraint: the slower the cells take up 
resources, the more efficiently they metabolise those resources that are taken up (e.g. 
Pfeiffer et al. 2001; MacLean and Gudelj 2006; MacLean 2008). In particular, we 
assume that the efficiency benefit is a power function of the level of self-restraint, 
with exponent a and scaled by a factor b, which is added to a baseline conversion 





1− exp −kn 1−Y( )( )( )1− b + bX a( ).                                                (9) 
 
From equation (2), we can write the relative fitness of cheats as: 
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2( ),               (10) 
 
where z is the population average level of self-restraint. Differentiating with respect 
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to first order in δx. The total density effect is the sum of two partial effects, the first 
due to the impact of cell density upon resource acquisition, and the second due to the 
impact of cell density upon whole-group relatedness. The first effect, described by 
the first term on the RHS of equation (11), is always negative. The second effect, 
described by the second term on the RHS of equation (11), is always positive 
(because dR/dn < 0). In general, it is not possible to write a condition in terms of the 
model parameters that describes whether the relative fitness of cheats will increase 
(positive density dependence) or decrease (negative density dependence) with cell 
density, as this will depend on the details of how whole-group relatedness decreases 
with density (Figure 3.1B). While the preceding theory requires only weak selection 
(small phenotypic differences between cheats and cooperators), we assume stronger 





Description of strains 
 
We replicated all our experiments with three independently-derived cooperator-cheat 
strain pairs in order to demonstrate that observed effects are not strain-specific (for 
further strain details, see Appendix A1 and Chapter 2). Briefly, these pairs were 
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derived from the well-categorised Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates PA01 
ATCC15692 (pairs ‘A’ and ‘B’) and UCBPP-PA14 (pair ‘C’). While cooperators 
(‘+’) retained the siderophore production proficiency of their wild type progenitors, 
cheat strains (‘-’) had mutations conferring defective production of the primary 
siderophore, pyoverdine, induced, respectively, by means of ultraviolet and 
transposon mutagenesis (pair A; Rella et al. 1985; Hohnadel et al. 1986), deletion of 
the pyoverdine synthesis gene pvdD (pair B; Ghysels et al. 2004) or laboratory 
selection (pair C; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007).In each case, cheat strains formed white 
colonies when grown on Kings B agar, making it possible to distinguish them from 




Our first experiment tested our model’s prediction that cheat fitness would be 
positively correlated with overall cell density in spatially structured populations 
(positive density dependence). For each strain pair, we cultured + and - from freezer 
stock in 6 ml standard Kings B solution in 30 ml glass universal vials, incubating 
overnight in an orbital shaker (37ºC, 200 r.p.m.). After 24 hours, the cultures were 
vortexed and combined to obtain a master mix culture of + and - at a volumetric ratio 
of 10:1.  
 
To create conditions in which the cooperative trait (siderophore production) was 
important to fitness, we prepared culture media in which iron was extremely limited 
(CAA-agar: 5 g casamino acids, 1.18 g K2HPO4.3H2O, 0.25 g MgSO4.7H2O and 12 g 
agar L-1, supplemented with 0.1 g human apo-transferrin and 1.68 g NaHCO3 L
-1 for 
additional iron chelation). We set up density treatments as follows: six replicate 
samples of the master culture were serially diluted in M9 buffer to obtain the 
following dilutions: 1 in 106 (low density); 1 in 104 and 1 in 102 (high density). We 
spread 20 µl samples of these diluted cultures to 10 cm diameter plates of 25 ml 
CAA-agar and set these to incubate at 37 ºC. We assessed, post-hoc, the actual ratio 
of + to – cells in this master mix by taking multiple samples, growing these overnight 
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on Kings B agar plates, and then counting colony-forming units (CFUs), which could 
be categorized as either + or - on the basis of colour and morphology. 
 
Meanwhile, our density treatment plates were incubated at 37ºC, and after 48 hours 
we scraped all bacterial growth from the surface of each plate with a sterile spatula 
and resuspended it in 6 ml M9. We vortexed and serially diluted these resuspended 
cultures, then plated them onto Kings B agar. We counted + and – CFUs on these 
plates after 24 hr incubation at 37ºC, and in this way we obtained data on change in 
relative proportions of + and – CFUs across the competition period. We fully 
randomized labelling, spreading and counting of plates at each stage to minimize 
order effects. 
 
Investigating the causal mechanisms underlying density dependent cheat fitness 
 
We carried out a separate experiment to investigate the causal mechanism underlying 
patterns of density-dependent cheat fitness. Specifically, we tested whether the 
growth of cheat colonies varied with their proximity to cooperator colonies. First, we 
cultured strains overnight in Kings B medium then diluted them such that 1 µl of 
culture contained approximately 25 bacteria. Next, we set up 3 × 8 point lattices of 1 
µl droplets of – culture on iron-limited agar (CAA, as above), by transferring culture 
from a microtitre plate using a 96-pin steel replicator tool (Boekel Scientific). Each 
lattice of – droplets was bounded along one edge by an adjacent row of 8 × 1 µl 
droplets of a “neighbour” culture, at a density of approximately 600 cells per droplet. 
In this manner we obtained 36 lattices (3 strain pairs × 3 treatments × 4 replicates), 
each of which comprised 3 rows of 8 cheat colonies, growing on iron-limited agar, at 
varying distances from the row of 8 “neighbour” colonies (either +, - or M9 buffer, 
“0”; see Figure 3.2). We incubated plates at 37ºC for 48 hrs and assayed the relative 
growth of cheat colonies in the lattices. First, we excised all colonies in each row, 
using a sterile 4 mm diameter hole-punch, and transferred the cores to an eppendorf 
containing 0.5 ml M9 buffer. We thoroughly vortexed each eppendorf to wash cells 
off the agar and into suspension, and then, taking two replicate 200 µl samples of 
diluent (minus agar), we estimated the cell density of the resuspended cultures by 
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measuring, with a spectrophotometer (M2 plate reader, Molecular Devices), their 











● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Neighbour
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Close
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Mid
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Far
 
Figure 3.2. Design of experiment to demonstrate that physical proximity to cooperators 
is the causal mechanism underlying density dependence of cheat fitness. Circles indicate 
position of bacterial colonies in the lattice. Colonies from the lower three rows were 




To analyse the first set of experiments, we first calculated relative cheat fitness (v), 
by comparing the frequency of cheats at the beginning and end of each experiment. 
Specifically, v is given by ( ) ( )2112 11 xxxxv −−= , where x1 is the initial proportion 
of cheats in the population, x2 is their final proportion (Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007). 
The value of v therefore signifies whether cheats increase in frequency ( )1>v , 
decrease in frequency ( )1<v , or remain at the same frequency ( )1=v . We assessed 
the nature and strength of the relationship between v and population density (n), 
using standard General Linear Models (GLMs) with n as the explanatory variable 
(along with strain pair and the interaction term, in the case of the maximal model). 
In each case, v and n were first log-transformed to comply with the assumptions of 
parametric analyses. In addition, we calculated an alternative measure for the fitness 
of cheats relative to cooperators, w, which is the ratio of the two strains’ respective 
Malthusian growth parameters - essentially, the ratio of the number of doublings 
achieved by each sub-population (Lenski et al. 1991). As above, we constructed a 
GLM with w as the response variable, and n and strain pair as fixed explanatory 
terms (where both w and n were first log-transformed).   
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To analyze our productivity vs. proximity data, we first calculated the relative 
productivity for each sample as its optical density relative to the average optical 
density across all samples for that same strain pair. We then constructed a Linear 
Mixed Effects Model with relative productivity as the response term (transformed to 
log(x+1)) and the following fixed effects: strain pair (A, B or C); neighbour (+, - or 
0); distance to neighbour (close, mid or far), as well as all two-way interactions. 
Because data were collected for multiple levels of the proximity treatment from the 
same replicate agar plates, and were thus not independent of each other, we included 





In general, we found that cheats fared better under conditions of high population 
density (Figure 3.3). In a model including all three strain pairs, the relative fitness of 
cheats, v, was significantly positively correlated with initial population density (F1,46 
= 87.40; p < 0.001). However, there were significant differences in relative cheat 
fitness across strain pairs (main effect: F2,46 = 200.39; p < 0.001) and in the patterns 
of density dependence across strain pairs (interaction: F2,46 = 38.96; p < 0.001). 
Indeed, when analysed separately, strain pair A (in contrast to pairs B and C) did not 




Figure 3.3. Positive density dependence of cheat relative fitness in three independently-
derived strain pairs (A - C).  
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When we analysed our data using the alternative measure of relative fitness (w), 
differences between strain pairs were more pronounced. Here, strain pair A showed 
negative density dependence (F1,16 = 12.39; p = 002), whereas pairs B and C both 
showed positive density dependence, as in the above analyses. Consequently, there 
was no overall main effect of initial density on w (F1,46 = 0.10; p = 0.756), but a 
strongly significant interaction between strain pair and initial density (F2,46 = 29.02; p 
< 0.001). Comparing the two strain pairs that did show positive density dependence, 
we found further differences, in terms of the intercepts of their density dependence 
functions: B- had relative fitness ≥1 across all treatments, whereas C- had lower 
fitness than C+ at low cell density (v and w both <1) but greater fitness at high 









































Figure 3.4. Interaction plot showing how the productivity of cheat colonies depends on 
whether or not cooperators are growing in the vicinity, and how close they are to these 
cooperators. Error bars show one standard error around the means.  
 
In support of the assumption of our model, cheats were most productive when they 
were growing in close physical proximity to colonies of cooperators. The minimal 
model showed that the relative productivity of cheats was strongly influenced by the 
types of colonies growing nearby (F2,84 = 144.04; p < 0.001) and by the proximity to 
these colonies (F2,84 = 33.88; p < 0.001), although the latter did vary in strength 
across the three strain pairs (F4,84 = 7.47; p < 0.001). The effects of treatment and 
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proximity, and the significant interaction between them (F4,84 = 46.19; p < 0.001), are 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. There was no significant main effect of strain pair (F2,9 = 




In this study, we have investigated – theoretically and empirically – the conditions 
under which cooperation in microbes is subject to density-dependent selection. We 
have shown that, when considering the production of public goods, cheats are 
predicted to have a higher relative fitness at higher population densities (positive 
density dependence; Figure 3.1A). In contrast, when considering prudent use of 
limited resources (tragedy of the commons), cheats can have either a higher or a 
lower relative fitness at higher population densities (positive or negative density 
dependence; Figure 3.1B), depending upon the biological details. We then tested the 
prediction of our public goods model, using the production of iron-scavenging 
siderophore molecules in Pseudomonas aeruginosa as a model trait. As predicted, we 
found that cheats have higher fitness at greater host densities (Figure 3.3). 
Furthermore, we found support for the underlying assumption leading to this 
prediction, that cheats are better able to exploit the cooperative siderophore 
production of others, when they are physically closer to them (Figure 3.4). 
 
We predicted that the direction of density dependent selection on cooperation 
depends firstly upon the form of cooperation (public good production or self-restraint 
in resource use) but also the finer biological details. Considering public goods, an 
increase in cell density will allow cheating cells a greater access to the public goods 
produced by its cooperative neighbours. Another way of thinking about this is that an 
increase in density increases the number of cells that each individual can interact 
with, and hence tend to decrease the relatedness of an individual to all the individuals 
in the group, including itself (‘whole-group’ relatedness; Pepper 2000). Both of these 
factors will increase the relative fitness of cheats at greater population densities. 
Support for this prediction has been provided by Greig and Travisano (2004) in 
relation to invertase production in yeast, and this study in relation to siderophores in 
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bacteria (Figure 3.3). Greig and Travisano (2004) suggested that fluctuating selection 
for increased then decreased cooperation, as yeast cells colonise new patches and 
then grow to high densities, could allow for the maintenance of both cooperators and 
cheats in the population (polymorphism). More generally, we might expect microbes 
to facultatively adjust their cooperation strategies conditionally upon local cell 
densities, for example through the use of quorum sensing systems (Brown and 
Johnstone 2001; Keller and Surette 2006; Diggle et al. 2007a, b).  
 
In contrast, when considering cooperative self-restraint in resource uptake, the 
relative fitness of cheats, which have a higher rate and less efficient metabolism of 
resources, can either increase or decrease with host density, depending upon 
biological details (parameter values). Whilst the advantage of more efficient 
metabolism of resources is greater when cell density is high enough for resources to 
be growth-limiting, the individual incentive for such cooperation can decrease with 
increasing cell density if the whole group relatedness of interacting cells declines 
with increasing number of social partners. These two effects are in opposition and so 
cheats that utilise resources quickly and inefficiently may be increasingly favoured or 
disfavoured as cell density increases, depending upon which of the two effects is 
strongest. The prediction of cheats having a lower fitness at higher densities 
(negative density dependence) has previously been made in theoretical studies, and is 
supported by empirical studies of the competition between yeast strains following 
alternative metabolic strategies (Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer 2003; MacLean and Gudelj 
2006; MacLean 2008). In yeast, respirers (cooperators) utilise resources slowly but 
with a higher yield of ATP than respiro-fermenters (cheats), which enjoy fast 
resource use but with a much smaller ATP yield. Whilst the observed negative 
density dependence of cheat fitness in yeast may occur for the reason discussed 
above, an added complication in this system is that the metabolic pathway employed 
by cheats yields toxic byproducts which decrease fitness as they accumulate, and this 
accumulation of toxins is increased at higher population densities (MacLean and 
Gudelj 2006). Thus, one consequence of toxin accumulation in this system is that it 
increases the parameter space over which negative density dependence is expected. 
Another potential complication not considered here is the possibility of interactions 
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between self-restraint and public goods cooperation, when they are linked (MacLean 
2008). 
 
Patterns of density-dependent fitness are intrinsically sensitive to the measure of 
fitness used. Our preferred measure of relative fitness (v, see above) captures the 
relative change in frequency of a genotype over time and, as such, is compatible with 
the population genetics concept of fitness. However, while a change in genotype 
frequency over time can indeed reflect different rates of growth or persistence among 
genotypes within a given population, this measure can be problematic in between-
population comparisons if the extrinsic conditions (i.e. treatments) afford different 
populations different opportunities for growth. When resources are finite and fixed 
(i.e. batch culture, as in our experiment), populations starting from low density will 
complete more generations during the observation period because they start growing 
at a density far below carrying capacity. In contrast, at high density a population will 
undergo little such exponential growth before reaching stationary phase. Thus, in the 
low inoculum scenario, absolute fitness differences between competing strains could 
be magnified relative to what would be seen in populations starting from high density 
inocula, resulting in density dependent fitness effects – that may have nothing to do 
with social interactions among strains. We investigated this possibility by also 
considering an alternative fitness measure that controls for differences in the number 
of generations (w, see above). Analyses of strain pairs B and C yielded qualitatively 
similar results for both fitness measures, confirming that the density-dependent 
fitness patterns we observed in these strains (Figure 3.3) cannot be explained by this 
confounding generation effect only.  
 
Our experimental data on siderophore production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
provided support for the prediction of our public goods model in two out of the three 
independent strain pairs we tested. In these two cases, relative cheat fitness was 
positively correlated with population density (Figure 3.3). Across all three of the 
pairs, however, there was considerable variation in the intercepts of the density 
dependent fitness function. One cheat strain consistently underperformed its 
cooperator progenitor (pair A) under our experimental conditions; another showed 
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greater relative fitness at all densities tested (pair B); while in the third, 
experimentally evolved pair, cheats outperformed cooperators at high density but lost 
the advantage at low density (pair C). How can we account for these differences? 
Our theoretical model for public goods cooperation (Figure 3.1A) predicts that the 
degree to which cooperation benefits recipients, b, can influence the shape, and in 
particular, the intercept of the relationship between density and cheat fitness. Where 
cooperation is strongly beneficial, cheats show low relative fitness values (v < 1) 
across a range of n, whereas if the benefits of cooperation are more marginal, cheat 
fitness may be greater than 1 across all densities. We postulate that differences in this 
parameter may, at least in part, underlie the different patterns of density dependence 
we see across our strain pairs (Figure 3.3). For instance, B- differs from B+ only at 
the pvdD locus (hence, marginal b), whereas in strain pair A, b may be larger 
because A- is also defective for additional traits involved in iron acquisition (e.g. 
production of pyochelin and quinolones; Steve Diggle, unpublished data). Similarly, 
strain C- could be acting as a cheat not only for siderophore production, but for other 
traits too. This highlights the value, when studying the fitness consequences of a 
given trait, of testing multiple, independently-derived bacterial strains (Velicer et al. 
2000; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007). Gene deletions, for instance, could give rise to 
unforeseen pleiotropic effects, whereas artificial selection against a given trait could 
generate more ‘natural’ mutants, with compensatory adaptations to counteract 
potential negative pleiotropic effects associated with the loss of the target trait. 
 
Whilst we have focused on microbes, our predictions could also apply to other taxa. 
The importance of density dependence in the production of public goods has also 
been much discussed for humans, in the economics literature. Since Olson (1965), a 
number of economics studies of public goods dilemmas have noted how cooperative 
behaviour frequently decreases and “free-rider” behaviour increases within larger 
groups (e.g. Andreoni 1988; Chamberlin 1974; Gaube 2006; Stonebraker 1993). 
However, as is typically the case with human behaviour, even small changes in 
experimental design or context can have important effects. For instance, Isaac and 
Walker (1988) and Isaac et al. (1994) showed that when the marginal incentives to 
individuals were scaled to remain constant across different group sizes, free-riding 
   65 
behaviour actually decreased at higher densities. More generally, for any organisms 
that live at high density, cooperation will be most favoured when interactions take 
place between close relatives (i.e. cooperators interact almost exclusively with other 
cooperators; Hamilton 1964). A common way to achieve this is to have relatively 
low dispersal into or out of the population – a pattern that has been observed in both 
microbes (e.g. biofilms, where cells encase themselves in a viscous matrix; Xavier 
and Foster 2007) and metazoans, including social invertebrates (Bilde et al. 2005; 
Hamilton 1972; Peer and Taborsky 2007) and molerats (Jarvis et al. 1994). 
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4. Social conflict over siderophore production and its 




Co-infections can have quite different fitness consequences for pathogens and hosts 
depending on how co-infecting strains interact. In the simplest case, scramble 
competition could favour rapid exploitation and consequently high virulence; 
whereas, if pathogens cooperate to infect a host, co-infection could introduce social 
cheats which selfishly undermine this cooperation and hence reduce the virulence. 
We investigated the latter scenario using the cooperative production of siderophores 
by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa in experimental infections with an insect 
(Galleria mellonella) and a plant (Lactuca sativa) host. In contrast with previous 
studies, we found no evidence for a fitness benefit of siderophore production in vivo 
and, consequently, no evidence that non-producing strains gained relative benefits 
through exploiting producers in co-infection. We did, however, observe attenuation 
of virulence in some infections with siderophore-deficient strains. More generally, 
we review evidence for the importance of bacterial siderophores in infection contexts 




Why are some infections so harmful while others are comparatively benign? Much 
attention has been focused on the evolution of virulence (damage to host; Bull 1994; 
Ewald 1994; Frank 1996; Day and Burns 2003), but one area in which existing 
theory does not adequately account for observed patterns concerns situations in 
which multiple co-infecting agents interact (Gandon et al. 2001; Read and Taylor 
2001). Classic virulence theory predicts that growth of a pathogen is traded off 
against its transmission efficiency, because healthier, longer-lived hosts provide 
more opportunities for transmission (Frank 1996). Thus, selection could favour 
pathogen “restraint” and lower virulence (Frank 1998). Under multiple infection, 
however, scramble competition among co-infecting strains favours rapid host 
exploitation and therefore higher virulence – a classic tragedy of the commons 
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situation (Hardin 1968). Thus, conflict between co-infecting pathogens, and their 
resultant virulence, should correlate negatively with kinship among the strains 
(Hamilton 1972; Bremermann and Pickering 1983; Frank 1992; Frank 1994; Nowak 
and May 1994; van Baalen and Sabelis 1995; Frank 1996) but so far, empirical 
support for this prediction has been limited and ambiguous (Herre 1993; Herre 1996; 
Taylor et al. 1998; Chao et al. 2000; Read and Taylor 2001; Davies et al. 2002; De 
Roode et al. 2003; Massey et al. 2004; Hodgson et al. 2004). 
 
In some cases at least, the specific underlying biology of the host and/or the pathogen 
could give rise to different relationships (Ganusov and Antia 2003). For example, 
hosts might deploy different immune responses against single versus multiple 
infections (Taylor et al. 1998) which obscure any adaptive responses of the 
pathogens themselves to the different infection types. Alternatively, if we allow for 
the possibility of cooperative interactions among pathogens, we can obtain quite 
different predictions for the relative virulence of co-infections versus single 
infections (Gardner et al. 2004; Buckling and Brockhurst 2008). Here we test the 
idea that when pathogens rely on cooperation to invade and exploit their hosts, high 
relatedness within an infecting population will favour more cooperation and thus lead 
to more, rather than less virulent infections (Chao et al. 2000; Brown et al. 2002; 
West and Buckling 2003). This scenario may be especially relevant among microbial 
pathogens, given the striking diversity and ubiquity of cooperative behaviours we 
now recognize to occur in such populations (Crespi 2001; West et al. 2006; West et 
al. 2007). Probably the most common form of cooperation involves the production of 
public goods – extracellular products which, while metabolically costly to the 
producing cell, confer general benefits at the local population level (West et al. 
2007). Such products include digestive enzymes; anti-competitor toxins; antibiotic 
degrading enzymes; protective biofilm polymers; surfactants to facilitate movement; 
and a wide variety of virulence factors which inactivate immune defenses and 
provide access to host resources.  
 
Among the best-characterised bacterial public goods are siderophores, iron 
scavenging molecules produced by cells in response to iron starvation. Bacteria, like 
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other organisms, require iron for redox-dependent metabolism but in most 
environments, soluble iron (Fe(III)) is scarce or, in the case of pathogens residing 
within a host, actively withheld using proteins of high iron-affinity (Ratledge and 
Dover 2000; Andrews et al. 2003; Wandersman and Delepelaire 2004; Ong et al. 
2006). Bacteria have evolved a number of strategies to overcome this problem. 
Foremost among these is the secretion of siderophores, which chelate ferric ions in 
the environment, making them available for uptake by the bacteria as a 
ferrisiderophore complex (Guerinot 1994; Braun 1995; Schalk 2008). To date, more 
than 500 siderophores have been identified, from most bacterial genera 
(Wandersman and Delepelaire 2004; for fungal siderophores see Haas et al 2008).  
 
A well-studied model for siderophore production is the Gram-negative 
proteobacterium, Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Visca et al. 2007). This species is an 
opportunistic pathogen, present in most terrestrial and aquatic habitats, and capable 
of causing infection in a range of plants and animals (D'Argenio 2004). In humans, it 
is an important nosocomial pathogen and a potentially serious threat to immune-
compromised patients, establishing infections in eyes, burn wounds, urinary tracts 
and around implanted devices, and especially in respiratory tissue (Lyczak et al. 
2000; Lyczak et al. 2002). It is also the primary pathogen in cystic fibrosis lung 
infections, where it gives rise to chronic and notoriously persistent infections 
(Harrison 2007). The majority of Pseudomonas species produce the yellow-green 
siderophore pyoverdine (Ravel and Cornelis 2003; Visca et al. 2007) which, in the 
case of P. aeruginosa, is held to be the primary means of iron acquisition 
(Ankenbauer et al. 1985; Vasil and Ochsner 1999; Visca et al. 2007).  
 
Because of its importance for bacterial growth, siderophore production is expected to 
contribute to virulence in vivo. Consistent with this idea, there is accumulating 
evidence of pyoverdine synthesis by P. aeruginosa during pulmonary infection (Haas 
et al. 1991; Handfield et al. 2000; Hunt et al. 2002; Palmer et al. 2005) and, in 
several different animal models of disease, pyoverdine-defective mutants show a 
significantly reduced ability to cause infection (Table 4.1). Infection models using 
other bacteria also demonstrate the involvement of siderophores in virulence, in 
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Vibrio (Wolf and Crosa 1986; Litwin et al. 1996), Yersinia (Bearden et al. 1997), and 
Erwinia (Expert 1999). Apart from its role in growth, uptake of iron by pyoverdine 
may, in turn, stimulate other virulence genes (Lamont et al. 2002; Beare et al. 2003) 
and there is also evidence to suggest that it is required for biofilm formation (Banin 
et al. 2005; Patriquin et al. 2008).   
 
We have argued (above, and previously West and Buckling 2003; Griffin et al. 2004; 
Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007) that siderophores such as pyoverdine are public goods, 
and that their production is a cooperative behaviour. As such, social evolution theory 
predicts that siderophore production could be vulnerable to exploitation by “cheats” 
that do not contribute siderophores of their own. In vitro experiments have shown 
that pyoverdine-defective mutants (cheats) do not grow well in iron-limited 
conditions but are able to use pyoverdine produced by pyoverdine-proficient strains 
(cooperators) when grown in mixed culture. Since cheats avoid the metabolic costs 
of pyoverdine production, they can achieve higher relative fitness than cooperators, 
even to the detriment of population-level productivity (Griffin et al. 2004; Ross-
Gillespie et al. 2007). Pyoverdine-defective cheats are frequently isolated from 
clinical settings (Huston et al. 2004), including cystic fibrosis lungs (De Vos et al. 
2001) where, evidence suggests, they may gradually accumulate over time (Smith et 
al. 2006). Moreover, both clinical P. aeruginosa infections and environmental 
populations frequently harbour multiple genetically distinct strains 
(Mahenthiralingam et al. 1994; Govan and Deretic 1996; Burns et al. 1998; Pirnay et 
al. 2005; Smith et al. 2006; Fothergill et al. 2007), so there is good reason to suppose 
that cooperator-cheat dynamics could naturally occur.  
 
What then are the potential consequences of these social dynamics for virulence? A 
key theoretical prediction is that the presence of siderophore cheats in a mixed 
infection should decrease virulence relative to a wild type infection (West and 
Buckling 2003). An earlier study with a Vibrio-Salmonid model confirmed this result 
(Wolf and Crosa 1986), and was further able to demonstrate that cheats had low 
fitness when growing on their own, but grew much better in co-infection with 
siderophore-producing cooperator strains, to the extent that they greatly increased 
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their relative proportion of the mixed population during the course of the infection. 
Working with an insect host (the greater waxmoth, Galleria mellonella), Harrison et 
al. (2006) obtained qualitatively equivalent results with P. aeruginosa pyoverdine 
cheats. Such patterns contrast strongly with those predicted by classical theory which 
assumes scramble competition among co-infecting strains (Frank 1996) yet, to our 
knowledge, these two studies are the only in vivo tests of this theory to date. In this 
study, therefore, we attempted to replicate and build on this work in two ways. First, 
we consider an additional host model (lettuce). Secondly, we consider multiple pairs 
of P. aeruginosa strains. In their experiments, Harrison et al. (2006) competed two 
strains that differed from each other at multiple loci and for multiple traits besides 
simply siderophore production. Here we use three independent cooperator-cheat 
pairs, derived from different clonal backgrounds using multiple methods - including 




Bacterial strains and model hosts 
 
We used three Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain pairs in our infection experiments, 
matching those we used previously for in vitro experiments (Ross-Gillespie et al. 
2007; chapters 2 and 3; appendix A1). Briefly, we derived strain pairs ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
from the well-categorised wild-type isolate PA01 ATCC15692 and pair ‘C’ from 
strain UCBPP-PA14. While cooperators (‘+’) exhibited wild-type levels of 
siderophore production; cheat strains (‘-‘) were defective for production of the 
primary siderophore, pyoverdine. Mutations for this trait were induced by means of 
ultraviolet and transposon mutagenesis (pair A; Rella et al. 1985; Hohnadel et al. 
1986), deletion of the pyoverdine synthesis gene pvdD (pair B; Ghysels et al. 2004) 
or laboratory selection (pair C; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007). In each case, cheat 
colonies were phenotypically distinguishable from cooperator colonies when grown 
on Kings B agar on the basis of differential pigmentation. We performed infections 
with both an insect and a plant host (Figure 4.1). For the insect host, we used larvae 
of the greater waxmoth (Galleria mellonella; Livefood UK; 
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http://www.livefoods.co.uk). As final instar larvae, waxmoths did not feed, and 
under refrigeration maintained good body condition for up to a week following 
purchase. Our methodology is derived from a model developed by Lysenko (1963), 
Jander et al. (2000) and, especially, Harrison et al. (2006). For the plant host, we 
obtained commercially-grown Romaine lettuces (Lactuca sativa) from a local 
supermarket, and infected them within hours of purchase. This lettuce infection 
model, on which we based our methodology, has been widely used to study P. 
aeruginosa pathogenesis (e.g. Rahme et al. 1997; Filiatrault et al. 2006; Vives-Florez 
and Garnica 2006). 
 
Preparation of bacterial inocula 
 
We conducted infection experiments one strain pair at a time, with at least two 
blocks per pair. For each pair, we grew monocultures of + and - from freezer stock 
overnight, using 6 ml of standard Kings B medium in an orbital shaker (37ºC, 200 
r.p.m.). After 24 hours, we prepared our treatment inocula. First, we twice pelleted 
cells by centrifugation (3 min; 6000 r.p.m.) and washed them in buffer (0.8% NaCl 
solution in the case of waxmoth infections; 10 mM MgSO4 in the case of lettuce 
infections). We set up three treatments: pure cooperator (‘+’); pure cheat (‘-’); a mix 
of + and – (‘M’; at a volumetric ratio of 1:1 in the case of the waxmoth model or 3:1 
in the case of lettuce model) as well as a control treatment, (‘0’; buffer only, as 
above). We injected waxmoths with a 10 µl infecting dose of 4-6 × 103 cells; 
whereas, for lettuces we used a more concentrated dose of 3-4 × 107 cells. In either 
case, we administered the dose using a 10 µl precision syringe 
(http://www.hamiltoncompany.com) fitted with a 26S gauge needle, which was 




(a) Waxmoth model 
We conducted separate assays for virulence and bacterial growth, although in either 
case we performed the initial infections in the same way. In the case of virulence 
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assays, for each strain pair in turn, we randomly allocated replicates to treatments 
split equally across two blocks. For bacterial growth assays, meanwhile, we obtained 
data from one single-block experiment per strain pair. For each larva, we weighed it 
to the nearest 0.1 mg, swabbed it with 70% ethanol to kill surface contaminants, and 
injected it in the abdomen between the first prolegs. Following injection, we 
randomly distributed larvae to individual wells of 24-well sterile microtitre plates 
and incubated them at 37°C. Finally, we took samples of the inocula, plated them to 
Kings B agar and, following overnight incubation at 37°C, counted colony-forming 
units (CFUs) to obtain estimates of initial cell densities and starting ratios of 




Figure 4.1. Experimental protocols used in (A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection 
models.  
 
For virulence assays, we monitored mortality at hourly intervals between 13 and 24 
hours post-inoculation. We scored larvae as dead if they failed to respond to 
mechanical stimulation of the head and prolegs. Distinct melanism was also evident 
in dead larvae (Figure 4.1A). Control treatment larvae showed negligible mortality.  
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For bacterial growth assays, we retrieved larvae after 8 hr incubation (as per Harrison 
et al. 2006), and homogenized them individually in 0.5 ml 0.8% NaCl by rapid 
shaking with a sterile ceramic bead (FastPrep FP120; http://www.mpbio.com; 4 m/s 
for 2 min). We centrifuged the homogenates at low speed (1000 r.p.m.; 3 min) to 
separate host tissues into distinct bands, then took samples from the liquid 
(haemolymph) fractions and after appropriate serial dilution in 0.8% NaCl, spread 
them using automated spiral plating (EddyJet; http://www.iul-inst.com) to plates of 
Kings B agar supplemented with 15 µg/ml ampicillin to restrict the growth of non-
target bacteria (this concentration does not impede growth in Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa). We then incubated these plates overnight at 37ºC and counted CFUs to 
obtain estimates of the endpoint cell densities achieved by the infecting populations 
and, for mixed infections, the endpoint ratios of cooperators to cheats. When 
estimating the final pathogen population density within a given larva, we had to 
consider how size differences among larvae could affect the total volume of 
homogenate from which we drew our sample. In a separate experiment (data not 
shown), we regressed larval mass against the volume of liquid larvae displaced, 
thereby establishing that larval volume (ml) = 1.032 × larval mass (g). We applied 
this correction factor to each homogenized host such that our estimates of final 
pathogen density were for the complete host (i.e. the entire infecting population), 
rather than per unit of host tissue.  
 
(b) Lettuce model 
From each lettuce, we selected four leaves of similar size (one per treatment), which 
we washed briefly with 0.1% bleach to kill surface contaminants and then patted dry 
with sterile tissue. We cut 50 mm diameter discs from the centre of the leaves using a 
cookie cutter, and placed them individually in 10 cm petrie dishes. We then 
inoculated leaf discs with bacteria by injection into the midrib using a 10 µl RN 
Hamilton syringe fitted with a 26S needle. Finally, we placed the leaf discs, in their 
individual petrie dishes, in a sealed container kept humid by the addition of filter 
papers moistened with 10 mM MgSO4 and incubated them at room temperature on 
the laboratory bench. We took samples of the inocula, diluted them, and plated them 
to Kings B agar. Following overnight incubation at 37°C we counted the CFUs 
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evident on these plates to obtain an estimate of inoculum densities and, in the case of 
the mixed treatment, an estimate of the starting ratio of cooperators to cheats.  
 
After 72 hours incubation, we assayed virulence by measuring the maximum extent 
of tissue damage along the midrib of the leaf disc, taking our measurements post-hoc 
from scale-standardized digital photographs (Figure 4.1B). Control leaf discs, 
injected with MgSO4 buffer only, showed negligible tissue damage. We then 
suspended whole leaf discs in 2 ml 10 mM MgSO4 and homogenized them (FastPrep 
FP120; 4 m/s for 2 min). We took samples of the homogenate and, after serial 
dilution, spread them to plates of Kings B agar supplemented with 15 µg/ml 
ampicillin. We incubated these plates overnight at 37ºC then counted CFUs to obtain 
estimates of the endpoint cell densities achieved by the infecting populations and, for 




We analysed waxmoth mortality data using parametric survival analysis. We 
specified a Weibull error structure, which, because it does not assume a constant 
probability of death through time, is commonly used in survival analysis (Carroll 
2003). The maximal model included a blocking factor but, since it had no significant 
effect, it was removed from the final model. We defined bacterial growth as the 
number of doublings an infecting population underwent during the observed period 
of infection, and calculated this for each host as per Lenski et al. (1991). In the case 
of mixed infections (treatment ‘M’), we were also able to estimate, separately, the 
growth of the cooperator and cheat subpopulations, since we had estimates for total 
population size and proportion of each strain type at both the start and end points of 
the infection period. For either infection model, we analysed bacterial growth data 
with linear mixed effects models or, where appropriate, ANOVA. In particular, since 
lettuce infections involved multiple replicate blocks per strain pair (with treatments 
equally represented in each), we began our analyses with maximal models including 
the random effects block and, nested within it, lettuce identity. Where these random 
effects comprised a substantial portion of the total error variance (>5%) they were 
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retained in the model, but in other cases, they were excluded and the resulting 
minimal model was then a 1-way ANOVA. Finally, for each mixed infection, we 
calculated values for the relative fitness of cheats (v) by comparing the frequency of 
cheats at the beginning and end of each infection. Specifically, v is given by 
( ) ( )2112 11 xxxxv −−= , where x1 is the initial proportion of cheats in the inoculum 
and x2 is their final proportion (Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007). The value of v therefore 
signifies whether cheats increase in frequency ( )1>v , decrease in frequency ( )1<v , 
or remain at the same frequency ( )1=v . We tested whether v differed significantly 





(a) Waxmoth model 
For two out of three strain pairs tested, we observed virulence patterns that accorded 
with our theoretical predictions and with previous results (Harrison et al 2006): 
waxmoths infected with siderophore-deficient bacterial strains survived relatively 
longer than those infected with wild type strains, while co-infections resulted in 
intermediate virulence (Figure 4.2A). Surprisingly, however, this pattern of virulence 
held only for the strains derived from a PA01 background (Parametric survival; pair 
A:  Χ2 = 10.6, d.f. = 2, n = 103, p = 0.005; pair B: Χ2 = 10.8, d.f. = 2, n = 84, p = 
0.005), whereas for pair C, derived via laboratory selection from a PA14 
background, the opposite pattern was evident (Χ2 = 13.1, d.f. = 2, n = 90, p = 0.001). 
Unlike Harrison et al (2006) we were unable to find a correlation between infection 
virulence and bacterial growth rates (Figure 4.3A). In each case, the growth rate of 
the total bacterial population did not differ significantly across different infection 
types (ANOVA; Pair A: F2,24 = 2.494, p = 0.104; Pair B: F2,24 = 0.107, p = 0.899; 
Pair C: F2,24 = 0.329, p = 0.723). Moreover, we did not find any evidence to suggest 
that cheats gained a fitness advantage when in co-infection with cooperators as 
compared with single infection conditions (Figure 4.3A; ANOVA; Pair A: F1,18 = 
0.026, p = 0.875; B: F1,18 = 3.276, p = 0.087; C: F1,18 = 1.508, p = 0.236). Finally, the 
relative fitness, v,  of cheats in co-infection (i.e. relative to cooperators in co-
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infection) was, in each case, significantly less than 1, indicating that cheats were 
actually at a disadvantage compared with cooperators under the conditions tested (1-
tailed Z-test; Pair A: v = 0.384; t = -14.655, d.f. = 9, p < 0.001; Pair B: v = 0.814; t = 




Figure 4.2.  Variation in virulence across different pathogen strain pairs and infection 
types for (A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection models. Black bars indicate infections 
with cooperator strains (+) strains only; white bars indicate infections with cheat strains 
(-) only; and checked bars indicate co-infections with both cooperators and cheats (M). 





Figure 4.3.  Variation in bacterial growth across different strains and infection types for 
(A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection models. Black bars refer to populations of 
cooperator cells, either growing alone (+) or in a co-infection (M). White bars refer to 
populations of cheat cells, either growing alone (-) or in a co-infection (M). Checked 
bars refer to the overall growth of a mixed population of cooperators and cheats. Error 
bars indicate one standard error. 
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(b) Lettuce model 
We found no evidence for an effect of infection type on virulence in our lettuce 
infection model (Figure 4.2B). Similar levels of tissue damage were observed for 
infections resulting from, respectively, the PA01 wild type strain (+), a pvdD-
knockout cheat strain (-), or a mixture of the two strain types (LMER: F2, 38 = 0.3694; 
p = 0.6936). Similarly, we observed no significant difference in overall bacterial 
growth across the three treatments (Figure 4.3B; ANOVA: F2,63 = 0.0759, p = 
0.9270) nor did we find any evidence for a growth advantage for cheats in co-
infection as compared to single infection (Figure 4.3B; ANOVA: F1,42 = 0.1660; p = 
0.6860). Finally, mean relative fitness, v, of cheats in co-infection (i.e. relative to 
cooperators in co-infection) was not significantly greater than 1 (1-tailed Z test: t = 
0.8085, d.f. = 21, p = 0.2139), suggesting that cheats had no advantage over 




We tested the hypothesis that social conflict among co-infecting pathogens could 
affect their fitness and hence the resulting virulence of an infection but we found no 
evidence, in either of the models we considered, to suggest that cheating by 
siderophore-defective mutants has important consequences for bacterial fitness in 
vivo. Cheats grew equally well in single infections as they did in co-infection and 
overall bacterial growth rates did not differ significantly across infection treatments 
(Figure 4.3). Despite this similarity in bacterial growth across treatments, we did 
find, in the waxmoth model at least, that virulence varied across infection types, 
though not always in the expected direction (Figure 4.2). Our study, which extended 
previous empirical work by considering multiple pathogen strain pairs and multiple 
host models, produced results that contrast with those of these earlier studies (Wolf 
and Crosa 1986; Harrison et al. 2006), both of which indicated that siderophore 
cheats can exploit cooperators in a co-infection context, and that pathogen 
productivity, and hence virulence, are consequently attenuated in such cases. 
Similarly, our results contrast with experiments where iron-limitation conditions 
were simulated in vitro (Griffin et al. 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007).  
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Pyoverdine production is widely considered to play a central role in iron-metabolism 
and pathogenicity in P. aeruginosa (Visca et al. 2007) and in light of the results from 
recent competition experiments (Griffin et al. 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007) it has 
been hailed as a classic example of a public-goods cooperative trait in the growing 
field of sociomicrobiology (West et al. 2006; Buckling et al. 2007; West et al. 2007). 
Why then, in the present study, did we not observe fitness differences between 
strains or evidence of cheating? Evidently, the explanation is that under the particular 
conditions we tested, bacteria were able to obtain sufficient iron from the host 
environment irrespective of whether or not they had recourse to pyoverdine. This 
could arise if either (a) the hosts we used did not impose sufficiently iron-limited 
conditions on the bacteria infecting them, at least not over the short time scales we 
considered, or (b) the bacteria employed alternative mechanisms for iron acquisition, 
and thus did not need pyoverdine.  
 
Considering (a), the first question is whether the host models we employed are 
appropriate for this particular question. The importance of iron to P. aeruginosa 
metabolism, and the role of siderophores in iron acquisition have both been well-
documented in vitro (Visca et al 2007), and mutant strains defective for siderophore 
production have been shown to have attenuated virulence in several rodent models 
(Table 4.1). However, to date, relatively little attention has been focused on the role 
of siderophores in non-mammalian infection models (Table 4.1; Haas et al. 2008), 
which is especially surprising given the widespread interest in using alternative host 
models to identify conserved mechanisms of pathogenesis in wide-spectrum 
pathogens like P. aeruginosa (Rahme et al. 1995; Rahme et al. 1997; Rahme et al. 
2000; Donabedian 2003). The few data that are available suggest that siderophores 
may be less important in non-mammalian hosts, possibly because such hosts have 
less efficacious systems of iron sequestration and thus provide bacteria with 
relatively easier access to iron (Ong et al 2006). In our experiments, we used the 
Romaine lettuce varietal for the purposes of consistency and comparison with other 
studies of P. aeruginosa pathogenicity (e.g. Rahme et al. 1997; Filiatrault et al. 2006; 
Vives-Florez and Garnica 2006). However, even compared with other lettuces, this is 
a relatively iron-rich organism (USDA 2007).  
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A related question is whether iron-limitation likely to be important given the specific 
type of infection we induced in these hosts? Pyoverdine production clearly benefits 
bacterial growth in mammalian hosts (Table 4.1) but, notably, even within a host it is 
not equally important across all tissue types, or over all time scales (acute vs. 
chronic), or for all infection routes (Table 4.1; Takase et al. 2000). P. aeruginosa 
does naturally associate with both insect larvae (Butcher 1981; Osborn et al. 2002) 
and lettuces (Kominos et al. 1972; Correa et al. 1991), but experimental infections in 
a laboratory can not capture all the features of natural, co-evolved infections. In 
nature, P. aeruginosa typically persists in or on these hosts at low densities and gives 
rise to few, if any, symptoms of disease. The relatively high inoculum dosages used 
in our experiments, the unnatural routes of infection and post-inoculation incubation 
conditions are all features designed to overwhelm host defenses and promote acute 
infection. It is conceivable that bacterial fitness differences resulting from different 
iron-metabolism profiles would become more pronounced in these host models in the 
context of more natural, chronic infections involving smaller pathogen loads.  
 
With regard to (b), it is important to note that, while pyoverdine production is 
considered the most important of P. aeruginosa’s adaptations to iron limitation 
(Visca et al. 2007; Cornelis et al. 2008), alternative means of acquiring iron are also 
known. Cells can scavenge host-bound Fe(III) using the secondary siderophore, 
pyochelin (Cornelis and Matthijs 2002), or pyocyanin (Cox 1986), or can take up 
iron as haem or haemoglobin  (Ochsner et al. 2000), or even as Fe(II) via a 
combination of redox molecules and ferrioxidase (Newman and Kolter 2000; Huston 
et al. 2004). Indeed, P. aeruginosa appears to have evolved impressive flexibility 
with respect to iron acquisition, as evidenced by the many homologues of 
ferripyoverdine receptor genes in its genome (Cornelis and Matthijs 2002; De Chial 
et al. 2003; Poole and McKay 2003), the intraspecies diversity of “siderovars” 
(Cornelis et al. 1989; Meyer et al. 2002), the high genetic diversity and diversifying 
selection at the pyoverdine locus (Spencer et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2005), and the 
ability to use a variety of heterologous siderophores produced by other microbes 
(Guerinot 1994; Poole and McKay 2003). When presented in the laboratory with 
medium artificially depleted of iron, pyoverdine-defective strains show strongly 
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attenuated growth (Griffin et al. 2004; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007), but it may be that, 
when growing in certain types of host tissues, these same mutant strains can use 
secondary pathways to access alternative iron sources (Takase et al. 2000). Indeed, 
there is still much to learn about how the in vivo physiology and metabolism of 
pathogens differs from that we see in vitro (Vasil and Ochsner 1999; Brown et al. 
2008; Buckling and Brockhurst 2008).  
 
Although we did not find growth differences across different infection types, we did, 
in some cases at least, observe attenuated virulence in infections involving 
pyoverdine-defective strains (Figure 4.2). This could potentially result because, aside 
from any growth benefits that may derive from enhanced iron metabolism, 
pyoverdine can contribute in a more direct way to the virulence of P. aeruginosa. 
The uptake of pyoverdine is known to positively regulate its own synthesis, as well 
as the production of two virulence factors, exotoxin A (ToxA) and an endoprotease 
(PrpL), which are major contributors to the ability of this bacterium to cause disease 
(Lamont et al. 2002; Beare et al. 2003). Thus, in wild type infections, the synthesis 
and uptake of pyoverdines could have enhanced damage to host tissue even though 
this did not translate to a significant growth advantage for the bacteria. That said, 
there is evidence to indicate that pyoverdine production can be facultatively 
regulated in response to iron limitation (Cunliffe et al. 1995; Leoni et al. 1996; Kim 
et al 2003; Kümmerli et al. in press). Under this scenario, if in vivo conditions were 
not iron-limited, as we hypothesise, pyoverdine production by wild type cells should 
have been deactivated (or low). This would account for the lack of growth 
differences between treatments, but does not explain the differences in virulence.   
 
Siderophores can be shared extracellularly as public goods, and where this occurs we 
would expect that pyoverdine-defective cheats could invade a population of 
pyoverdine-producers and increase in relative frequency. However, our waxmoth 
infection data indicate that cheats had lower relative fitness than cooperators in co-
infection, as found by Harrison et al. (2006). Does this suggest then that social cheats 
have no place in an infection context? On the contrary, the relative costs and benefits 
of cooperation vs. cheating are highly context dependent, and are expected to vary 
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as, for example, the environment becomes more benign (Griffin et al. 2004), or as the 
population structure changes (Griffin et al. 2004; Harrison et al. 2006; Ross-Gillespie 
et al. 2007). Indeed, in longitudinal studies of P. aeruginosa infections in the cystic 
fibrosis lung, average pyoverdine production per cell is seen to decrease over the 
course of the infection, while concomitantly, pyoverdine-defective mutants increase 
in frequency (De Vos et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2006). Whether this reflects ongoing 
social conflict, or merely a decreased need for siderophores as more iron becomes 
available in the CF lung (Stites et al. 1999), remains to be resolved.   
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5. Social conflict over quorum sensing and its 




Bacteria coordinate and regulate much of their activity using ‘quorum sensing’ (QS) 
chemical signaling but, as in vitro experiments demonstrate, this is cooperative 
behaviour, involving costs to the individual and benefits at a group level. As such, 
QS is vulnerable to exploitation by QS-deficient cheats. This exploitation can have 
significant fitness consequences at both the strain and population level, which, in the 
context of co-infecting pathogens, could potentially impact on the virulence 
experienced by a host. Here we use the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa to test 
whether QS functions as a social trait in vivo in experimental infections in insects 
(Galleria mellonella) and plants (Lactuca sativa). Our data indicate that QS does not 
provide a bacterial growth advantage in these infection models and accordingly, we 
found no consistent evidence of social exploitation among strains. Finally, although 
virulence did vary across infection types, it was not attenuated in co-infections of 
wild type and QS-deficient mutants. Thus, our data do not support the idea that QS 
functions as a cooperative trait in vivo in these host models. More generally, we 
survey evidence from experimental infection studies for the effect of QS-disruption 
on virulence. We conclude that, while QS frequently plays an important role in 
virulence, notable exceptions exist for some host taxa and certain infection types and 




Microbiology has been revolutionised in recent decades by the discovery that 
bacteria possess elaborate chemical signaling systems by which they can gain 
information about other cells in their local environment and coordinate their 
behaviour accordingly (Fuqua et al. 2001; Bassler and Losick 2006; Camilli and 
Bassler 2006; Williams et al. 2007). These so-called “quorum sensing” (QS) systems 
operate by the extracellular release, dissemination and uptake of small molecules 
which, typically once they attain a threshold concentration (i.e. quorum), 
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subsequently trigger the expression or repression of target genes. QS systems have 
been shown to operate in a wide variety of bacterial taxa and make it possible for 
bacteria to act cooperatively in accessing nutrients, killing competitors, defending 
themselves against biotic or abiotic threats, migrating to more favourable habitats, or 
banding together into multicellular aggregations better suited to the rigours of their 
environment (e.g. biofilms, fruiting bodies; Williams et al. 2007).  
 
One of the most intensively-studied and best-characterized QS systems is that of 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, a Gram-negative bacterium found in most terrestrial and 
aquatic environments and an opportunistic pathogen of a wide range eukaryotes, 
from amoebae to mammals (D'Argenio 2004; Juhas et al. 2005; Venturi 2006; Case 
et al. 2008). In humans, P. aeruginosa is a notorious cause of infections among 
burned, intubated, post-operative and immune-compromised patients and is a 
particular problem in the lungs of cystic fibrosis sufferers, where it establishes 
chronic, stubborn and ultimately fatal infections (Cross et al. 1983; Govan and 
Deretic 1996; Lyczak et al. 2000; Lyczak et al. 2002; Harrison 2007). The QS 
regulatory apparatus in this species comprises two subcircuits, Las and Rhl, which 
are mediated by the N-acyl homoserine lactone signal molecules 3-oxo-C12-HSL 
and C4-HSL, respectively. In each case there is a synthase gene (lasI or rhlI) which 
encodes the signal molecule and a second gene (LasR or rhlR) encoding a cognate 
receptor which both regulates target genes and amplifies the signal by autoinducing 
further signal production (Gambello et al. 1993; Latifi et al. 1995). The organization 
of the Las and Rhl systems is not yet fully understood, although Las is thought to be 
hierarchically dominant because it positively regulates the Rhl system (Latifi et al. 
1996; Pesci et al. 1997; McKnight et al. 2000; de Kievit et al. 2002; Schuster and 
Greenberg 2006; Venturi 2006), via interaction with a third system involving a 2-
alkyl-4-quinolone signal (PQS; Diggle et al. 2003; Wade et al. 2005; Dubern and 
Diggle 2008).  
 
Quorum sensing is considered to play a vital role in the basic biology and 
pathogenesis of P. aeruginosa. Indeed, transciptome studies suggest that over 300 
genes – between 6 and 10% of the genome – could be under QS control (Hentzer et 
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al. 2003; Schuster et al. 2003; Wagner et al. 2003). In particular, the Las and Rhl 
systems are known to regulate the expression of multiple extracellular virulence 
factors including elastase, alkaline protease, exoenzyme S, exotoxin A, rhamnolipids, 
pyocyanin, hydrogen cyanide, neuraminidase, haemolysin, lectins, catalase and 
superoxide dismutases (see reviews by Passador et al. 1993; Brint and Ohman 1995; 
Van Delden and Iglewski 1998; Juhas et al. 2005). QS is involved in iron acquisition 
(Stintzi et al. 1998; Hentzer et al. 2003; Ren et al. 2005), it is required for swarming 
(Köhler et al. 2000; Overhage et al. 2008) and twitching motility (Glessner et al. 
1999; although see also Beatson et al. 2002), it has an anticompetitor function 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005; Qazi et al. 2006; McAlester et al. 2008), it positively 
regulates the injection of virulence factors into host cells via type III secretion 
(Hogardt et al. 2004; Bleves et al. 2005) and it may also, under certain conditions at 
least, play a role in the formation and maintenance of biofilms (Kjelleberg and Molin 
2002; Parsek and Greenberg 2005; Kirisits and Parsek 2006; Patriquin et al. 2008). 
QS systems have been shown to operate in infected tissues, especially the cystic 
fibrosis lung (Stickler et al. 1998; Storey et al. 1998; Geisenberger et al. 2000; Singh 
et al. 2000; Wu et al. 2000; Erickson et al. 2002; Middleton et al. 2002; Ward et al. 
2003; Wu et al. 2003) and experimental studies with model hosts (including rodents, 
plants, insects, nematodes and amoebae) have demonstrated that mutations in las or 
rhl genes typically reduce the capacity of P. aeruginosa to establish and maintain 
infections (Table 5.1; see also reviews by Rumbaugh et al. 2000; Donabedian 2003; 
Smith and Iglewski 2003).  
 
Aside from its evident importance to P. aeruginosa, QS is fundamentally a social 
trait with complex fitness consequences for both signalers and receivers, and as such, 
it can lead to conflicts of interest (Brookfield 1998; Brown and Johnstone 2001; 
Keller and Surette 2006; West et al. 2006; Diggle et al. 2007a; Diggle et al. 2007b; 
Hense et al. 2007). A large body of evolutionary theory predicts that communication 
and cooperation are vulnerable to exploitation (Hamilton 1964; Frank 1998; 
Maynard Smith and Harper 2003; Lehmann and Keller 2006). For instance, In the 
case of QS, there could be cheats that either (a) do not produce signal but still benefit 
by monitoring the signals of others (‘signal-negative’), or (b) do not respond to 
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others’ solicitations (‘signal-blind’) and thus avoid the costs of exoproduct 
production, etc. while still benefiting from the QS-controlled contributions of others 
(Haas 2006). Meanwhile, signal-blind cheats could still produce (or even 
overproduce) signal to ‘coerce’ other cells into greater levels of cooperation (Brown 
and Johnstone 2001; Keller and Surette 2006).  
 
QS mutants, especially signal blind lasR-defective mutants, have been found in P. 
aeruginosa populations from diverse sources and are known to spontaneously arise 
and spread in artificial cultures and natural infections alike (Hamood et al. 1996; 
Cabrol et al. 2003; Denervaud et al. 2004; Schaber et al. 2004; Zhu et al. 2004; 
Heurlier et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2005b; Salunkhe et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2006; 
D'Argenio et al. 2007; Fothergill et al. 2007; Lujan et al. 2007; Sandoz et al. 2007; 
Bosgelmez-Tinaz and Ulusoy 2008). While this pattern could arise if the loss of QS 
is simply an adaptation to the host environment, an alternative explanation is that 
these mutants are social cheats which spread at the expense of cooperators (West et 
al. 2006; Sandoz et al. 2007). Concordant with this idea, Diggle et al. (2007b) 
demonstrated in a series of elegant experiments that both lasI and lasR mutants can 
function as cheats in vitro. More recently, we showed that these patterns hold in vivo 
too (Rumbaugh et al, submitted). Using a mouse model, we showed that under co-
infection conditions, QS-mutants could exploit cooperators (wild-type cells) and 
consequently increase in frequency, and that this social conflict reduced the virulence 
of such infections relative to those involving only wild-type QS-proficient bacteria.  
 
In this study, we explore the generality of these results. We consider two non-
mammalian host models, an insect (Galleria mellonella) and a plant (Sativa lactuca), 
which we experimentally infect with QS-defective P. aeruginosa strains derived 
from the widely studied PA01 background (Stover et al. 2000). Specifically, we test 
the predictions that (a) QS enhances P. aeruginosa growth in an infection context 
and (b) is, in turn, detrimental to the host; (c) QS-defective mutants ‘cheat’ by 
exploiting the QS-related cooperative behaviour of co-infecting wild type cells in 
vivo and (d) such social conflict can attenuate both the bacterial productivity and (e) 
the virulence of such co-infections relative to wild type infections. 
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5.3. Methods 
 
Bacterial strains and model hosts 
 
We considered two types of Pseudomonas aeruginosa QS mutants, defective for 
different parts of the LasI/LasR signaling system. We derived “signal-negative” and 
“signal-blind” cheats in a PA01 ATCC15692 background by targeted disruption of 
the genes lasI and lasR respectively. Briefly, we used standard conjugation 
techniques to transfer suicide vector plasmids from E. coli S17-1 donor strains to our 
PA01 wild type, where the latter was first sensitized to mating by overnight growth 
at 42°C. Specifically, the conjugations involved plasmids pSB219.8A and 
pSB219.9A (carrying lasI::Gm and lasR::Gm respectively; Beatson et al. 2002). We 
isolated single-crossover conjugants from Pseudomonas Isolation Agar (Fluka 
17208) supplemented with 100 µg/ml gentamycin, and subsequently grew them on 
5% sucrose to select against retention of the plasmid (which promotes host cell 
sensitivity to sucrose via the genes sacBR). Thus, we generated stable double-
crossover QS mutants, in which there is loss-of-function disruption of a single gene 
(either lasI or lasR) but no cost of plasmid maintenance.  
 
To allow us to discriminate between colonies of cooperator vs. cheat strains, we 
generated duplicate versions of our wild-type and mutant strains tagged with 
bioluminescence genes from the proteobacterium Photorhabdus luminescens. Using 
similar standard protocols to those above, we conjugated the promoter-less 
luxCDABE cassette (via the 12538 bp mini-CTX-lux plasmid; Becher and Schweizer 
2000) from an E. coli S17-1λpir donor into the chromosome of our target P. 
aeruginosa strains. The resulting stable single-crossovers, isolated from agar 
supplemented with 200 µg/ml tetracycline, constitutively express a low level of 
bioluminescence which is clearly detectable in long-exposure images in an otherwise 
dark environment. We detected no significant growth differences in vitro between 
tagged and untagged versions of our strains (data not shown), suggesting that the 
metabolic costs of lux expression are negligible under standard growth conditions. 
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We performed infections with both an insect and a plant host. For the insect host, we 
used larvae of the greater waxmoth (Galleria mellonella; Livefood UK; 
http://www.livefoods.co.uk). As final instar larvae, waxmoths did not feed, and 
under refrigeration maintained good body condition for up to a week following 
purchase. Our methodology is derived from that of previous studies (Lysenko 1963; 
Jander et al. 2000; Harrison et al. 2006). For the plant host, we obtained 
commercially-grown Romaine lettuces (Lactuca sativa) from a local supermarket, 
and infected them within two hours of purchase. This lettuce infection model, on 
which we based our methodology, has been widely used to study P. aeruginosa 
pathogenesis (e.g. Rahme et al. 1997; Filiatrault et al. 2006; Vives-Florez and 
Garnica 2006; Wagner et al. 2007). 
 
Preparation of bacterial inocula 
 
We conducted infection experiments one strain pair at a time, with at least two 
blocks per pair. For each pair, we grew separate overnight cultures of the wild type 
and a derived QS mutant from freezer stock, using 6 ml of standard Kings B medium 
in an orbital shaker (37ºC, 200 r.p.m.). After 24 hours, we prepared our treatment 
inocula. First, we twice pelleted cells by centrifugation (3 min; 6000 r.p.m.) and 
washed them in buffer (10 mM MgSO4 in the case of lettuce infections; 0.8% NaCl 
solution in the case of waxmoth infections). We set up three treatments: pure 
cooperator (‘+’); pure cheat (‘-’); a mix of + and – (‘M’; at a volumetric ratio of 1:1 
in the case of the waxmoth model or 3:1 in the case of lettuce model) as well as a 
control treatment, (‘0’; buffer only, as above). For the waxmoth model, we used 
untagged PA01 wild-type (cooperator) and lux-tagged QS mutants (cheats), at an 
infecting dosage of 3-5 × 103 CFU. For lettuce infection assays we used a lux-tagged 
PA01 wild-type (cooperator) vs. untagged QS mutants (cheats), at a dose of ~1 × 107 
CFU. In all cases, we administered doses using a 10 µl precision syringe 
(http://www.hamiltoncompany.com) fitted with a 26S gauge needle, which was 
sterilised between each treatment using 100% EtOH and a sterile water rinse.  
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Infection protocols 
 
(a) Waxmoth model 
We conducted separate assays for virulence and bacterial growth, although in either 
case we performed the initial infections in the same way. In the case of virulence 
assays, for each strain pair in turn, we randomly allocated replicates to treatments 
split equally across two blocks. For bacterial growth assays, meanwhile, we obtained 
data from one single-block experiment per strain pair. For each larva, we weighed it 
to the nearest 0.1 mg, swabbed it with 70% ethanol to kill surface contaminants, and 
injected it in the abdomen between the first prolegs. Following injection, we 
randomly distributed larvae to individual wells of 24-well sterile microtitre plates 
and incubated them at 37°C. Finally, we took samples of the inocula, plated them to 
LB agar and, following overnight incubation at 37°C, counted CFUs to obtain 
estimates of initial cell densities. For mixed infections, we also photographed plates 
in a sealed cabinet (Fluorchem SP Light Cabinet, operated with AlphaPart 11 Ease 
software; Alpha Innotech http://www.alphainnotech.com) then digitally overlaid 
false-coloured screens of regular (illuminated) and long-exposure (6 min; non-
illuminated) photographs to yield a composite image in which lux-tagged and 
untagged CFUs could easily be distinguished. From these photographs, we obtained 
an estimate of the starting ratio of cooperators to cheats. 
 
For virulence assays, we monitored mortality at hourly intervals between 13 and 24 
hours post-inoculation. We recorded larvae as dead if they failed to respond to 
mechanical stimulation of the head and prolegs. Distinct melanism was also evident 
in dead larvae (Figure 5.1A). Control treatment larvae showed negligible mortality. 
  
For bacterial growth assays, we retrieved larvae after 8 hr incubation, and 
homogenized them individually in 0.5 ml 0.8% NaCl by rapid shaking with a sterile 
ceramic bead (FastPrep FP120; http://www.mpbio.com; 4 m/s for 2 min). We 
centrifuged the homogenates at low speed (1000 r.p.m.; 3 min) to separate host 
tissues into distinct bands, then took samples from the liquid (haemolymph) 
fractions, and after appropriate serial dilution in 0.8% NaCl, spread them using 
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automated spiral plating (EddyJet; http://www.iul-inst.com) to plates of LB agar 
supplemented with 15 µg/ml ampicillin to restrict the growth of non-target bacteria 
(this concentration does not impede growth in Pseudomonas aeruginosa). We then 
incubated these plates overnight at 37ºC then counted CFUs to obtain estimates of 
the endpoint cell densities achieved by the infecting populations. As before, we 
produced composite photographs of the plates to in which lux-tagged CFUs could be 
easily distinguished from untagged CFUs and from these images we estimated the 
endpoint ratios of cooperators to cheats. When estimating the final pathogen 
population density within a given larva, we had to consider how size differences 
among larvae could affect the total volume of homogenate from which we drew our 
sample. In a separate experiment (data not shown), we regressed larval mass against 
the volume of liquid larvae displaced, thereby establishing that larval volume (ml) = 
1.032 × larval mass (g). We applied this correction factor to each homogenized host 
such that our estimates of final pathogen density were for the complete host (i.e. the 
entire infecting population), rather than per some unit of host tissue. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental protocols used in (A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection models.  
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(b) Lettuce model 
From each head of lettuce, we selected four leaves of similar size (one per 
treatment), which we washed briefly with 0.1% bleach to kill surface contaminants 
and then patted dry with sterile tissue. We cut 50 mm diameter discs from the centre 
of the leaves using a cookie cutter, and placed them individually in 10 cm petrie 
dishes. We then inoculated leaf discs with bacteria (see dosage details above) by 
injection into the midrib using a 10 µl RN Hamilton syringe fitted with a 26S needle. 
Finally, we placed the leaf discs, in their individual petrie dishes, in a sealed 
container kept humid by the addition of filter papers moistened with 10 mM MgSO4 
and incubated them at room temperature on the laboratory bench. Samples of the 
inocula were diluted and plated to LB agar. Following overnight incubation at 37°C, 
we counted CFUs to obtain estimates of the starting cell densities. We also 
photographed mixed inocula plates as described above in order to estimate starting 
ratios of wild type to mutant CFUs.   
 
After 72 hours incubation, we assayed virulence by measuring the maximum extent 
of tissue damage along the midrib of the leaf disc, taking our measurements post-hoc 
from scale-standardized digital photographs (Figure 5.1B). Control leaf discs, 
injected with MgSO4 buffer only, showed negligible tissue damage. We then 
suspended whole leaf discs in 2 ml 10 mM MgSO4 and homogenized them by rapid 
shaking with a sterile ceramic bead (FastPrep FP120; 4 m/s for 2 min). We took 
samples of the homogenate and, after serial dilution, spread them using automated 
spiral plating to LB agar supplemented with 15 µg/ml ampicillin. We incubated these 
plates overnight at 37ºC then counted CFUs to obtain estimates of the endpoint cell 
densities achieved by the infecting populations and, for mixed infections, we took 





We calculated bacterial growth for each host, defined as the number of doublings an 
infecting population underwent during the observed period of infection (Lenski et al. 
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1991). In the case of mixed infections (treatment ‘M’), we were also able to estimate, 
separately, the growth of the cooperator and cheat subpopulations, since we had 
estimates for total population size and proportion of each strain type at both the start 
and end points of the infection period. We analysed bacterial growth data using 
linear mixed effects models or, where appropriate, ANOVA, with larval mass 
included as a covariate. For each mixed infection, we calculated values for the 
relative fitness of cheats (v), by comparing the frequency of cheats at the beginning 
and end of each infection. Specifically, v is given by ( ) ( )2112 11 xxxxv −−= , where 
x1 is the initial proportion of cheats in the inoculum and x2 is their final proportion 
(Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007; see also “competitive index”; Beuzon and Holden 2001). 
The value of v therefore signifies whether cheats increase in frequency ( )1>v , 
decrease in frequency ( )1<v , or remain at the same frequency ( )1=v . We tested 
whether v differed significantly from 1 using a Z-test. We analysed waxmoth 
mortality data using parametric survival analysis, specifying the commonly used 
Weibull error structure, which allows the probability of death to vary over time 
(Carroll 2003). The maximal model included a blocking factor but, since it had no 
significant effect, it was removed from the final model. Since lettuce infections 
involved multiple replicate blocks per strain pair (with treatments equally 
represented in each), we began our analyses with maximal models including the 
random effects block and, nested within it, lettuce identity. Where these random 
effects comprised a substantial portion of the total error variance (>5%) they were 
retained in the model, but in other cases, they were excluded and the resulting 





(a) Waxmoth model 
Data on bacterial growth within waxmoth hosts are summarized in Figure 5.1A. For 
the strain pair featuring the signal-blind mutant, PA01∆lasR, there was an in vivo 
growth difference across treatments (F2,26 = 4.434, p = 0.022), in that mixed 
infections showed more growth than the mutant alone (post-hoc Tukey test showed 
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95% confidence intervals excluded 0 in the ‘M’ vs. ‘-’ comparison only), whereas for 
the strain pair with the signal-negative mutant, PA01∆lasI, we found no significant 
growth differences across treatments (F2,26 = 1.932, p = 0.165). Next, we compared 
growth of the QS-defective mutants (‘cheats’) only, in single infection versus mixed 
infection. Signal-blind mutants did show a growth advantage in co-infection versus 
single infection (ANOVA: F1,18 = 10.265, p = 0.005) while for signal-negative 
mutants, the opposite patterns emerged – growth was relatively higher in single 
infection (ANOVA: F1,19 = 7.429, p = 0.013). Finally, we tested whether mutants had 
a relative fitness advantage over the wild type within a co-infection. Signal blind 
mutants were relatively fitter than the wild type in co-infections (v = 1.28; 1-tailed Z-
test of  v > 1;  t = 2.63, d.f. = 9, p = 0.014), whereas signal-negative mutants were 
relatively less fit than the wild type (v = 0.46; 1-tailed Z-test of  v < 1;  t = 15.84, d.f. 
= 10, p < 0.001). Virulence varied significantly across different infection treatments 
(Figure 5.3A; parametric survival analyses; signal-blind mutant: Χ2 = 13.15, d.f. = 2, 
n = 89, p < 0.002; signal-negative mutant: Χ2 = 21.59, d.f. = 2, n = 90, p < 0.001) but 
not in a pattern generally concordant with our growth data reported above (Figure 
5.2A). Single infections with the signal-blind mutant were not significantly different 
in virulence to infections with the wild type (z = 1.47, p = 0.143); whereas in the case 
of the signal-negative mutant, the mutant was significantly more virulent than the 
wild type (z = -2.07, p = 0.039). In either case, co-infections involving a mixture of 
PA01 wild type and a QS-defective mutant resulted in significantly greater virulence 
(i.e. quicker waxmoth death) than did single infections of the wild type strain (signal-
blind mutant: z = -2.26, p = 0.024; signal-defective mutant: z = -5.12, p < 0.001).  
 
(b) Lettuce model 
Total bacterial growth did not differ significantly across the three infection 
treatments (Figure 5.2B; LMER: F2,36 = 0.091, p = 0.913). Considering the QS-
mutant strain only, there was no evidence for a growth advantage in co-infection 
relative to single infection (Figure 5.2B; ANOVA: F1,25 = 0.189; p = 0.668), although 
within a co-infection, this strain did show relative fitness greater than 1 (mean 2.297; 
1-tailed Z-test: t = 3.047, d.f. = 11, p = 0.006), suggesting that it was able to increase 
its proportional representation in a mixed population at the expense of the wild type 
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strain. In contrast to the patterns we observed in waxmoths, our a priori predictions 
regarding virulence were well met in the lettuce infection model (Figure 5.3B). 
These differences in virulence did not, however, correspond to differences in growth 
reported above. The QS-defective mutant strain PA01∆lasR resulted in significantly 
less tissue damage than infections with the PA01 wild type, while co-infections 
involving a mixture of the two strains had intermediate virulence (LMER: F2,94 = 




Figure 5.2.  Variation in bacterial growth across different strains and infection types for 
(A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection models. Black bars refer to populations of 
cooperator cells (wild type PA01), either growing alone (+) or in a co-infection (M). 
White bars refer to populations of cheat cells (signal-blind, PA01∆LasR or signal-
negative, PA01∆LasI, respectively), either growing alone (-) or in a co-infection (M). 
Checked bars refer mixed populations of cooperators and cheats. Error bars indicate one 





Figure 5.3.  Variation in virulence across different strain pairs and infection types for 
(A) waxmoth and (B) lettuce infection models. Black bars indicate infections with the 
cooperator strain (wild type PA01) only. White bars indicate infections with cheat strains 
only (signal-blind, PA01∆LasR or signal-negative, PA01∆Las, respectively). Checked 
bars indicate co-infections with both cooperators and cheats (M). Error bars indicate one 
standard error. 
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5.6. Discussion 
 
In this study we tested the hypothesis that, given (a) QS promotes P. aeruginosa 
growth in an infection context and (b) is, in turn, detrimental to the host; (c) QS-
defective mutants can ‘cheat’ by exploiting the QS-related cooperative behaviour of 
co-infecting wild type cells in vivo and (d) such social conflict can attenuate both the 
bacterial productivity and (e) the virulence of such co-infections relative to wild type 
infections. These various predictions are summarized in table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. Summary of results from experiments to test whether QS functions as a social 






LasR lasI lasR 
(a) QS-proficient strains show more growth in vivo than QS 
deficient strains    
(b) Infections with QS-proficient strains are more detrimental to 
their host than those involving QS-deficient strains    
(c) QS-defective cheats achieve greater relative fitness in vivo 
than QS-proficient cells     
(d) Mixed populations of QS-proficient and –deficient strains 
have relatively attenuated productivity in vivo     
(e) Coinfection with QS-proficient and –deficient strains leads 
to attenuated virulence     
 
Firstly, and crucially, we found no support for (a). Considering single infections only 
(Figure 5.2), we see that disruption of QS had a negligible effect on the growth of 
bacteria in vivo in either infection model (Figure 5.2). The generally consistent levels 
of growth did not, however, translate to consistent virulence. Instead, for (b) we 
found evidence of, respectively, (i) a QS-mediated enhancement of virulence (Figure 
5.3A, signal-negative mutant), (ii) no difference (Figure 5.3A, signal-blind mutant) 
or (iii) QS-mediated attenuation of virulence (Figure 5.3B). This apparent 
disassociation between growth and virulence is interesting and we return to it later in 
this section. Considering (c), that QS mutants can act as cheats in co-infections, we 
found that signal-blind mutants could indeed have high relative fitness in such 
conditions (Figure 5.2) but signal-negative mutants did not. As for (d) and (e), we 
found that co-infections with wild type and QS mutants could yield either enhanced 
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(Figure 5.2A; signal-blind), attenuated (Figure 5.2A signal-negative) or equivalent 
growth (Figure 5.2B) relative to a wild type infection; and either greater (Figure 
5.3A) or reduced (Figure 5.3B) virulence, depending on the type of mutant and the 
model host involved. Taken together, our results do not support the hypothesis that 
QS is an important and exploitable cooperative trait in these infection models (West 
and Buckling 2003).  
 
We found several instances where bacterial growth and virulence were disassociated 
(Figure 5.2; Figure 5.3) which suggests that the expression of QS may negatively 
affect host fitness without having significant consequences for bacterial fitness (at 
least over the short term). This has been reported in other models (Cowell et al. 1998; 
Silo-Suh et al. 2002; Lesprit et al. 2003; Stoltz et al. 2008) and is interesting in light 
of the fact that QS has been touted as a potential target for novel anti-infective drugs 
and it is now recognized that for any such therapy to avoid inducing pathogen 
counter-adaptation, it must reduce virulence without affecting cell viability 
(Bjarnsholt and Givskov 2007; Lesic et al. 2007).  
 
How do our results compare with previous work? To our knowledge, we and 
Rumbaugh et al (submitted) are the first to investigate the in vivo social dynamics 
and virulence consequences of co-infections between Las-mutants and wild type P. 
aeruginosa but several other groups have performed single-strain infections with 
various model hosts to investigate the role of QS (i.e. hypotheses a and b; Table 5.2). 
Notably, Jander et al. (2000), using a wax moth model similar to ours, report clearly 
reduced virulence for a PA14-derived lasR mutant while Wagner et al. (2007) found 
attenuated virulence in PA01 QS mutants (including ∆lasR) in a lettuce model. 
Neither study, however, reported the bacterial growth trends underlying this pattern.  
 
It is often suggested in the literature that disruption of QS attenuates pathogenesis 
(Rumbaugh et al. 2000; Donabedian 2003; Smith and Iglewski 2003) but mounting 
evidence suggests this is not always the case (Table 5.2) and it is becoming 
increasingly clear that to properly understand the role of QS in bacterial 
pathogenesis, strain-and host-specific details must be taken into consideration  
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(Hendrickson et al. 2001; Tan 2002). More generally, it is not uncommon to 
encounter negative or seemingly contradictory results in the QS literature (Vasil 
2003; Kirisits and Parsek 2006; Schuster and Greenberg 2006; Turovskiy et al. 
2007). 
 
How can we account for these inconsistent patterns across studies? There are several 
things to consider. Firstly, and quite obviously, QS is a complex phenomenon. The 
Las, Rhl and PQS circuits are interconnected in ways that are not yet completely 
understood, and each circuit is further subject to upstream or downstream modulation 
by a number of additional regulators that fine tune the QS response (e.g. rpoN, rpoS, 
qscR, gacA, mvaT and mvfR; see Juhas et al. 2005; Soberon-Chavez et al. 2005; 
Schuster and Greenberg 2006; Venturi 2006 for further detail). By such secondary 
regulatory mechanisms, various QS-controlled genes, including the rhl circuit, may 
still be active in las mutants (Venturi 2006). Alternatively, las mutants can 
sometimes harbour compensatory mutations (e.g. affecting pilus formation) that 
could contribute to virulence (Beatson et al. 2002). Also, it is important to remember 
that QS regulation can repress, as well as promote, target genes (Schuster et al. 2003; 
Wagner et al. 2003). Thus, to think of las mutants as being devoid of QS-activity and 
universally repressed for QS-associated traits would be a naïve oversimplification of 
a complex reality.   
 
Secondly, both the timing and intensity of QS expression are highly sensitive to 
environmental variation, such as medium composition, alkalinity or oxygen, so even 
small changes in environmental conditions could potentially have a profound effect 
on metabolism and pathogenesis (Bazire et al. 2005; Shrout et al. 2006; D'Argenio et 
al. 2007; Diggle et al. 2007b; Duan and Surette 2007). For example, P. aeruginosa 
can kill nematodes by several completely distinct processes, which may or may not 
involve QS, depending on the growth medium (Tan 2002). Similarly, within the host, 
different types of tissue present dramatically different challenges to bacteria and, 
indeed, different infection routes into the same host organism also vary in their 
dependence on QS (Rumbaugh et al. 2000; Lutter et al. 2008; Willcox et al. 2008). 
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Thirdly, different studies have employed different strains of P. aeruginosa. 
Substantial genotypic and phenotypic differences exist between the two most widely 
used strains, PA01 and PA14 (Choi et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2006; D'Argenio et al. 
2007; Carilla-Latorre et al. 2008; Kukavica-Ibrulj et al. 2008) and even within the 
PA01 type strain, adaptation to local laboratory conditions could rapidly generate 
differences between isolates under study at different laboratories (Fux et al. 2005). It 
should not be surprising then, to find differences in pathogenesis among different 
strains.  
 
Fourthly, infection models for bacterial pathogenesis necessarily focus on the 
variation due to the pathogen but it may be misleading to assume that host-responses 
are invariant across replicates and across experiments. QS-controlled virulence 
factors, or even QS-signals themselves, can have strong immunomodulatory effects, 
which can profoundly influence the resultant virulence of an infection (Hooi et al. 
2004; Pritchard 2006). Host immune responses, and thus infection outcomes, are also 
known to vary temporally (e.g. Lee and Edery 2008), and spatially (e.g. Corby-Harris 
and Promislow 2008), and can depend on prior immune challenges (Apidianakis et 
al. 2005), yet such variables are not always adequately controlled for, or even 
reported, in laboratory studies.  
 
Finally, for a more holistic picture of the role of QS in pathogenesis, we may need to 
consider both acute and chronic settings. In this study, using acute infection models 
optimized for rapid bacterial growth, we found limited evidence of a role for QS in 
pathogenesis. Perhaps, however, QS is more important in a chronic infection context 
(Nguyen and Singh 2006), for example, because of its role in biofilms (Kirisits and 
Parsek 2006). Alternatively, QS-mediated motility could allow migration from the 
site of infection, and so facilitate the establishment of a systemic infection (Glessner 
et al. 1999; Köhler et al. 2000; Lesic et al. 2007). On the other hand, there are key 
QS-controlled processes, such as type III secretion or immunomodulation, which 
may be most important early in the infection process (Bjarnsholt et al. 2005; Lee et 
al. 2005a; Willcox et al. 2008).  Early transcriptional studies reported that QS 
mutants do not grow faster under standard laboratory conditions (Heurlier et al. 
   105 
2005; An et al. 2006), and that QS-regulated genes were expressed only once a 
population has reached stationary phase (Whiteley et al. 1999; Schuster et al. 2003; 
Heurlier et al. 2005). More recently, however, it has been shown that QS can 
function during the growth phase too (i.e. in response to a lower quorum), depending 
on the selective conditions (Alvarez-Ortega and Harwood 2007; Duan and Surette 
2007; Sandoz et al. 2007), so QS may be involved in both acute and chronic 
infections, depending on the model.  
 
The discovery that QS affects bacterial virulence in vivo in multiple host models 
prompted much excitement: P. aeruginosa is notoriously difficult to control using 
conventional antibiotics, and here, finally, was a promising target for novel therapies 
(Donabedian 2003; Cegelski et al. 2008). Much attention was (and is) focused on 
developing new ways to disrupt QS (“quorum quenching”; Hentzer et al. 2003; 
Smith et al. 2003; Xu et al. 2003; Roche et al. 2004; Zhang and Dong 2004; Rice et 
al. 2005; Gonzalez and Keshavan 2006; Rasmussen and Givskov 2006; Lesic et al. 
2007). An alternative approach could be to harness the social side of QS (Foster 
2005). In light of our demonstration that QS functions as a cooperative trait in a 
mouse infection model (Rumbaugh et al., submitted), we recently raised the 
possibility that QS cheats could be introduced into hosts to outcompete wild type 
cooperators. The present study, however, highlights important limitations in either 
approach. QS is not universally required for growth in vivo, nor is growth in vivo 
necessarily correlated with virulence, nor are all virulence factors under QS-
regulation, so disrupting QS may not always attenuate virulence (Table 5.2). 
Increasing the proportion of QS-deficient mutants, therefore, may not always act to 
weaken the bacterial population: QS-defective mutants can, under certain conditions, 
have an absolute (as opposed to relative) fitness advantage over QS-proficient cells 
(Heurlier et al. 2005; D'Argenio et al. 2007; Diggle et al. 2007b). Indeed, there is 
much we still need to learn about both the proximate (molecular) mechanisms by 
which QS operates and the ultimate (evolutionary) forces by which it is maintained.   
 
 
   106 
   107 
6. General discussion and concluding remarks 
 
Each of the four preceding chapters of this thesis has included its own extensive 
discussion. In this final chapter I summarise the findings from each of these chapters 
and make some general observations on the progress that has been made and the 
implications arising from this work.  
 
In chapter 2, I explored the question of when and why cooperation should be 
frequency dependent – essentially the idea that cheats prosper most when rare. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, Hamilton (1964) demonstrated that frequency 
dependence is actually not predicted to occur under most circumstances because, 
even though cheats do benefit from a relative profusion of cooperators, cooperators 
also benefit from this situation since their cooperation becomes more efficient. In 
contrast with this theoretical expectation that frequency dependent cooperation 
should be rare, several recent studies have demonstrated that the phenomenon does 
evidently occur in microbes (Velicer et al. 2000; Vulic and Kolter 2001; Fiegna and 
Velicer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Turner and Chao 2003; Dugatkin et al. 2005; 
Brockhurst et al. 2006; Harrison et al. 2006; MacLean and Gudelj 2006; Diggle et al. 
2007; Ellis et al. 2007; Gilbert et al. 2007).  
 
To clarify this situation and account for the apparent mismatch between existing 
models and data, we used individual based kin selection methodology to model 
public goods cooperation in a microbial context. It has been argued before that 
frequency dependent cooperation can arise in situations with strong selection 
(Charlesworth 1978; Michod 1982; Toro et al. 1982; Queller 1984; Nowak and May 
1992; Day and Taylor 1998; Rousset 2004; Jansen and Van Baalen 2006). Our 
models reveal the additional requirements that either (a) cooperators and cheats do 
not share the same social environment (structured population), or (b) a population’s 
growth is a function of its composition of cooperators and cheats (frequency 
dependent population growth). I tested the last of these predictions in laboratory 
experiments with Pseudomonas aeruginosa. As predicted, I found that cheats had 
greater relative fitness when rare, and that this effect arose because populations with 
mostly cheats were less productive than populations in which cheats were rare. These 
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theoretical results, backed up with empirical support, advance our understanding of 
when and why we observe frequency dependent cooperation in microbes.  
 
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, the work in chapter 3 employed a 
combination of theory and empirical experiments to investigate the conditions under 
which selection for cooperation is expected to vary with population density. Density-
dependence has not been as well explored as frequency dependence by empiricists, 
and two recent studies, both of yeast, have reported opposing results. Greig and 
Travisano (2004) reported that cheats exploited cooperators best when population 
density was high; while (MacLean and Gudelj 2006; MacLean 2008) found the 
opposite pattern, with cheats performing poorly relative to cooperators at higher 
densities.  
 
By highlighting the distinction between two different forms of cooperative dilemma 
(public goods vs. tragedy of the commons), and then explicitly modeling either 
scenario, we were able to resolve this apparent conflict. Our models predict that 
under public goods type cooperation, cheats will have a higher relative fitness at 
higher population densities because they have a greater access to the public goods 
produced by cooperative neighbours, and also because whole-group relatedness is 
decreased under these conditions. In contrast, under tragedy of the commons 
(restraint) type cooperation, cheats can have either a higher or a lower relative fitness 
at higher population densities depending on the particular parameter values of the 
model (i.e. system-specific biological details). I used siderophore production by P. 
aeruginosa to empirically evaluate our theoretical predictions for a public goods type 
cooperative scenario. My results confirmed that cheat relative fitness was greater at 
higher population densities, as predicted, and that this effect arose, at least in part, 
because the closer proximity between cooperators and cheats (as would occur at high 
densities) allowed cheats better access to the public good. This study resolves an 
apparent conflict in the literature and brings greater clarity to this area of social 
evolution theory. 
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In chapters 4 and 5, I tested the idea that social conflict between cooperators and 
cheats, in the context of an infecting population of pathogens, could attenuate 
population productivity and hence decrease the virulence of the infection (Brown et 
al 2002; West and Buckling 2003). This hypothesis is important because the effect it 
predicts (lower virulence at higher multiplicity of infection) contrasts directly with 
that of classic virulence theory (Frank 1996; Frank 1998; Read and Taylor 2001). 
This theory therefore has potential implications for the medical management of 
virulence but, to date, it has received scant empirical attention.  
 
In chapter 4, as in the preceding chapters, I used siderophore production by P. 
aeruginosa as my model trait, in experimental infections of plant and insect hosts. In 
contrast to previous work by Harrison et al. (2006), where they did find, as expected, 
attenuation of bacterial growth and virulence in co-infections with siderophore 
producers and non-producers, here I found no fitness benefit for siderophore 
production in vivo. Consequently, I also found no evidence that non-producers 
gained relative benefits through exploiting producers in co-infection. In summary, I 
was unable to find support for the hypothesis of West and Buckling (2003). 
 
For social conflict to play any significant role in the demography of a population, it 
is necessary first that the social costs and benefits are associated with the expression 
or non-expression of the putatively social trait. Despite the supposed importance of 
siderophore production to P. aeruginosa iron metabolism (Visca et al. 2007), 
surprisingly few studies have rigorously tested for the in vivo consequences of 
knocking out siderophore production in this pathogen - particularly in non-
mammalian hosts. From the evidence that is available (Table 4.1), it seems clear that 
siderophores are crucial to infections in mammalian tissues; however, there is little 
evidence of an important role in virulence in plant hosts. In such contexts, bacteria 
defective for siderophore production may well be able to acquire adequate iron via 
alternative pathways, without recourse to siderophores. Thus, while siderophore 
production can function as an important social trait in vitro (Griffin et al. 2004; 
Buckling et al. 2007; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007), the importance of such dynamics in 
real infections may be highly dependent on the particular host and infection context.  
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Another trait thought to be highly important in bacterial virulence is quorum sensing 
(Donabedian 2003) and recent work has demonstrated that this can be a social trait, 
subject to exploitation by cheats (Diggle et al. 2007; Sandoz et al. 2007). In chapter 
5, I adopted the same experimental protocols developed in the previous chapter to 
investigate the potential for social conflict in this trait in vivo, and its potential effects 
on virulence. I constructed knockout strains defective for either the production or 
reception of quorum sensing signals, and tested them in single and mixed infections 
of insects and plants. My data indicate that quorum sensing did not provide a 
bacterial growth advantage in these infection models and accordingly, there was no 
consistent evidence of social exploitation among strains. Thus, I found no support for 
the idea that QS functions as a cooperative trait in vivo in these hosts.  
 
In my experiments, infections with QS-defective strains did not consistently show 
attenuated virulence, despite the supposed importance of this trait to pathogenesis 
(Donabedian 2003). In contrast to the situation with siderophores, a considerable 
number of studies have now tested for the virulence consequences of disrupted QS in 
P. aeruginosa and I conducted a comprehensive survey of the literature on this 
subject (Table 5.2). Though the majority of studies support the idea that disruption of 
QS leads to attenuated virulence, exceptions (including my own experiments 
presented in chapter 5) have been reported, and I conclude that it is misleading to 
ascribe universal control of virulence to this highly complex trait. Instead, work in 
this area must take into consideration the finer biological details that determine 
when, how and to what extent QS influences virulence.  
 
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis, I employed the same three strain pairs to 
investigate cooperator/cheat dynamics in the context of siderophore production under 
various conditions. My experiments revealed significant qualitative differences 
across these strain pairs, in terms of the strength and direction of frequency- and/or 
density dependence, and in the relative virulence and in vivo growth of cooperators 
vs. cheats. Let us now briefly consider whether these differences were consistent 
across experiments and, if so, what possible features of these particular strain pairs 
could have given rise to these differences. Strain pair B – in which the difference 
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between B+ and B- is a single gene mutation – conformed well to our theoretical 
predictions, except that we saw little difference between B+ and B- in terms of in 
vivo growth and virulence. The performance of strain pair C, meanwhile, matched 
our expectations fairly well under in vitro conditions (which were broadly similar to 
the conditions under which C+ and C- coevolved for the past 100+ generations) but, 
in vivo, we found that C- produced a more virulent infection. This suggests that C-, 
despite its defective siderophore production, has acquired additional mutations that 
make it more harmful to hosts. Strain pair A has been used previously in social 
evolution studies of siderophore production (Griffin et al. 2004; Harrison et al. 
2006), and for the most part it performed as predicted by theory. Unexpectedly, 
however, our data show that A- (PA09) does not show positive density dependent 
fitness. I suspect this may be due to additional defects this strain carries in its QS 
signalling pathways that, under the conditions of our experiment, act to reduce its 
fitness relative to the wildtype at densities where QS would normally be activated 
(for instance, quinolone signalling appears to be defective in this strain; Steve 
Diggle, unpublished data). The fact that these striking differences still arose in strain 
pairs selected on the basis of their supposed similarities (each comprised a 
siderophore proficient and a non-proficient strain), underscores the value of studying 
functional traits in multiple independent strains. In the remainder of this discussion, I 
consider some general themes that warrant consideration by workers in the field of 
sociomicrobiology.   
 
Adaptationist vs. mechanistic approaches 
Social evolution, and behavioural ecology more generally, employs an adaptationist 
approach that assumes that the evolution of behaviours can be understood from a 
purely phenotypic perspective. This approach, termed ‘the phenotypic gambit’ 
(Grafen 1984), although it mostly ignores underlying genetic architecture, has served 
us well and through it we have come to learn much about the evolutionary function 
of behavioural traits. Indeed, sometimes the details don’t matter. In chapter 2, for 
instance, our prediction that cheat fitness should be negatively frequency dependent 
was upheld for three different strain pairs, derived independently and featuring 
different mutations (Figure 2.1). 
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In other situations, however, the details do matter. Host-pathogen interactions are 
highly complex and involve numerous molecular pathways. The phenotypic gambit 
should be relatively safe to apply to behaviours at long-term evolutionary equilibria, 
because, given enough time, traits should tend towards being optimally adapted, 
irrespective of the underlying genetic architecture. In the context of virulence, 
meanwhile – especially experimental infections involving hosts and parasites that 
have not shared a long history of co-evolution – we should proceed with caution and 
pay more attention to detail (Buckling and Brockhurst 2008). 
 
General theories describing the evolution of virulence have not been very successful 
in accounting for observed patterns (Herre 1993; Frank 1996; Gandon et al. 2001; 
Read and Taylor 2001; Griffin and West 2002), and even when some of the details 
are known (for example, that the lasR gene is required for 3-oxo-C12-HSL–mediated 
quorum sensing), other system-specific details (interactions between gene regulatory 
networks, host immune responses, etc.) can still obscure patterns. If evolutionary 
biology is to make a meaningful contribution to our understanding of when and why 
some infections are virulent while others are benign, we will need to complement our 
(laudable) quest for minimalist models that capture general patterns with a 
willingness to engage more with the detail (Frank and Schmid-Hempel 2007; 
Schmid-Hempel and Frank 2008). 
 
More generally, to reveal whether or not phenomena of interest will vary from one 
situation to another, it is important that we replicate experiments, with different 
pathogen strains, in different hosts, and in different laboratories, in order to test the 
generality of our theories. Indeed, I have already alluded to this issue above in my 
discussion of the inter-strain variation seen in my experiments. There is an alarming 
tendency among cell biologists to under-replicate, or pseudoreplicate, experiments 
and draw inferences from dubious statistics. Evolutionary biologists meanwhile, 
although they come from a stronger tradition of implementing appropriate statistics 
and experimental design methodologies within studies, seldom deem it worthwhile to 
replicate the same experiments across different laboratories, and so might more often 
fail to notice important but unforeseen “minor” details.  
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What is virulence?  
There is a certain amount of confusion, generally, about what the term ‘virulence’ 
actually means (Read 1994; Casadevall and Pirofski 1999; Poulin and Combes 1999; 
Casadevall and Pirofski 2001). In medical fields, and in microbiology, virulence is 
regarded as the ability of a pathogen to multiply and cause disease in a host (i.e. 
growth, persistence, invasion, production of virulence factors). This broad definition 
either ignores or conflates adaptations of the host that resist damage by the pathogen. 
Evolutionary biologists, meanwhile, tend to define virulence strictly in terms of the 
pathogen-induced fitness effects on the host (i.e. mortality, reduced reproductive 
output) when in reality they are trying to indirectly capture some underlying attribute 
of the pathogen (I have adopted this convention in this thesis too). Either approach is 
problematic since it measures one side of the interaction only. What we are actually 
referring to when we speak of virulence is an emergent property of the interaction 
between a particular host and a particular pathogen at a particular time.  
 
Though this may seem an unimportant semantic issue, it highlights an important 
distinction (Read 1994). Consider for example, what exactly we mean by “virulence 
genes”? Are these genes that act to enhance pathogen productivity, or host damage? 
One pattern to emerge from my experiments in chapters 4 and 5, and from my 
surveys of the literature (Tables 4.1 and 5.2), is that damage to a host (i.e. host 
fitness) is not necessarily correlated with bacterial growth (pathogen fitness), as is 
sometimes asserted in the microbiological literature, and as would be expected if 
these traits were perfectly co-adapted over long periods of time.  
 
This decoupling of host fitness and bacterial fitness is significant: therapies designed 
to attenuate virulence (i.e. minimize damage to a host) without affecting pathogen 
fitness may be more effective than strategies which seek to attenuate virulence by 
thwarting pathogen growth, because in the latter scenario, pathogens would be under 
strong selection to evolve resistance to the therapy (Cegelski et al. 2008). To better 
understand the evolution of virulence, future studies should, wherever possible, 
collect data on the fitness consequences of an infection to both pathogen and host.  
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Social traits and pathogen control 
The two traits I have studied in this thesis (siderophore production and QS) have 
great significance for the biology of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and indeed microbes 
in general, and accordingly have attracted much attention in the field of applied 
microbiology. Since iron is crucial for pathogens, iron uptake pathways are obvious 
targets for antibacterial drugs. Against a backdrop of increasingly widespread 
resistance to conventional antibiotics – among microbes in general (Neu 1992; 
Alanis 2005; Livermore 2005; Thomson and Bonomo 2005; Payne 2008) and in the 
case of P. aeruginosa in particular (Lambert 2002; Livermore 2002) – there is much 
current interest in finding novel ways of blocking iron metabolism (Miethke and 
Marahiel 2007), or potentially hijacking siderophore uptake mechanisms to introduce 
antibiotics directly into the bacterial cytoplasm (Budzikiewicz 2001). Similarly, there 
has been, and is, much interest in pharmacologically disrupting QS (Hentzer et al. 
2003; Smith et al. 2003; Xu et al. 2003; Zhang and Dong 2004; Rice et al. 2005; 
Gonzalez and Keshavan 2006; Rasmussen and Givskov 2006; Lesic et al. 2007).  
 
At the same time, considering the ubiquity of social behaviour in microbial life 
(Crespi 2001; West et al. 2006; Frank 2007; West et al. 2007), it may be useful to 
look to social evolution for inspiration for alternative, complementary therapies. 
Although my experiments (chapters 4 and 5) failed to find support for a significant 
role of social conflict in vivo, such a role has been found in other studies (Harrison et 
al 2006; Rumbaugh et al, submitted) and substantial circumstantial evidence from in 
vitro studies (Buckling et al. 2007; Diggle et al. 2007) suggests that we should 
anticipate that, in some circumstances at least, social conflict among pathogens could 
be very important in determining the course of an infection. Manipulations that 
change the costs and benefits of cooperation and cheating could potentially have a 
profound influence on the productivity and virulence of a pathogen population 
(“Hamiltonian medicine”; Foster 2005; André and Godelle 2005). It is an exciting 
prospect: the impressive sociality of pathogens may indeed hold the key to their 
downfall. 
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Appendix A1 
This plate illustrates the contrasting colony morphologies of the wild-type cooperator strain 
(green; siderophore producing) and mutant cheat strain (white; siderophore-defective) from 
each of three strain pairs featured in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. For these photographs, 
mixed cultures of wild-type and mutant cultures were plated to Kings B agar and incubated 
overnight at 37ºC. Further details on strain sources and mutagenesis procedures are provided 
in Chapter 2. 
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Strain pair C 
 
Wild type:  




“7K-”, spontaneous mutant isolated from the same 
experimentally-evolved laboratory culture as 7F+ 
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abstract: Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory provides a leading
explanation for the problem of cooperation. A general result from
inclusive fitness theory is that, except under restrictive conditions,
cooperation should not be subject to frequency-dependent selection.
However, several recent studies in microbial systems have demon-
strated that the relative fitness of cheaters, which do not cooperate,
is greater when cheaters are rarer. Here we demonstrate theoretically
that such frequency-dependent selection can occur in microbes when
there is (1) sufficient population structuring or (2) an association
between the level of cooperation and total population growth. We
test prediction (2) and its underlying assumption, using the path-
ogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, by competing strains that
produce iron-scavenging siderophore molecules (cooperators) with
nonproducers (cheaters) at various ratios, under conditions that min-
imize population structuring. We found that both the relative fitness
of cheaters and the productivity of the mixed culture were signifi-
cantly negatively related to initial cheater frequency. Furthermore,
when the period of population growth was experimentally shortened,
the strength of frequency dependence was reduced. More generally,
we argue that frequency-dependent selection on cooperative traits
may be more common in microbes than in metazoans because strong
selection, structuring, and cooperation-dependent growth will be
more common in microbial populations.
Keywords: Pseudomonas aeruginosa, public goods, siderophores,
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Explaining cooperation is one of the greatest challenges
for evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith and Szathmàry
1995; Hamilton 1996). The problem is this: why should
an individual perform a cooperative behavior that appears
costly to perform but benefits other individuals (Hamilton
1964)? Following a wealth of theoretical work in this area
in recent decades, we now have an excellent general un-
derstanding of the different ways in which cooperation
can be favored (reviewed by Frank [2003]; Sachs et al.
[2004]; Lehmann and Keller [2006]; West et al. [2006],
[2007]). However, much of this vast body of theory has
been developed to elucidate general principles and is less
useful for stimulating empirical tests of theory (Leimar
and Hammerstein 2006). Consequently, a major task for
social evolution research is to take this general theory and
develop it so it can be tested empirically, with specific
groups of organisms.
Microbes offer a number of advantages for testing social
evolution theory (reviewed by Crespi [2001]; West et al.
[2006]). In particular, they perform a number of coop-
erative behaviors, where it is possible to alter the costs and
benefits of cooperation experimentally and then follow the
fitness consequences (West et al. 2006). Recently, there has
been interest in how the relative fitness of cooperators,
and cheaters who do not cooperate (or cooperate less),
depends on the relative proportion of cooperators in the
population (Levin 1988; Velicer et al. 2000; Dugatkin et
al. 2003, 2005; Harrison et al. 2006; MacLean and Gudelj
2006). However, these experimental examinations of fre-
quency dependence contrast with most theory in this area,
where frequency dependence is not predicted. Indeed, a
major result from Hamilton’s (1964) original inclusive fit-
ness formulation, showing how cooperation can be favored
between relatives, was that the inclusive fitness of coop-
erators did not vary with gene frequency at all. Instead,
because increased cooperation provides benefits to both
cooperators and cheaters, the inclusive fitness advantage
of cooperation remains constant despite changes in the
frequency of cooperators. Hamilton was so pleased by this
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result that he later described it as a “gift from God” (Ham-
ilton 1988, p. 16). Subsequent work has shown that fre-
quency dependence can enter into kin selection theory in
cases featuring strong selection (genes with large fitness
effects) or nonadditivity (e.g., Charlesworth 1978; Michod
1982; Toro et al. 1982; Queller 1984; Day and Taylor 1998;
Frank 1998; Rousset 2004; Wild and Traulsen 2007).
Our first aim in this article is to develop theory that
predicts specifically when and why frequency-dependent
selection on cooperation should be observed in microbes.
The phenomenon is illustrated by considering the extra-
cellular secretion of substances that can be utilized by
neighboring cells. The production of such “public goods”
requires explanation because they are costly to the indi-
vidual to produce but provide a benefit to the local group
(West et al. 2006). In this situation, we might, at first
glance, expect that selection on cells that contribute less
than their fair share to the public good resource pool
(cheaters) should be frequency dependent. That is, cheat-
ers should do better when they are rare, because there will
be more public goods/cooperators for them to exploit.
However, cooperators also gain a benefit from being in a
more cooperative population. In the simplest scenario,
these two effects exactly cancel, and so selection on cheat-
ers and cooperators does not depend on their frequency
(see next section). We examine the extent to which fre-
quency dependence does arise when the following biolog-
ical complexities are taken into consideration: population
structure, effects of cooperation on population growth,
and large (as opposed to small) fitness consequences as-
sociated with variation in the level of cooperation (strong
selection).
Our models predict that, given strong selection, cheaters
will be subject to negative frequency-dependent selection
(i.e., their relative fitness will be lower when common)
when (1) the population is structured and/or (2) a higher
frequency of cooperators leads to greater population
growth. We tested prediction (2) and the underlying as-
sumption on the relationship between growth and coop-
erator frequency by investigating the production of a pub-
lic good, iron-scavenging siderophore molecules, in the
bacterial pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa (West and
Buckling 2003; Griffin et al. 2004). Iron is a major limiting
factor for bacterial growth, because most iron in the en-
vironment is in the insoluble Fe(III) form and is actively
withheld by hosts (Guerinot 1994; Ratledge and Dover
2000). Siderophores scavenge insoluble and host-bound
iron, making it available for bacterial metabolism. To de-
termine whether frequency dependence is a general char-
acteristic of P. aeruginosa siderophore production and not
just a pleiotropic effect associated with a specific coop-
erator-cheater pair, we examined three independently de-
rived cooperator-cheater strain pairs. These involved mu-
tants produced by ultraviolet mutagenesis, single-gene
deletion, and spontaneous natural mutation, respectively.
Models and Analyses
We explore some ways in which frequency-dependent se-
lection can arise in kin selection models for the production
of public goods dilemmas in microbes. In particular, we
examine the role of (1) population structure (including
mixing rates and the scale over which social interaction
occurs) and (2) the dependence of population carrying
capacity and growth on the level of public goods contri-
butions. In both cases, we allow for strong selection, which
is crucial for frequency dependence in the context of social
behaviors and is an important characteristic of many mi-
crobial cooperative traits (see “Discussion”). To begin, we
demonstrate that frequency dependence does not emerge
under the simplest possible scenario with weak selection.
Weak Selection and Frequency Independence
In a broad class of models, weak selection leads to fre-
quency independence (Rousset 2004, p. 80; 2006). To see
why, consider a large population facing a public goods
dilemma, such as, for example, siderophore production.
An individual’s fitness is a function of (1) its level of public
goods contribution, , and (2) the average public goodss
production across the whole population, . Without mak-s̄
ing further assumptions, we can express fitness as ;¯w(s, s)
this can be done for structured and unstructured popu-
lations. Further, we assume that cooperative individuals
contribute an amount and that a proportion p of thesC
individuals in the population are defectors (cheaters) who
contribute a smaller amount, ; hence, ¯s p s  d s pD C
. Thus, the fitness of a cooperator iss  pdC
w p w(s , s  pd), (1)C C C
and the fitness of a cheater is
w p w(s  d, s  pd). (2)D C C
The relative fitness of cheaters is given by the ratio of
cheater and cooperator fitness and, using a Taylor expan-
sion, can be expressed as
w wD 2ˆv p p 1  d/w  O(d ), (3)D Fw s dp0C
where is the fitness of cooperators in theŵ p w(s , s )C C
absence of cheaters. This reveals that, to leading order in
d, the relative fitness of cheaters is not a function of their
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frequency p in the population (the partial derivative ap-
pearing in eq. [3] is not a function of p, because it is
evaluated in the neutral population where , so thatd p 0
cooperators and defectors are indistinguishable and the
frequency of the latter is irrelevant). Hence, if selection is
weak (d sufficiently small for higher-order terms in d to
be negligible; the d-weak selection of Wild and Traulsen
[2007]), it is also frequency independent. For stronger
selection, the trailing term of order d2 becomes more im-
portant, and if this is a function of the frequency of cheat-
ers, then there is the possibility of frequency-dependent
selection. Note that although our analyses focus on
whether the fitness of cheaters is frequency dependent, the
fact that we are examining relative fitness means that they
also demonstrate the nature of selection on cooperators—
if the relative fitness of cheaters decreases as they become
more common, then the relative fitness of cooperators
must increase as they become rarer.
Structured Populations
One way in which strong selection can give rise to fre-
quency-dependent selection is if populations are struc-
tured so that cooperators and cheaters do not share the
same social environment. This could occur in populations
with localized social interaction due to limited mixing of
public goods or cells. A consequence of this is that more
cooperative individuals would have greater access to public
goods, either because they enjoy preferential access to the
public goods that they have produced or because they use
the public goods produced by their clonal relatives (who
are also cooperators). We examine this in general terms,
describing fitness as a product of two components that
capture (1) the cost of producing public goods and (2)
the benefit of receiving public goods. In particular, we
write
ˆ ˆw(s, s) p g(s)h(s), (4)
where w is fitness, g is a growth component that decreases
with one’s individual allocation to public goods produc-
tion s, and h is a growth component that increases with
one’s access to public goods (for related microbial mod-ŝ
els, see Brown 1999; Smith 2001; West et al. 2002; Dugatkin
et al. 2003; West and Buckling 2003). In mathematical
terms, we have , , , and′g 1 0 g/s p g ! 0 h 1 0
. We make the further assumption of linear′ˆh/s p h 1 0
or diminishing returns to fecundity as access to public
goods in the social environment is increased, giving
. Due to population structure, the level of pub-2 2ˆ h/s ≤ 0
lic goods available in the social environment is correlated
with the individual’s own allocation to public goods, ac-
cording to the expression ; that is, theˆ ¯s p rs  (1  r)s
level of public goods available lies between one’s own in-
vestment (s) and the population average investment ( ),s̄
according to the relatedness between social partners (r).
The variable r encapsulates the effects of both bacterial
dispersal and the diffusion of public goods through the
population. It therefore allows us to move between the
extremes of a completely mixed population or global dif-
fusion of public goods ( ) and a completely structuredr p 0
population, where all neighbors are of the same genotype
or public goods disperse over such small distances that
they are utilized only by the individual that produced them
( ; cheaters only interact with cheaters, and cooper-r p 1
ators only interact with cooperators).
We compare the fecundity of a cheater strain that al-
locates nothing to public goods ( , defection) to thats p 0
of a strain that allocates a standard unit ( , cooper-s p 1
ation). Respectively, these are
w p g(0)h[(1  r)(1  p)] p g h (5)D D D
and
w p g(1)h[r  (1  r)(1  p)] p g h , (6)C C C
where p is the population frequency of cheaters, and hence
is the population average allocation to publics̄ p 1  p
goods, being the proportion of cooperators. The relative
fitness of cheaters can be written as
w g(0)h[(1  r)(1  p)] g hD D Dv p p p . (7)
w g(h)I[r  (1  r)(1  p)] g hC C C
We now determine whether and how the relative fitness
of cheaters ( ) varies with their frequency in the globalv
population (p):
′ ′dv g h h  h hD D C C Dp (1  r) . (8)
2dp g hC C
This reveals the following: (1) in the absence of population
structure ( ), there is no frequency dependencer p 0
( ), because cooperators and cheaters share thedv/dp p 0
same social environment; hence, and ;′ ′h p h h p hC D C D
(2) in fully structured populations ( ), there is nor p 1
frequency dependence ( ), because an individ-dv/dp p 0
ual’s social environment is dependent only on its own
cooperation strategy and not on the global frequency of
cooperators; (3) in a population with intermediate struc-
turing ( ), there is negative frequency dependence0 ! r ! 1
( ), because cooperators enjoy more public goodsdv/dp ! 0
in their social environment than do cheaters and hence
and .′ ′h 1 h h ≤ hC D C D
The impact of population structure (r) on cheater rel-
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Figure 1: Structured population model, with fitness given by the product of and , where s is an individual’s own contributionˆ ˆg(s) p 1  s/2 h(s) p s
to public goods and is the amount of public goods in the individual’s social environment. A, Relative fitness of cheaters ( ) decreases with theirŝ v
frequency (p) and with the degree of population structure (r). B, Total productivity of the population decreases with the frequency of cheaters (p)
and with degree of population structure (r).
ative fitness is examined using the same approach. The
derivative
′ ′dv g ph h  (1  p)h hD D C C Dp  (9)
2dr g hC C
is a negative quantity, and hence increasing population
structure (higher r) reduces the relative fitness of cheaters.
This is because cheaters will have a higher fitness in more
mixed populations, where they are better able to exploit
the cooperators. This could be tested empirically by ex-
amining the strength of frequency dependence across pop-
ulations that are structured to different degrees, for ex-
ample, using shaken versus unshaken liquid culture media
or semisolid agar culture media of varying viscosities. Nu-
merical illustrations of the model are given in figure 1.
Population Growth as a Function of
Cooperation Frequency
Another way in which strong selection can give rise to
frequency dependence is when the growth of a population
depends on its genetic composition. If the growth of a
bacterial population is negligible when cheating is prev-
alent, we expect little change in population size and genetic
composition, due to cheaters having a limited opportunity
to exploit cooperators. Conversely, if more cooperative
bacterial colonies achieve a higher carrying capacity and
hence more growth, differences in growth rates of coop-
erators and cheaters could lead to more pronounced
changes in gene frequencies. Describing fitness in terms
of absolute increase over the growth period, the relative
fitness of faster growers increases with the number of
rounds of division. Put simply, more growth means a
greater chance for cheaters to exploit cooperators.
For simplicity, consider a well-mixed population of bac-
teria growing exponentially over a time period that de-
pends on the initial proportion of cooperators. Defining
a basic time unit such that the instantaneous rate of growth
is 1 for cooperators, then the growth rate of cheaters can
be represented as . After t time units, the numbers1  b
of cooperators and cheaters are given by
tn p n e , (10)C, t C, 0
(1b)tn p n e , (11)D, t D, 0
respectively, where and are, respectively, the num-n nC, 0 D, 0
bers of cooperators and cheaters at time . If growtht p 0
ceases at time , which decreases with the initialt p T(p )0
proportion of cheaters (p0; i.e., ), then the fre-dT/dp ! 00
quency of cheaters following growth is given by
bTn p eD, T 0p p p . (12)T bTn  n p e  1  pD, T C, T 0 0
Frequency Dependence and Cooperation 335
Figure 2: Logistic growth model, with more cooperative populations experiencing higher carrying capacity, for a range of initial population sizes
( as a proportion of carrying capacity for a fully cooperative population) and initial proportion of cheaters ( ). We assumez p n  n p p n /z0 C,0 D, t 0 D,0 0
that cheaters grow at twice the rate of cooperators and that they exert twice as great a competitive strain on resources ( ). A, Relativea p b p 1
fitness of cheaters ( ) decreases as initial population size (z0) and initial proportion of cheaters (p0) increases, because both result in reducedv
population growth and, hence, less pronounced fitness differences. B, Total productivity of the population (G) decreases as initial population size
(z0) and initial proportion of cheaters (p0) increases, because both result in reduced population growth.
Hence, the relative fitness of cheaters versus cooperators
is
bTv p e . (13)
It is easy to show that relative fitness of cheaters is
frequency dependent and, indeed, that it is a decreasing
function of cheater frequency:
dv v dT dT
bTp p be (14)
dp T dp dp0 0 0
is negative because dT/dp0 ! 0. Note that frequency in-
dependence is recovered in the limit of weak selection
(small b). Here, we can write , where isˆ ˆT p T  O(b) T
a constant with respect to the initial frequency of cheaters,
p0. Hence, from a Taylor expansion of equation (13), rel-
ative fitness is given by ; that is, to a2ˆv p 1  Tb  O(b )
first-order approximation, it is independent of the fre-
quency of cheaters.
This model of exponential growth, with an abrupt halt
at a time depending on the population level of coopera-
tion, is unrealistic and pursued only for the sake of analytic
tractability. We now consider a more realistic model de-
scribing logistic growth and competition for resources, in
which a population of cooperators can maintain a higher
cell density than can a population of cheaters. In particular,
we continue to assume an intrinsic growth rate of 1 and
for cooperators and cheaters, respectively, but also1  b
include a density-dependence term in the dynamical equa-
tions describing growth:
dnC p n (1  E ), (15)C, t tdt
dn D p (1  b)n (1  E ), (16)D, t tdt
where the numbers of cooperators and cheaters ( andnC, t
) are expressed as proportions of the total populationn D, t
size that can be maintained at equilibrium (carrying ca-
pacity) if all cells cooperate and isE p n  (1  a)nt C, t D, t
the “effective” population size, in terms of the strain on
resources that slows population growth, where each cheat-
ing individual incurs a strain that is equivalent to that of
cooperators. This reflects the benefit of cooperation1  a
for the population: for , cheaters inflate the effectivea 1 0
size of the population so that, when they are common,
the actual number of cells that can be sustained at sta-
tionary phase is reduced. This model contains nonline-
arities that prevent an analytical treatment, although nu-
merical solutions are possible (fig. 2), and these recover
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the same qualitative results derived above for the simpler
exponential growth model.
Methods
We experimentally tested our prediction that cheater fit-
ness will be negatively correlated with the frequency of
cheaters when population growth increases with cooper-
ator frequency. We minimized the possible effects of struc-
tured populations leading to frequency dependence by car-
rying out growth in a shaken liquid media.
Description of Strains
Three Pseudomonas aeruginosa cooperator-cheater pairs
(A–C) were used in this experiment. Each pair comprised
a cooperator strain (“”), a wild-type isolate that did pro-
duce pyoverdine (pvd), and a cheater strain (“”), a pvd-
defective mutant derived from the cooperator strain, giv-
ing A, A, B, B, C, and C. Specifically, the strains
used were as follows. A: PA01 (strain ATCC15692), a
pvd-producing wild type; A: PAO6609 (Hohnadel et al.
1986), a pvd-negative mutant derived by ultraviolet mu-
tagenesis from methionine auxotroph PAO6409 (Rella et
al. 1985), which in turn was generated by transposon mu-
tagenesis from PA01; B: PA01 (strain ATCC15692), a
pvd-producing wild type, as for A above; B: PA2399,
an unmarked deletion mutant derived from PA01, defec-
tive for the pyoverdine synthetase gene pvdD (Ghysels et
al. 2004); C: a wild type, pvd-producing clone cultured
from UCBPP-PA14, a clinical isolate known to also be
pathogenic in plants and animals (Rahme et al. 1995); C:
a pvd-negative mutant coevolved with C in the labo-
ratory under iron-limiting conditions, which should favor
the spread of spontaneously arising mutants that somehow
avoid the cost of producing siderophores and instead take
up those produced by neighboring bacteria. Both C and
C were isolated from the same overnight culture, which
at that point had been passaged through 19 (daily) serial
transfers, where each transfer entailed the inoculation of
60 mL of overnight culture (incubated at 37C and shaken
at 200 rpm) into 30-mL glass universal vials containing 6
mL fresh medium (CAA; 5 g casamino acids, 1.18g
K2HPO4.3H2O, 0.25g MgSO4.7H20 L
1). Like A and B,
which are known to be pvd-synthesis defective, mature
C colonies also have a pale white appearance, distin-
guishing them from both C and their parent strain,
which appear conspicuously green owing to the presence
of pyoverdine.
Experimental Design
For each strain pair, “” and “” cultures were initiated
from freezer stock and incubated overnight in an orbital
shaker (37C, 200 rpm). For this first stage, strains were
grown in 6 mL standard King’s B (KB) medium in 30-
mL glass universal vials. After 24 h, the cultures were re-
trieved and vortexed for 45 s. For pair A only, pilot data
predicted substantial cell density differences between the
A and A cultures after 24 h growth in KB, so to equal-
ize cell densities in the “” and “” cultures, a volume
of A culture (3.64 mL) was drawn off and replaced with
buffer solution (M9).
By appropriate dilution, we then prepared “treatment”
cultures, mixing “” (cheaters) with “” (cooperators) at
cell density ratios of approximately 1 : 1,000, 1 : 100, 1 : 10,
1 : 1, and 100 : 1. These cultures were supplemented with
buffer (M9) such that each would contain cells at ap-
proximately the same density (∼106 cells/60 mL). For each
of these five treatments, we inoculated six replicate “com-
petition” vials with 60 mL of the prepared mixed cultures:
30-mL universal glass vials containing 6 mL CAA medium,
as described previously, supplemented with 100 mg mL1
human apo-transferrin (an iron chelator) and 20 mM
NaHCO3, necessary for effective chelator activity (Meyer
et al. 1996). The 30 competition vials were then placed in
random order in an orbital shaker for overnight incubation
(37C, 200 rpm).
To assess the initial ratios of cooperators to cheaters in
the inocula, multiple samples were taken and grown on
KB-agar plates, and colony-forming units (CFUs) were
counted and categorized as either “” or “” on the basis
of color and morphology. Similarly, each of the 30 com-
petition cultures, after 24 h of incubation at 37C, was
diluted, spread onto KB-agar plates, and incubated again
overnight for counting. In this way, we obtained data on
the absolute density and relative proportions of “” and
“” CFUs both before and after the competition period.
At each stage, labeling, spreading, and counting of plates
were fully randomized to minimize order effects.
For pairs A and B, a single round of competition was
conducted. In the case of pair C, two rounds were con-
ducted, in each of which a different treatment failed to
yield useful data. The results of both rounds were thus
pooled for combined analysis.
We also carried out a separate experiment to test
whether reducing the period of population growth reduced
the extent of frequency dependence. Using strain pair A,
we simultaneously inoculated two parallel sets of three
treatments, with cheater : cooperator ratios of approxi-
mately 1 : 1,000, 1 : 10, and 100 : 1. Our protocol was iden-
tical to that described above except that, whereas one set
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was cultured for a full 24 h before sampling, the second
set was sampled after just 6 h of incubation.
Statistical Analyses
We performed two types of analyses on data from each of
the three strain pairs. First, we calculated relative cheater
fitness ( ), by comparing the frequency of cheaters at thev
beginning and end of the experiment. Specifically, isv
given by , where x1 is the initialv p x (1  x )/x (1  x )2 1 1 2
proportion of cheaters in the population and x2 is their
final proportion. The value of , therefore, signifiesv
whether cheaters increase in frequency , decrease in(v 1 1)
frequency , or remain at the same frequency(v ! 1) (v p
. We assessed the nature and strength of the relationship1)
between and x1, using standard general linear modelsv
(GLMs), with x1 as the explanatory variable. In each case,
and x1 were first log transformed or, in the case of pairsv
1 and 2, converted to the form to normalizelog (v  1)
the distribution of the residuals, in accordance with the
assumptions of parametric analyses. In the case of pair C,
“round” was included as a blocking factor in the maximal
model but was nonsignificant and so was excluded from
the final model. Second, we quantified productivity (G)
as the final cell density attained by the mixed culture at
the end of the competition period. Again, this was analyzed
with respect to initial cheater frequency, x1, using a stan-
dard GLM. Here again, G was first log transformed to
normalize the distribution of the residuals. All analyses
were performed with Minitab 14.1 (http://www.minitab
.com).
Results
In all three cheater-cooperator pairs, the relative fitness of
cheaters was significantly negatively correlated with initial
cheater frequency (fig. 3A). In all cases, the relationship
was best described by a power function (pair A: v p
, GLM: , , ; pair B:0.4424.200x F p 92.17 df p 1, 28 P ! .0011
, GLM: , ,0.123v p 1.856x F p 11.27 df p 1, 26 P p1
; pair C: , GLM: ,0.176.0024 v p 2.270x F p 37.24 df p1
, ). At low frequencies, cheaters showed higher1, 45 P ! .001
fitness than cooperators, while at high frequencies, cheater
fitness was comparable to—or in the case of pair A, sig-
nificantly lower than—that of cooperators.
For all three strain pairs, productivity of the mixed culture
was significantly negatively correlated with initial cheater
frequency (fig. 3B). In all cases, the relationship was best
described by an exponential function (pair A: G p
, GLM: , , ;8 1.97x13.56 # 10 e F p 74.83 df p 1, 28 P ! .001
pair B: , GLM: ,8 2.38x1G p 2.82 # 10 e F p 75.82 df p
, , pair C: ,2 9 2.13x11, 26 P ! .001 r p 0.70; G p 1.04 # 10 e
GLM: , , ). In cultures initi-F p 139.11 df p 1, 51 P ! .001
ated with a high frequency of cheaters (i.e., the 100 : 1 treat-
ment), productivity was around an order of magnitude
lower than in cultures where cheaters were scarce (i.e., the
1 : 1,000 treatment).
The strength of frequency dependence was reduced
when populations were allowed to grow for shorter periods
of time (fig. 4). In our further experiment with strain pair
A, the population growth was significantly lower in the 6-
h-old cultures than in the 24-h-old cultures (fig. 4B; 24-
h cultures: , 6-h cultures:8 2.779x1G p 1.01 # 10 e G p
; GLM: final ,6 3.824x11.68 # 10 e density # time F p 119.76
, ). The strength of frequency depen-df p 1, 29 P ! .001
dence with respect to cheater relative fitness was also re-
duced over the shorter time period (fig. 4A; 24-h cultures:
, 6-h cultures: ; GLM:0.241 0.036v p 1.303x v p 1.117x1 1
, , ).fitness # time F p 13.06 df p 1, 27 P ! .001
We carried out a number of additional analyses to test
the robustness of our results. First, we considered an al-
ternative measure of productivity: the fold increase in total
cell density over the competition period. These analyses
produced results qualitatively concordant with those pre-
sented here. Second, we considered an alternative ap-
proach for all fitness versus proportion analyses: instead
of regressing x1 against (an expression that itself containsv
x1), we simply regressed the initial odds ratio, x /(1 1
against the final odds ratio, . By this ap-x ) x /(1  x )1 2 2
proach, fitted regression lines with slopes significantly less
than 1 indicate negative frequency dependence. In the first
set of experiments, we found this result for all three strain
pairs (pair A: slope , , ,0.73  0.02 T p 12.30 df p 28s
; pair B: slope , , ,P ! .001 0.93  0.03 T p 2.32 df p 26s
; pair C: slope , , ,P p .029 0.84  0.04 T p 4.33 df p 48s
). In the experiment considering different com-P ! .001
petition periods, only the 24-h cultures showed negative
frequency dependence (24-h cultures: slope ,0.84  0.02
, , ; 6-h cultures: slopeT p 7.68 df p 16 P ! .001 0.97 s
, , , ). Third, we repeated0.03 T p 1.29 df p 14 P p .218s
all analyses using the ratio of cheaters to cooperators (xR)
as the explanatory variable, rather than the proportion of
cheaters in the mixed population (x1), where x pR
. For all three strain pairs, results obtained inx /(1  x )1 1
regressions with xR were qualitatively analogous to those
presented here.
Discussion
In this study, we have determined under what conditions
the production of public goods in microbes will be subject
to frequency-dependent selection. Specifically, we have
shown that if there is strong selection, two sets of con-
ditions can lead to frequency-dependent fitness: (1) when
cooperators acquire more than a random benefit of public
good production—for example, if cooperators tend to be
Figure 3: Relative cheater fitness (A) and mixed-culture productivity (B) as functions of initial cheater frequency for three independent pairs of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa strains. Here, relative fitness is the proportional increase in frequency of cheaters relative to cooperators, and productivity
is the final cell density of the mixed culture after a 24-h competition period. Fitted lines reflect power (A) and exponential regression (B) curves
estimated by least squares.
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Figure 4: Relative cheater fitness (A) and mixed-culture productivity (B) as functions of initial cheater frequency in 6-h cultures (open circles, dotted
regression line) versus 24-h cultures (solid circles, solid regression line). Here, relative fitness is the proportional increase in frequency of cheaters
relative to cooperators, and productivity is the final cell density of the mixed culture at the end of the competition period. Fitted lines reflect power
(A) and exponential (B) regression curves estimated by least squares. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals around the means.
clustered together (population structuring) or if individual
cells have preferential access to the public goods that they
produce (fig. 1); or (2) when increased levels of cooper-
ation lead to greater growth, a higher carrying capacity,
and hence more generations over which cheaters can ex-
ploit cooperators (fig. 2). In both cases, the relative fitness
of cooperators or cheaters is greater when they are less
common. We then explicitly tested the second of these
possibilities (by controlling for the first, population struc-
turing), using the production of iron-scavenging sider-
ophore molecules in Pseudomonas aeruginosa as a model
trait. As predicted, we found a negative relationship be-
tween the relative fitness of cheaters and the proportion
of cheaters in the population (fig. 3A). Furthermore, we
found support for the underlying assumption leading to
this prediction—a higher proportion of cooperation led
to greater growth (fig. 3B), and a reduction in the period
of growth led to a decrease in the extent of frequency
dependence (fig. 4).
Situations Favoring Frequency-Dependent Selection
We have identified two ways in which kin selection models
of public goods dilemmas can generate frequency-depen-
dent selection, given strong selection. First, population
structure, incorporating both limited mixing of cells and
limited diffusion of public goods molecules (local social
interaction) can result in the selective advantage of cheat-
ing decreasing as cheaters become more common. When
populations are structured, the level of public goods avail-
able to an individual will depend on (1) the production
of public goods by that individual and its clonal relatives
and (2) the average level of public goods production in
the population. Increasing population structure increases
the importance of the former and decreases the impor-
tance of the latter. A higher frequency of cheaters will lead
to a lower average level of public goods production (2).
The consequences of this will be greater for cheaters, be-
cause they receive fewer public goods through their own
production and that of their relatives (a). This leads to
the relative fitness of cheaters decreasing with cheater fre-
quency. Second, frequency dependence may also arise
when total population growth increases with the level of
cooperation in the population. If more cooperative pop-
ulations achieve a higher carrying capacity, then more
rounds of growth and division are possible before sta-
tionary phase is reached. The selective benefit of cheating
multiplies with each round of division, so that the relative
fitness of a cheater measured over the period of population
expansion increases with the (initial) frequency of coop-
erators in the population (fig. 2A).
How does our work relate to previous theory? We have
provided some specific cases for the general conclusion that
the generation of frequency-dependent selection relies on
strong selection (Charlesworth 1978; Michod 1982; Toro et
al. 1982; Queller 1984; Nowak and May 1992; Day and
Taylor 1998; Rousset 2004; Jansen and Van Baalen 2006).
The aim of this previous work was to elucidate general
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points, and so scenarios were modeled that do not facilitate
simple application to specific systems such as public goods
production (e.g., two-player games; Queller 1984). An im-
portant exception to this was provided by Dugatkin et al.
(2003), who explicitly considered frequency-dependent se-
lection in microbes. However, Dugatkin et al. (2003) did
not explain how frequency dependence should occur in the
first place—their aim was to address the consequences of
frequency-dependent selection, and so they simply assumed
that it occurred. This is analogous to taking equation (7)
or (13) as a starting point rather than determining how they
should arise. More generally, frequency dependence does
not usually arise from most of social evolution theory be-
cause selection is usually assumed to be weak, to make
analyses more tractable (Hamilton 1964; Taylor and Frank
1996; Frank 1998; Rousset 2004). Frequency dependence
can also arise in models for the evolution of cooperation
that do not rely on kin selection (e.g., reciprocity; Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981).
Frequency-Dependent Selection in Microbes
Frequency-dependent selection can, under certain con-
ditions, prevent cheater takeover and facilitate the coex-
istence of multiple phenotypes (Aviles 2002). However, in
two of the three strain pairs examined in this study, cheat-
ers were at least as fit as cooperators, even when common
(fig. 3A). With such a payoff structure, we may anticipate
that, in time, cheaters would go to fixation in populations
where there is little competition between groups. Consis-
tent with this idea, siderophore-defective strains are rou-
tinely isolated from the lungs of late-stage cystic fibrosis
patients, where they typically grow as monoclonal popu-
lations (Lee et al. 2005; Salunkhe et al. 2005; Smith et al.
2006). On the other hand, in an environment where com-
petition occurs between subpopulations and these sub-
populations contain different proportions of cheaters,
those groups with more cooperators may outcompete
cheater-dominated groups (Griffin et al. 2004). Thus, co-
operation may also be maintained by frequency-dependent
selection at the level of the group.
We suggest that negative frequency dependence should
be common in microbes, because (1) both population
structuring and cooperation-dependent growth rates are
likely to be important in many situations, and (2) mu-
tations can occur that lead to large differences in the level
of cooperation (strong selection; see below). Accordingly,
negative frequency-dependent selection has now been
shown for social cheaters in at least 12 studies on seven
microbial species (Velicer et al. 2000; Vulic and Kolter
2001; Fiegna and Velicer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003;
Turner and Chao 2003; Dugatkin et al. 2005; Brockhurst
et al. 2006; Harrison et al. 2006; MacLean and Gudelj 2006;
Ellis et al. 2007; Gilbert et al. 2007; this study). However,
while we highlight these studies as support for our pre-
diction, we also point out that most did not explicitly test
the underlying assumptions of why frequency dependence
occurs. Ultimately, a range of complementary approaches
is most useful. At one extreme will be studies designed to
reveal those specific mechanisms responsible for frequency
dependence. For example, our aim in this study was to
test one particular mechanism that can lead to frequency
dependence—cooperation-dependent population growth.
In order to do this, we (1) carried out our experiment in
shaken vials, in order to remove the other possible mech-
anism that can lead to frequency-dependent selection—
population structure— and (2) tested the underlying as-
sumption that a higher proportion of cooperators allows
the population to grow to a larger size (fig. 3B). At the
other extreme are studies in more natural conditions that
examine the net consequences of both mechanisms for
generating frequency dependence (e.g., Harrison et al.
2006). An important task for the future is to determine
the relative importance in nature of the two different
mechanisms that we have shown can lead to frequency
dependence.
We observed a decrease in the extent of frequency de-
pendence when the period of time available for growth
was shortened (fig. 4). This supported the assumption of
our model that the relative fitness of cheats increases over
time as the population goes through more rounds of
growth and division. It is possible that other factors could
also cause the relative fitness of cheaters to vary over time.
For example, as the population grows, this could lead to
a decrease in iron availability that reduces the relative fit-
ness of cheaters (Griffin et al. 2004) or a higher population
density that allows cheaters to better exploit cooperators
and hence increases their own relative fitness (Greig and
Travisano 2004; MacLean and Gudelj 2006). However, ef-
fects such as these cannot explain the frequency depen-
dence evident in our data; in order for frequency depen-
dence to be observed, one of the additional factors that
we have suggested would still be required, such as pop-
ulations with greater frequencies of cooperators growing
to higher final densities.
More generally, our study illustrates that, although the
same social evolution theory originally developed for
metazoans can be applied to microbes, certain aspects of
microbial biology mean that some differences may occur
in the evolution of social traits. In particular, with typical
social evolution study organisms, such as insects, birds,
and mammals, it is usually assumed that mutation will
lead to minor variations in behavior (weak selection), and
so frequency dependence will be relatively unimportant
(Sinervo and Lively 1996; Sinervo et al. 2006; Sinervo and
Calsbeek 2006). In contrast, in the case of microbes, single
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or small numbers of mutations can have extremely large
effects on social behaviors (strong selection; Velicer et al.
1998, 2000; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Velicer and Yu 2003;
Foster et al. 2004; Griffin et al. 2004; Fiegna et al. 2006).
For example, in P. aeruginosa, social behaviors such as
siderophore production are routinely and completely lost
from isolates obtained from lung infections (Lee et al.
2005; Salunkhe et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2006). Further-
more, the majority of microbial cooperative behaviors are
controlled by quorum sensing regulatory networks (Keller
and Surette 2006; Venturi 2006; Diggle et al. 2007). Con-
sequently, the disruption of these networks, even through
the loss of a single gene, can have huge effects on the level
of cooperation. A consequence of the potential for mu-
tations of large effects (strong selection) in microbes, is
that this allows frequency-dependent selection, through
the mechanisms we have described in this study.
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Inbreeding is typically detrimental to fitness. However, some animal populations are reported to inbreed without incurring inbreed-
ing depression, ostensibly due to past “purging” of deleterious alleles. Challenging this is the position that purging can, at best,
only adapt a population to a particular environment; novel selective regimes will always uncover additional inbreeding load. We
consider this in a prominent test case: the eusocial naked mole-rat (Heterocephalus glaber), one of the most inbred of all free-living
mammals. We investigated factors affecting mortality in a population of naked mole-rats struck by a spontaneous, lethal coron-
avirus outbreak. In a multivariate model, inbreeding coefficient strongly predicted mortality, with closely inbred mole-rats (F ≥
0.25) over 300% more likely to die than their outbred counterparts. We demonstrate that, contrary to common assertions, strong
inbreeding depression is evident in this species. Our results suggest that loss of genetic diversity through inbreeding may render
populations vulnerable to local extinction from emerging infectious diseases even when other inbreeding depression symptoms
are absent.
KEY WORDS: Coronavirus, disease susceptibility, Heterocephalus glaber, inbreeding depression, purging.
Inbreeding depression, the negative fitness effects of mating
among relatives, has been well documented in laboratory, agricul-
tural, and natural settings (e.g., Charlesworth and Charlesworth
1987; Crnokrak and Roff 1999; Hedrick and Kalinowski 2000;
Keller and Waller 2002). Nonetheless, great variance exists in
the magnitude of inbreeding depression within and among pop-
ulations (e.g., Pray and Goodnight 1995; Lacy and Ballou 1998;
Haag et al. 2003) and some populations, despite high levels of
inbreeding, show little or no evidence of inbreeding depression
(e.g., Keane et al. 1986; Doums et al. 1996; Kalinowski et al.
1999; Visscher et al. 2001; Duarte et al. 2003; Bilde et al. 2005;
Peer and Taborsky 2005; Milot et al. 2007). Such a lack of in-
breeding depression is often attributed to “purging,” the removal
3Present address: Institute of Evolutionary Biology, University of
Edinburgh, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, United Kingdom.
of deleterious alleles by strong selection, during historical peri-
ods of extended inbreeding (Lande and Schemske 1985; Barrett
and Charlesworth 1991). Although there is empirical support for
reduced inbreeding depression with continued inbreeding (e.g.,
Barrett and Charlesworth 1991; McCall et al. 1994; Crnokrak and
Barrett 2002), recent studies, both theoretical (Wang et al. 1999;
Wang 2000; Whitlock 2002; Glémin 2003) and empirical (Bar-
rett and Charlesworth 1991; Ballou 1997; Lacy and Ballou 1998;
Byers and Waller 1999; Crnokrak and Barrett 2002; Boakes et al.
2007), have demonstrated that purging is not always effective.
Alleles that are only deleterious under certain environmental con-
ditions, for example, will only be disfavored by natural selection
when those particular conditions arise (Bijlsma et al. 1999). Even
habitual inbreeders would thus be expected to still harbor alleles
that would be deleterious under some different, novel selection
regime.
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The eusocial naked mole-rat, Heterocephalus glaber, is a
classic example of a habitual inbreeder seemingly impervious to
inbreeding depression; “the only mammal species that has been
shown to undergo continuous close inbreeding with no obvious
effects of inbreeding depression” (Bromham and Harvey 1996).
An early microsatellite study of wild colonies suggested that over
80% of all mating occurs between first-degree relatives (Reeve
et al. 1990)—an unprecedented level of inbreeding among verte-
brates. The lack of inbreeding avoidance and the naked mole-rats’
intense xenophobia (Lacey and Sherman 1991) have been de-
scribed as “mechanisms that apparently minimize the chance of
ever outbreeding” (Jarvis et al. 1994). More recently, however,
some circumstantial evidence has emerged of some latent selec-
tion for outbreeding: O’Riain et al. (1996) and Braude (2000)
demonstrated the existence of rare dispersal morphs, and Clarke
and Faulkes (1999) and Ciszek (2000) demonstrated a weak mat-
ing preference for nonkin. However, in 25 years of intensive study
no overt signs of inbreeding depression have been reported. This
makes the naked mole-rat a particularly interesting case to test the
hypothesis that novel selection regimes may uncover inbreeding
depression.
In this study, we performed a retrospective investigation of
the effects of inbreeding on naked mole-rat mortality through a
spontaneous outbreak of a novel viral pathogen. In doing so, we
uncovered the first evidence of a substantial cost to continuous
close inbreeding in this species.
Methods
STUDY POPULATION
Our population, initiated with wild-caught founders from various
localities in Kenya, has been maintained since 1981 in custom-
built facilities at the University of Cape Town. Husbandry details
have been described previously by Jarvis (1991). Colonies typi-
cally comprised a single breeding pair and up to 55 nonbreeding
relatives of both sexes. In total, our sample comprised 365 animals
in 10 complete colonies: 209 males and 159 females, including
11 and 10 breeders of either sex, respectively. Age and body mass
were known for all animals (age: 5 to 273 months, mean 89.4 ±
60.4 SD; mass: 11.9 to 83.2 g, mean 35.7±12.7 SD). Furthermore,
for each individual, a single dam and sire could be identified with
certainty, on the basis of their distinctive morphologies and behav-
ioral profiles (Clarke and Faulkes 1998). Based on these records,
we constructed a pedigree for each individual (maximum length:
five generations) and used it to estimate a coefficient of inbreed-
ing (F) as per Wright (1922). Our study violates a key assumption
of Wright’s approach, however: that pedigree founders are un-
related. Population genetic studies (Faulkes et al. 1990; Reeve
et al. 1990) suggest that intracolony relatedness is typically very
high in wild naked mole-rats. Thus, here we explicitly assumed
that pedigree founders captured from the same exact locality (i.e.,
same colony) were siblings. Parallel analyses in which founders
were held to be unrelated yielded qualitatively concordant anal-
yses (results not shown). Inbreeding coefficients ranged from
F = 0 (outbred) through to F = 0.5 (highly inbred) with mean
F = 0.163 ± 0.158 SD.
DISEASE OUTBREAK
In September 2002, an emergent strain of virulent enteric coron-
avirus swept unchecked through our captive naked mole-rat study
population, causing acute diarrhea, dehydration, and severe enteric
hemorrhaging. The day of first exposure in each colony was deter-
mined from the first appearance of symptoms (dry, unused toilet
chamber), and in each case, the first deaths were recorded within
two days. Coronaviruses spread easily by faeco-oral or aerosol
transmission (Weiss and Navas-Martin 2005), so we assumed that
all individuals in a colony were exposed to the virus simulta-
neously. No attempts were made to medicate infected animals.
Mortality was monitored daily and dead animals were removed
immediately for identification and confirmation of the presence
of disease symptoms.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
To identify factors affecting survival, we used proportional haz-
ards regressions (Therneau and Grambsch 2002), implemented
with the PHREG procedure (with the TIES = exact option), in
SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). Our data conformed to the as-
sumption of proportional hazards; no evidence of nonproportion-
ality was apparent in the smoothed, scaled Schoenfeld residual
plots (Therneau and Grambsch 2002) and the inclusion of a time-
dependent covariate had a nonsignificant effect (P = 0.09). Model
selection followed the “main-effects first” model-building strat-
egy of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000). Only the effects shown in
Table 1 were entered into the final model; we excluded body mass
as an explanatory variable after preliminary runs showed that its
presence did not significantly improve the model (likelihood ratio
test:  2 = 1.27; P = 0.26). All two- and three-way interaction
terms not shown in Table 1 were excluded in a similar fashion.
Because the 10 colonies were housed in three separate constant
environment rooms, we accounted for possible location effects by
stratifying the final model by “room number,” and nested within
that, “colony.” An unstratified model, however, yielded virtually
identical results. To assess the relative effect of different levels
of inbreeding on survival, we calculated hazard ratios (Therneau
and Grambsch 2002) for F at discrete values. Finally, inbreed-
ing depression was estimated in terms of the number of lethal
equivalents per gamete, calculated as per Kalinowski and Hedrick
(1998).
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Table 1. Factors affecting the probability of death during the coronavirus epizootic.
Variable df Parameter SE  2 P Hazard 95% confidence
estimate ratio limits for hazard ratio
Inbreeding F 1 4.422 1.444 9.379 0.0022 83.295 4.914 1411.805
Age (months) 1 0.006 0.002 8.008 0.0047 1.006 1.002 1.011
Sex 1 0.362 0.179 4.078 0.0434 1.436 1.011 2.041
Breeding status 1 1.012 1.383 0.536 0.4642 2.752 0.183 41.399
Age × Breeding status 1 −0.017 0.006 7.677 0.0056 0.983 0.971 0.995
Sex × Breeding status 1 2.821 1.096 6.624 0.0101 16.789 1.959 143.863
Results
In just eight weeks, acute diarrhea, dehydration, and severe enteric
haemorrhaging associated with the coronavirus killed 161 of 365
animals (44.1%). Survival was significantly lower among more
inbred animals (Fig. 1). Statistically controlling for the effects of
other explanatory variables (Table 1), we found that offspring pro-
duced by half-sibling (F = 0.125) and full-sibling (F = 0.250)
parent pairs were, respectively, 174% and 302% more likely to die
than the offspring of unrelated parents (F = 0). Inbreeding depres-
sion in survival, measured as lethal equivalents, was calculated as
B = 1.13 (95% CI: 0.50–1.81).
Age was also highly significantly correlated with suscepti-
bility, with 10 years of age increasing mortality risk by 212.5%
among nonbreeders (Fig. 2). Sex too was a significant factor, with
females (143.6%) more likely to survive than males. Breeding
status interacted significantly with sex. Queens had high survival
despite their advanced age (eight of 10 survived), whereas only
two of 11 male breeders survived.
Figure 1. Kaplan–Meier plots showing the proportional survival
of highly inbred (F ≥ 0.25) versus outbred and mildly inbred naked
mole-rats (0 ≤ F ≤ 0.125) through the course of the coronavirus
outbreak. Open markers denote censored datapoints. Although
represented categorically here, inbreeding was treated as a con-
tinuous variable for all regression analyses.
Discussion
This study provides the first clear evidence of a substantial cost
to inbreeding in this habitual inbreeder. Inbred naked mole-rats
were significantly more likely to die than their outbred counter-
parts, displaying inbreeding depression of a magnitude similar
to that observed in other captive rodents (naked mole-rats: B =
1.13; other rodents: mean B = 1.15; calculated for n = 7 captive
taxa; Ralls et al. 1988). Note, however, that this estimate of lethal
equivalents does not account for variation in other variables (sex,
age, breeding status) that were found to affect mortality (Table 1),
and may thus be an underestimate. Moreover, this figure does
not account for Allee effects associated with the obligate social
lifestyle of naked mole-rats. In the wild, naked mole-rat colonies
persist under harsh environmental conditions because the coop-
erative efforts of multiple foragers enable them to exploit patchy
food resources. The loss of 87% of the workforce (as we observed
in one colony) would almost certainly lead to local extinction of
a wild colony. Thus, the true costs of inbreeding in the wild may
well be higher than the estimates presented here.
Figure 2. Comparison of selected variables’ effects on the risk of
death during the coronavirus epizootic. These values are derived
from hazard ratio estimates generated by the proportional hazards
model and reflect the change in likelihood of death following a
given change of a predictor variable from its base condition (i.e., 0
for continuous variables, females in the case of sex). Age and sex
effect estimates shown here apply to nonbreeders only.
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Mechanistically, inbreeding increases homozygosity, leaving
inbred individuals with lower genetic diversity than their outbred
counterparts. There is much interest in the relationship between
host genetic diversity (at key loci such as the major histocom-
patibility complex, as well as more generally in the genome) and
resistance to parasites and disease (O’Brien and Evermann 1988;
Hamilton et al. 1990; Hedrick 1994). The results of this study aug-
ment mounting evidence from a broad range of taxa that reduced
genetic diversity, as can arise through inbreeding, is associated
with increased susceptibility to infection (O’Brien et al. 1985;
Black 1992; Carrington et al. 1999; Coltman et al. 1999; Meagher
1999; Schmid-Hempel and Crozier 1999; Cassinello et al. 2001;
Hedrick et al. 2001; Messaoudi et al. 2002; Acevedo-Whitehouse
et al. 2003; McClelland et al. 2003; Reid et al. 2003; Spielman
et al. 2004; Wegner et al. 2004; Hawley et al. 2005; Calleri et al.
2006; Whiteman et al. 2006; Luong et al. 2007; Reid et al. 2007;
Seeley and Tarpy 2007).
Our secondary findings, that susceptibility increased with
age and was higher in males, both conform to established theory.
Immune responsiveness is known to decline with age in various
taxa (Adamo et al. 2001; Linton and Dorshkind 2004), with a
range of symptoms including a marked decline in T-cell produc-
tion. Similarly, a male bias in susceptibility is a well-documented
phenomenon (Klein 2000), and in vertebrates is hypothesized to
result at least in part from the immunosuppressive burden of testos-
terone (Folstad and Karter 1992). Our data provide circumstantial
support for this hypothesis, in that breeding males, which typi-
cally show highly elevated testosterone levels (Clarke and Faulkes
1998), were especially vulnerable to the virus. The high survival
among queens was unexpected, but may also have been partially
hormone driven: glucocorticoid stress hormones, also known to
be immunosuppressive (Sapolsky 1992), are typically lower in
naked mole-rat queens than in other colony members, except dur-
ing pregnancy (Faulkes and Abbott 1997). At such times stress
hormone levels are elevated, most likely in response to acute ener-
getic stress (Råberg et al. 1998), and immune function is typically
impaired (e.g., Nordling et al. 1998) Accordingly, of four mole-
rat queens pregnant at the onset of the infection, two aborted and
survived, whereas the two that carried their pups to full term suc-
cumbed to the virus. Other potential sources of energetic stress,
and hence immunosuppression, such as differences in nutritional
status (Gershwin et al. 1985), workload (Deerenberg et al. 1997),
or thermoregulatory burden (Nelson and Demas 1996), are un-
likely to have contributed substantially to these results because all
animals had lifelong access to ad libitum food and lived in a finely
regulated physical environment.
In this study, we have demonstrated that inbreeding is associ-
ated with increased susceptibility to a viral epidemic in a habitual
close inbreeder, ostensibly free from other inbreeding depression
effects. These results have important implications for our under-
standing of animal populations with reduced genetic variability.
Inbred individuals may remain more vulnerable to emergent in-
fectious diseases than their outbred counterparts, despite exten-
sive purging of the background genetic load. Thus, assessment
of inbreeding depression in the absence of severe disease out-
breaks may dramatically underestimate the true fitness costs of
inbreeding.
More generally, our results emphasize that purging cannot
remove deleterious alleles unless these alleles are exposed to se-
lection (Bijlsma et al. 1999). Alleles temporarily “hidden” from
selection, such as those conferring susceptibility to novel or rare
diseases, may accumulate over time without negatively affecting
fitness. However, when an appropriate pathogen is ultimately en-
countered, these alleles may start to strongly affect fitness and thus
will be exposed to selection. Our finding of increased mortality
among inbred mole-rats during a coronavirus outbreak reflects
such purging in action.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank J. U. M. Jarvis for pedigree records and H. Kokko and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions. Financial support was pro-
vided to JOR by the South African National Research Foundation. This
research adhered to the Animal Behavior Society Guidelines for the Use
of Animals in Research, the legal requirements of the country in which
the work was carried out, and all institutional guidelines.
LITERATURE CITED
Acevedo-Whitehouse, K., F. Gulland, D. Greig, and W. Amos. 2003. Disease
susceptibility in California sea lions. Nature 422:35.
Adamo, S. A., M. Jensen, and M. Younger. 2001. Changes in lifetime immuno-
competence in male and female Gryllus texensis (formerly G. integer):
trade-offs between immunity and reproduction. Anim. Behav. 62:417–
425.
Ballou, J. D. 1997. Ancestral inbreeding only minimally affects inbreeding
depression in mammalian populations. J. Hered. 88:169–178.
Barrett, S. C. H., and D. Charlesworth. 1991. Effects of a change in the level
of inbreeding on the genetic load. Nature 352:522–524.
Bijlsma, R., J. Bundgaard, and W. F. Van Putten. 1999. Environmental depen-
dence of inbreeding depression and purging in Drosophila melanogaster.
J. Evol. Biol. 12;1125–1137.
Bilde, T., Y. Lubin, D. Smith, J. M. Schneider, and A. A. Maklakov. 2005. The
transition to social inbred mating systems in spiders: role of inbreeding
tolerance in a subsocial predecessor. Evolution 59:160–174.
Black, F. L. 1992. Why did they die? Science 258:1739–1740.
Boakes, E. H., J. Wang, and W. Amos. 2007. An investigation of inbreed-
ing depression and purging in captive pedigreed populations. Heredity
98:172–182.
Braude, S. 2000. Dispersal and new colony formation in wild naked-mole-
rats: evidence against inbreeding as the system of mating. Behav. Ecol.
11:7–12.
Bromham, L., and P. H. Harvey. 1996. Naked mole-rats on the move. Curr.
Biol. 6:1082–1083.
Byers, D., and D. M. Waller. 1999. Do plant populations purge their genetic
load? Effects of population size and mating history on inbreeding de-
pression. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 30:479–513.
EVOLUTION SEPTEMBER 2007 2271
BRIEF COMMUNICATION
Calleri, D. V. II, E. M. Reid, R. B. Rosengaus, E. L. Vargo, and J. F. A.
Traniello. 2006. Inbreeding and disease resistance in a social insect:
effects of heterozygosity on immunocompetence in the termite Zooter-
mopsis angusticollis. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 273:2633–2640.
Carrington, M., G. W. Nelson, M. P. Martin, T. Kissner, D. Vlahov, J. J. Goed-
ert, R. Kaslow, S. Buchbinder, K. Hoots, and S. O’Brien. 1999. HLA and
HIV-1: heterozygote advantage and B∗35-Cw∗04 disadvantage. Science
283:1748–1752.
Cassinello, J., M. Gomendio, and E. R. S. Roldan. 2001. Relationship between
coefficient of inbreeding and parasite burden in endangered gazelles.
Conserv. Biol. 15:1171–1174.
Charlesworth, D., and B. Charlesworth. 1987. Inbreeding depression and its
evolutionary consequences. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 18:237–268.
Ciszek, D. 2000. New colony formation in the “highly inbred” eusocial naked
mole-rat: outbreeding is preferred. Behav. Ecol. 11:1–6.
Clarke, F. M., and C. G. Faulkes. 1998. Hormonal and behavioural correlates
of male dominance and reproductive status in captive colonies of the
naked mole-rat, Heterocephalus glaber. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 265:1391–
1399.
———. 1999. Kin discrimination and female mate choice in the naked mole-
rat Heterocephalus glaber. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 266:1995–2002.
Coltman, D. W., J. G. Pilkington, J. A. Smith, and J. M. Pemberton. 1999.
Parasite-mediated selection against inbred soay sheep in a free-living,
island population. Evolution 53:1259–1267.
Crnokrak, P., and S. C. H. Barrett. 2002. Purging the genetic load: a review of
the experimental evidence. Evolution 56:2347–2358.
Crnokrak, P., and D. A. Roff. 1999. Inbreeding depression in the wild. Heredity
83:260–270.
Deerenberg, C., V. Apanius, S. Daan, and N. Bos. 1997. Reproductive effort
decreases antibody responsiveness. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 264:1021–
1029.
Doums, C., F. Viard, A. F. Pernot, B. Delay, and P. Jarne. 1996. Inbreeding de-
pression, neutral polymorphism, and copulatory behavior in freshwater
snails: a self-fertilization syndrome. Evolution 50:1908–1918.
Duarte, L. C., C. Bouteiller, P. Fontanillas, E. Petit, and N. Perrin. 2003.
Inbreeding in the greater white-toothed shrew, Crocidura russula. Evo-
lution 57:638–645.
Faulkes, C. G., and D. H. Abbott. 1997. The physiology of a reproduc-
tive dictatorship: regulation of male and female reproduction by a sin-
gle breeding female in colonies of naked mole-rats. Pp. 302–334 in
N. G. Solomon and J. A. French, eds. Cooperative breeding in mam-
mals. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK.
Faulkes, C. G., D. H. Abbott, and A. L. Mellor. 1990. Investigation of genetic
diversity in wild colonies of naked mole-rats (Heterocephalus glaber)
by DNA fingerprinting. J. Zool. Lond. 221:87–97.
Folstad, I., and A. J. Karter. 1992. Parasites, bright males, and the immuno-
competence handicap. Am. Nat. 139:603–622.
Gershwin, M. E., R. S. Beach, and L. S. Hurley. 1985. Nutrition and immunity.
Academic Press, Orlando, FL.
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Meerkats
Adin Ross-Gillespie  
and Ashleigh S. Griffin
What is a meerkat? Meerkats 
(Suricata suricatta) are small 
(<1 kg) mongooses found in 
arid regions of southern Africa. 
They feed mainly on insects, 
arachnids and small vertebrates, 
and spend much of their time 
digging in the sand in pursuit of 
their prey. Unlike many other small 
mammals in such environments, 
meerkats are strictly diurnal. By 
night, they shelter in elaborate 
burrow systems; at dawn they 
emerge to roam their territories, 
which may extend for several 
square kilometres and encompass 
dozens of overnight burrows 
and hundreds of emergency 
‘bolt-holes’ that provide refuge 
from predators such as eagles or 
jackals.
What kind of a name is 
‘meerkat’ anyway? Meerkatzen 
is the Germanic name for 
Cercopithecine monkeys, which 
in turn probably derives from the 
Sanskrit for monkey — markata. 
Presumably, to the explorers that 
first described meerkats, their 
appearance and/or behaviour was 
reminiscent of monkeys. So now 
you know. 
Is Timon from Disney’s The Lion 
King a fair representation of a 
meerkat? Not really… In the wild, 
a solitary meerkat is a rare and 
typically short-lived phenomenon; 
indeed, the single most striking 
thing about meerkats is that they 
are highly social animals. They 
live year-round in tight-knit groups 
of up to 40 individuals presided 
over by a dominant female and a 
dominant male who fathers most 
of the litters born in the group. 
What’s so special about meerkat 
sociality? Meerkats exhibit a 
rich repertoire of cooperative 
behaviours. Observe a group of 
meerkats at their burrow at the 
end of a day’s foraging, and you’ll see piles of individuals huddling 
together for warmth and grooming 
one another. You may also see 
digging teams working together 
to maintain the tunnels of their 
burrow. By day, while the group 
forages, individuals take turns to 
stand guard atop nearby bushes 
or termite mounds. These sentries 
scan the sky and surroundings 
and signal to the group at the first 
sign of approaching danger. When 
rivals are encountered, meerkat 
groups band together to defend 
their territories, and the crucially 
important burrows they contain. 
At other times, they mob together 
to ward off larger predators, such 
as cobras. Cooperation is most 
striking, however, when it comes 
to rearing young. The matriarch 
produces most of the group’s 
offspring, but raising these pups 
is a responsibility shared by all 
group members. For the first 
month, helpers babysit pups at 
the burrow, losing up to 11% of 
their body mass in the process. 
Older females may even suckle the 
young. Later, when the pups begin 
to forage with the group, helpers 
provision them with a large share 
of the prey that they manage to 
find.
Is life as a meerkat a Utopian 
idyll? In meerkats, as in our 
own society, cooperation is 
seldom to be found without its ugly twin, conflict. Throughout 
the day, foragers frequently 
attempt to steal prey items 
from one another, but the most 
serious conflicts occur over who 
gets to breed. Males from rival 
groups, prospecting for receptive 
females, are often attacked by 
resident males, and dominant 
males jealously guard their mates 
during oestrus. Competition for 
dominance is fierce: a coup d’état 
is always a threat, and a regime 
of bullying is necessary to keep 
order in the ranks. If a subordinate 
female falls pregnant, she risks a 
brutal beating, or worse, expulsion 
from the safety of the group. Even 
if she does manage to stay until 
giving birth, her newborn pups 
may well be killed by the dominant 
female. 
Why do meerkats cooperate? 
Social evolution theory would 
suggest that meerkat cooperation 
may largely be down to high 
levels of genetic relatedness: by 
helping to raise the offspring of 
relatives, individuals indirectly 
transmit copies of their own 
genes. In meerkats, however, this 
is not a complete explanation, 
because unrelated immigrants 
may help just as much as other 
group members. Research 
suggests that, in the harsh 
environment in which meerkats 




function of the 
cerebral cortex
Stewart Shipp
The grey matter of the cerebral 
cortex is a convoluted, layered 
sheet of tissue, 2–3 millimetres 
thick in man but with a surface 
area of several hundred square 
centimetres. This is not an 
adaptation to promote gaseous 
exchange, or heat loss — rather, 
if the grey matter is compact in at 
least one dimension, it is outgoing 
axons that may readily escape it; 
once outside, they club together 
and form the cortical white matter. 
If grey and white were intermixed, 
the average separation of neurons 
would be greater, creating extra 
neural ‘wiring’. The speed of 
cortical computation would suffer 
accordingly.
The principle of economic 
wiring can also be invoked to 
account for regional specialisation 
of function across the surface 
area of the cortex. Put simply, 
neurons performing similar roles 
need to communicate, and do so 
more efficiently if nearby. When 
microelectrodes were first used for 
cortical recordings, an immediate 
discovery was that neurons in 
a radial column — a column 
perpendicular to the plane of 
layering — shared similar response 
properties: their receptive fields 
might all be located on the same 
patch of skin, or be selective for 
the same orientation of a contour 
at a certain location in the image 
on the retina. Moving tangentially 
through the sheet (parallel with the 
plane of layering) the discovery 
was that neighbouring columns 
have neighbouring receptive 
fields — the ensemble of columns 
ultimately giving rise to a cortical 
map of the relevant sensory 
surface. In sensory cortex, this 
engenders the ‘one map, one 
area’ principle for parcelling the 
cortical surface into discrete 
areas, each of which is thought to 
have some nuance of functional 
Primerlarger the better — is absolutely vital. Without sentries, meerkats 
cannot feed safely; without 
helpers, they cannot breed 
successfully; without strength 
in numbers, they cannot hold 
territory. Through cooperation, 
individuals can increase the size 
and success of their group, and 
in so doing, improve their own 
individual prospects for survival 
and reproduction.
Do all meerkats help equally? 
No, research has shown that the 
amount of help provided typically 
depends on the ability to help: 
well-fed individuals are more 
likely to expend energy for the 
benefit of others. But this is not 
to say that meerkats simply help 
indiscriminately. Female helpers, 
for example, preferentially feed 
female pups — probably because 
these pups, being the philopatric 
sex, represent the future 
workforce that might one day help 
to raise the helpers’ own litters. 
How is it that we know so much 
about meerkats? Meerkats’ 
striking sociability and their 
tendency to become habituated to 
the presence of human observers, 
make them eminently tractable 
model organisms for investigations 
into the evolution of social 
behaviour. A large- scale, long- term 
field study of meerkats in the 
southern Kalahari was initiated 
in 1993 by Tim Clutton- Brock 
of the University of Cambridge. 
This project, involving hundreds 
of thousands of man- hours of 
detailed behavioural observations 
coupled with long- term pedigree 
and life-history information has 
provided a wealth of data on 
cooperative breeding behaviour 
and constitutes the best database 
of such information that exists 
today for social mammals.
What else have we learned 
from meerkats? Apart from 
serving as a model for the 
evolution of cooperation, 
the Kalahari meerkats have 
provided unique opportunities 
for research in other areas of 
biology too. Through observation 
and experiments, Marta Manser 
and her group at the University 
of Zurich have ‘decoded’ many of the 30 or so calls, 
and the numerous postures, 
displays and olfactory signals 
that meerkats use. This work 
extends our understanding of 
animal communication and 
cognition. For example, meerkat 
alarm calls, which categorise 
threats according to both class 
and urgency, exhibit a level 
of complexity more typically 
associated with humans. Other 
behavioural studies have used 
meerkats to investigate why 
animals play, and recently they 
were used to neatly demonstrate 
that animals can, and do, 
actively teach their young. On 
the ecological front, meanwhile, 
meerkats have provided insight 
into the demographics, dispersal, 
and population genetics of 
social carnivores. For instance, 
long-term population data 
clearly demonstrate the “Allee 
effect”: if meerkat group sizes 
fall too low, recruitment tails 
off rapidly and local population 
crashes can ensue. Finally, at a 
physiological level, meerkats are 
helping us to better understand 
the energetics, endocrinology 
and thermoregulation of small 
desert- adapted mammals. 
Where can I learn more about 
meerkats?
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